

THE BIBLICAL REVIEW

QUARTERLY

Vol. II.

JULY, 1917

No. 3

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL: THE SUMMER NUMBER

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD *James H. Snowden*

THE TASK OF THE MODERN APOLOGIST . *Louis Matthews Sweet*

HEAD AND HEART *H. C. G. Moule*

CHRISTIAN HISTORY IN RELATION TO THE ART OF PAINTING
T. H. Wright

STOICISM AND CHRISTIANITY *E. G. Sihler*

EXEGETICAL OUTLINES: PAUL'S USE OF ΚΑΤΑΠΕΩ
James Coffin Stout

COLLATERAL READINGS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SUNDAY SCHOOL
LESSONS

LITERARY REVIEWS

The Biblical Review

QUARTERLY

PUBLISHED BY THE
BIBLE TEACHERS TRAINING SCHOOL

GILBERT W. WHITE, *Editor*

ROBERT M. KURTZ, *Managing Editor*

Associate Editors:

JAMES S. GALE, for Korea

JOSHUA C. GARRITT, for China

MUEL M. ZWEMER, for the Near East

JULIUS RICHTER, for Germany

*The general diffusion of the Bible is the most effectual way
to civilize and humanize mankind.*—CHANCELLOR KENT.

Vol. II.

JULY, 1917

No. 3

CONTENTS

EDITORIAL:	PAGE
THE SUMMER NUMBER.....	325
THE PERSONALITY OF GOD. JAMES H. SNOWDEN.....	330
THE TASK OF THE MODERN APOLOGIST. LOUIS MATTHEWS SWEET	369
HEAD AND HEART. H. C. G. MOULE.....	386
CHRISTIAN HISTORY IN RELATION TO THE ART OF PAINTING. T. H. WRIGHT.....	396
STOICISM AND CHRISTIANITY. E. G. SIHLER.....	420
EXEGETICAL OUTLINES:	
PAUL'S USE OF KATAPTEQ. JAMES COFFIN STOUT.....	447
COLLATERAL READINGS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SUN- DAY SCHOOL LESSONS.....	453
LITERARY REVIEWS	457

THE SUBSCRIPTION PRICE OF THE BIBLICAL REVIEW IS ONE
DOLLAR a year, prepaid in American territory, in Canada, Mexico, and
Hawaii. For all other countries, add thirty cents postage. Single
copies, thirty cents. Receipt of subscription is indicated on the wrapper.

REMITTANCES should be sent by draft on New York, Express Order,
Money Order, payable to THE BIBLICAL REVIEW.

CHANGE OF ADDRESS—For change, give both old and new addresses.

Address: THE BIBLICAL REVIEW
41 LEXINGTON AVENUE - - - NEW YORK, N. Y.

Entered as second-class matter, December 17, 1912, at the Post Office at
New York, New York, under the Act of August 24, 1912.
Copyright, 1917, by Bible Teachers Training School

BIBLE TEACHERS TRAINING SCHOOL

WILBERT W. WHITE, President

It is a Divinity School, evangelical, interdenominational, and intervocational, designed for the training of ministers and other Christian leaders and workers.

Having a Revised Charter, granted by the Board of Regents of the University of the State of New York, which provides for the conferring of degrees.

Governed by an interdenominational Board of Trustees.

Conducting the following group of Schools:

- A School of Theology (with a three years course).
- A School of Pedagogy (with a three years course).
- A School of Missions (with a two years course).
- A School for Bible Teachers (with a two years course).
- A School for Graduates and for Special Students.

In all of these the Organizing Discipline is the study of the Bible in the student's mother-tongue, as the most important part of training for any kind of Christian activity.

The general standards and principles of the institution may be gathered from this statement concerning its School of Theology

In the School of Theology the courses of study extend through three years. The Biblio-centric curriculum has been framed with the college graduate in mind.

In accordance with the organizing principle of the School as a whole, the basis of training is direct, intensive and comprehensive study of the Bible in the mother-tongue. However, the curriculum includes a due proportion of study in the usual correlated departments of theological training

Of the 1,384 required hours in the School of Theology 589, or a little less than one-half, are devoted to direct systematic, progressive Bible study. In addition to the required hours, 104 hours must be elected, making 1,488 hours in all.

Condensation and effectiveness in presentation have been carefully studied, so that the enlarged place given to Bible study may not impair the efficiency of other disciplines

Some of the lecturers on Homiletics are: Dr. D. J. Burrell, Dr. J. M. Farrar, Dr. C. L. Goodell, and Dr. Cornelius Woelfkin.

Graduates are now in the ministry of over twelve denominations.

Having a clearly non-sectarian, interdenominational, and evangelical basis; carefully guarding against conscious bias and unnecessary antagonisms.

Avoiding the exploiting of negation, but standing for fundamentals in Biblical knowledge, and giving constant prominence to the great abiding spiritual forces, such as the reality and efficacy of prayer, the saving work of the risen and living Christ, and the influence and power of the Spirit and Word of God.

Employing the most approved educational methods.

Directing a special department for the training of workers among Italians, which has sent out into this important field fifty-eight ordained ministers of various denominations and seventy trained lay workers. These ministers have organized thirty-two Italian churches and missions.

Developing an Extension Department which enrolled in the year 1916-1917 1,685 regular students.

Having a supervised Practical Work Department in which during the year 1916-1917 about three hundred and twenty-five appointments were filled by students weekly.

Publishing THE BIBLICAL REVIEW, quarterly, which has a circulation among leading Christian scholars and workers throughout the world.

Affording also the great cultural advantages of a cosmopolitan company of students, representing (1916-1917) eighteen denominations, sixteen countries, thirty-seven states of the Union, and eighty-six universities and colleges.

Possessing a carefully selected working Library of over ten thousand volumes in charge of a professional Librarian and staff.

With a Faculty of fourteen members who give full time to the work, together with a representative corps of special lecturers.

Officially endorsed and signally honored as a model by the Flanking School of Theology, the Foochow Union Theological School, and the Pierson Memorial Bible School, of Seoul, Korea.

Officially approved by two denominations in the home land as the training center for their ministry.

CATALOGUE AND OTHER LITERATURE SENT ON APPLICATION
BIBLE TEACHERS TRAINING SCHOOL
41 LEXINGTON AVENUE NEW YORK

Christianity alone of all religions claims to be founded, not on feeling or fancy, but on Fact and Truth.

DEAN STANLEY.

THE BIBLICAL REVIEW

QUARTERLY

Vol. II.

JULY, 1917

No. 3

EDITORIAL

THE SUMMER NUMBER

ONE of the chief difficulties in dealing with a theme of vast magnitude and importance is that the writer is apt to become lost in the mazes of his own argument. One's sense of direction, both logical and philosophical, must be sure if he is to succeed in an endeavor to lay out a path for others where many have already gone astray. We have on several occasions presented in these pages the ripe work of the specialist in the form of a comprehensive view of some great field of human thought or experience. The purpose has been to enable the reader who has little time himself for exhaustive research to possess in brief but satisfactory form the essentials of the matter under discussion. In this issue we publish the first part of Dr. Snowden's admirable discussion of the supreme subject, The Personality of God. While this article is a model of clearness in its arrangement as well as in its literary style, the author has nevertheless felt that it would be an aid to the reader if a synopsis of his treatment of the theme were given in the form of a table of contents. A glance at

this table will indicate the orderly structure of the argument. It has been thought best to divide it for publication in serial form, but we believe this will not break its force. Such a discussion might well be put into the hands of those who have persuaded themselves that they are agnostics, while its solid conclusions will come with renewed force and comforting assurance to the believer.

It has been said that what people want are definite facts. To a great extent this is not true. Folks in general want—what they want. Facts are not only stubborn things—they are very frequently most unwelcome. Probably all of the numerous “isms” that have sprung up in late years to vex and mislead our age would be found, in the last analysis, to have issued from the desires, ambitions, prejudices, and dreams of men. They are not the offspring of reality, but retain in many instances the weak, morbid, weird or even grotesque lineaments of their human progenitors. In his present paper, *The Task of the Modern Apologist*, Dr. Sweet places the emphasis upon the vital necessity of dealing with facts. Truth, he says, not Origen, won the debate between Origen and Celsus. However, it is too often the man who wins, not truth. The pleasing orator, not the sober reasoner, sways the mob. Too much of our ostensibly apologetic deliverances have been of the rhetorical rather than the logical type. The flaming utterances of many “defenders” of the faith have only masked their own fears as to the outcome of a quiet inquiry into their reasons for believing. We are living in a scientific age, and science is but the discovery and orderly use of facts. If the things of revelation are true they will respond to the rational powers which the Creator has given man.

the Scriptures appeal to rational faith, not to superstitious credulity. Hence, as Dr. Sweet says, Christianity is to be vindicated "as the most reasonable hypothesis to explain undoubted facts."

How far can we trust the "head" alone, as distinguished from the "heart," in our study of the Scriptures? In the course of his paper, *Head and Heart*, Bishop Moule presents a strong reminder of the very real and practical value of the witness of the heart in matters where too often the testimony of the head is given almost or quite the only attention. In his usual gentle and conciliatory spirit he presses the claims of the heart as often the only possible interpreter of the problems involved in the comprehension of the Scriptures. Without any disparagement of the intellectual powers, we are given a clear conception of the infinite importance of spiritual insight. Though his article is comparatively brief its aid in clearing our vision and strengthening our powers for seizing upon the highest truths makes it of particular worth.

"At the present day we have arrived at the point of being able to build up scientifically the theory of the early ages" is the rather presumptuous sentence with which the noted French literary critic, Loliee, opens his *History of Comparative Literature*. A more common formula would be that we now have the past ages in perspective. It is not enough, however, to have the materials for the task of a historical critic; one must have a sympathetic grasp of their meaning. Most of our readers have already recognized, in the author of the essays we have published upon *Christian History in Relation to the Art of Painting*, the mind of a discriminating master of his subject. Mr. Wright is

a discerning student, no mere chronicler of the names and times of men or compiler of their works. In his present article, covering the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, we have the vital and spiritual elements in art strongly brought into relief. More than ever are we led to know how much of what men do and think and express is but the flowering out in individuals of the great inward forces of human history. It is only by applying for a long time a mind singularly adapted to its task that "one has arrived at the point of being able to build up scientifically"—and philosophically and spiritually—a comprehensive interpretation of one of humanity's noblest modes of expressing its finer emotions and sentiments.

A word of warning is often as unwelcome as it is important. Nobody likes to have his idols overthrown, and one reason is that when human nature has once come to a conclusion it dislikes to reopen the case. One of the present hindrances to the effectiveness of evangelical Christianity is the tendency to emphasize the value of high moral principle and conduct, at the expense of the attention due to sin and reconciliation with God through Christ. This attitude on the part of persons of culture naturally results in putting the classic moral philosophers in a very favorable light. The good things the latter have said are so magnified as to hide the insufficiency of their systems of thinking. In his paper, *Stoicism and Christianity*, Dr. Sihler continues to show forth the spiritual failure of classic civilization, which he discussed in a recent number. A glance will show the care requisite for the compilation of the evidence necessary to determine the spiritual and moral status of the great moralists of the past. Such a marshalling of quotations unavoidably gives the

article an almost forbidding appearance, but its value lies in this very presentation of proofs of the writer's view rather than mere generalities, however attractively handled. It becomes a magazine of ammunition for those who have occasion to indicate the failure of human philosophy to point the way to spiritual freedom.

It would be a serious error to seek to give the impression that one must understand the original languages in order to know his Bible proficiently and to use it profitably. Moreover, knowledge of Hebrew and Greek, however thorough, cannot take the place of that study which is marked by a sympathetic appreciation of the very inwardness of a book, chapter or passage, and which continually looks for help from the Spirit who inspired the message. At the same time it would be a mistake to ignore the wealth of meaning that is to be derived from the study of the original text in the case of important words and phrases. Only those who have had much experience in the study of languages realize the difficulties that confront the translator in his efforts to find satisfactory equivalents for each idiom, synonym, and subtle expression. Yet, unless these values are preserved, the full richness and force of an utterance are obscured or even lost. There seems to be a place for the department of exegetical studies which we open in this issue. The aim will be to give various studies by specialists in the original texts, in such form as shall suggest profitable lines of thought in the making of sermons. Professor Whitout gives us here a brief outline study of one of Paul's favorite verbs. It is the intention to avoid anything resembling exhaustive discussion here, but rather to furnish the reader with the practical results of such research.

THE PERSONALITY OF GOD

By JAMES H. SNOWDEN, D. D., Professor of Systematic Theology in
Western Theological Seminary, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

CONTENTS

- I. INTRODUCTION.
 - 1. Importance of the subject.
 - 2. Means and methods of solving the problem.
 - 3. The conclusion one of probability.
 - 4. Our belief in God is constitutional.
- II. PERSONALITY IN MAN.
 - 1. The first reality we know is the soul.
 - 2. This reality is personal spirit.
 - 3. The complexity of the soul.
 - 4. The soul is subject to degrees and growth.
- III. THE PASSAGE FROM MAN TO GOD.
 - 1. Human personality is a part and product of the world.
 - 2. The Cause of personality in man must be a personal Power.
- IV. THE WITNESS OF THE WORLD OF NATURE TO THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.
 - 1. The world discloses intelligence.
 - 2. It is a manifestation of sensibility.
 - 3. It manifests will.
 - 4. The universe thus manifests a vast if not an infinite Person.
- V. THE WITNESS OF RELIGION TO THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.
 - 1. The witness of the moral nature of man.
 - 2. The witness of the religious nature of man.
- VI. THE WITNESS OF CHRISTIAN REVELATION.
 - 1. The personality of God as revealed in the Hebrew people.
 - 2. The witness of Jesus to the personality of God.
 - 3. The Christian doctrine of the Trinity.
- VII. TENTATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.
 - 1. The analogy of human to divine personality.
 - 2. The processes of the Divine Mind in thought, sensibility, and will.

3. Trinity in unity in the divine personality.
4. Philosophical views of the divine personality.

II. OBJECTIONS TO THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.

1. Agnosticism asserts that we cannot know ultimate reality.
 - (1) Yet agnosticism knows much about its Unknowable.
 - (2) Agnosticism is equally fatal to all knowledge.
 - (3) The mind is a limited but true organ of knowledge.
 - (4) We can therefore know God in a finite degree.
2. The allegation that personality is a limitation.
 - (1) The alleged limitations of self and not-self and of subject and object.
 - (2) Personality is not a limitation but an enormous power.
 - (3) The reasoning of Lotze and Bowne on divine personality.

III. ALTERNATIVES TO THE PERSONALITY OF GOD.

1. Deterministic monism.
 - (1) The theory provides no origin for its system.
 - (2) It cannot account for ascent in evolution.
 - (3) It violates our sense of freedom and responsibility.
2. Pantheism.
 - (1) One eternal Substance in evanescent manifestations.
 - (2) Insurmountable difficulties of the doctrine.
 - (3) Its practical consequences.
 - (4) The dread specter of the pantheistic Absolute.

X. THE VALUE OF PERSONALITY.

1. Personality the supreme worth in our human world.
2. Personality the only adequate explanation of the universe.
3. Personality is the only true and worthy view of God.
4. The divine personality is the only explanation and guarantee of human personality.
5. The personality of God affords the only complete satisfaction of all our needs.

I. INTRODUCTION

1. The question of the personality of God is one of fundamental importance. Our answer to it will frame our conception of God, of His character and worth and relation to the world; shape our view of the universe; determine the reality and worth of our own personality; measure all our values; decide character and destiny; and underlie all our psychology, ethics, economics, sociology, politics, science, philosophy, and religion. As this central, sovereign Personality of the universe stands or falls will all finite personalities and worths abide or wither.

It is therefore no remote, abstract question or curious speculation we are considering, but one that comes home to our business and bosoms and enters into every drop of blood in our veins. Decide it negatively, and everything goes down in the market; not an acre of ground or a steel beam, much more will not a human soul, be worth as much as before. Decide it positively, and everything goes up in value; all our goods will be enhanced and human life will be enormously raised in rank and crowned with permanent worth. The question is now a burning one in our popular thought and life and has got out into the street and market, and more and more it will shape and color our character and conduct and our whole civilization.

2. A word may be said as to the means and methods of solving the problem, and as to the degree of assurance we may have in the result reached. It might seem that the question is so vast and runs so far beyond all our faculties that it is impossible for us to solve it or to get any probable or possible light upon it, and that all our thinking about it is only fanciful and futile speculation. One quick solution of the problem

the agnostic answer, that our very faculties are incapable of reaching or catching any glimpse of the nature of God, and that we are hopelessly shut up within our own finite limitations of impotence. But our minds are made to think about big things, and the very heavens cannot set bounds to our faculties; and, for the agnostic answer, it is equally fatal, as we shall see, to all knowledge and precludes us from knowing the least as well as the largest things.

The means and methods of solving this problem are the same as those by which we try to answer any question however great or small. Perception, observation, comparison, combination of objects into larger wholes, tracing of causal links and connections, the use of analogy, the deduction of principles and their wider application, constructive thought and imagination, all the means and methods of experience apply to this problem and lead us toward its solution. Great care and caution should be exercised as we walk these dizzy heights. Prejudice and dogmatism, superficial reasoning and hasty conclusions, should be avoided. The trustworthiness of the human mind as an organ of knowledge is an assumption which must underlie this undertaking as it does all our reasoning in any field. We must trust something before we can know anything, and the mind must trust itself or it cannot prove or disprove anything. If it cannot know that it is trustworthy, then it cannot know that it is untrustworthy, and all knowledge is at an end. From a very small base on the earth the astronomer determines the distance of the sun and stars, and from a seemingly small area of thought in the brain the mind dares to think its way up to God and catch a vision of His nature.

3. The conclusion thus reached is one of probability. Few of our results are of any other degree of assurance, and only in mathematical demonstrations do we reach absolute certainty, and even this is doubted by some thinkers. All our practical conclusions rest on probability of greater or less degree. And such knowledge answers our practical purposes, and we act upon it with full confidence. We may not demonstrate the personality of God so as to put it beyond the doubt of skeptical or thoughtful minds, but we may reach it along many converging lines of probability which meet in a focus of faith that becomes "the fountain light of all our day, a master light of all our seeing."

4. Our belief in God and in His personality is much older and deeper than our reasoning and proofs in connection with it. It is a constitutional instinct and impulse which begins to act with the beginning of human experience and grows with its growth as a practical need and necessity. Our inherited and instinctive sense of dependence and spiritual yearning pushes us immediately into religious belief and life, just as our physical hunger impels us to seek food and our mental faculties feed on knowledge. God is thus a practical necessity to give meaning and worth, purpose and power, to our life; and if we found no god waiting to match and satisfy our needs we would be forced to invent one. We do not prove the existence of God and then believe in Him, but we first believe in Him and then construct arguments to confirm our belief. Destroy all our intellectual arguments for God, and we would believe in Him still. Kant, having disproved, as he believed, the possibility of knowing God through the intellect, fell back on his practical moral need for

God and believed in Him as a necessary postulate. God hath set eternity in our heart, and therefore eternity comes out of our heart before we reason on the ground and nature of this belief.

And so we start this argument for the personality of God with belief in Him already deeply imbedded in our whole nature, and this instinctive belief is likely to give its way whatever may be our logical conclusion. Great agnostics, such as Spencer and Huxley, themselves illustrate and prove this fact. However they may deny God, they find some way of slipping back to Him. Huxley, though inventor of the word agnostice, yet could not refrain from putting the name of the personal God, together with the Christian hope of immortality, on his tombstone in an inscription written by his wife and approved of by himself. Though philosophy should sever the intellectual threads that bind us to God, yet mysticism has bound us to Him with deeper threads that the knife of philosophy cannot reach.

But if our belief in a personal God is deeper and more secure than all our logic, why go through all this unnecessary reasoning? If this "intellectual business" is eminently a dust-raising process," why stir up the needless argument and raise the dust? Because the human mind also has an instinct for rational inquiry and confirmation. It cannot rest content even with the deepest instincts of the heart, but as these emerge into the field of conscious, logical analysis they must submit to this process and justify themselves at the bar of the brain as well as in the mystic chamber of the heart. Our fundamental needs are thus rationalized and confirmed, and they are also clarified and purified, controlled and guided. Our constitutional belief in a

personal God passes through this process and comes out confirmed and intensified. Our theistic faith may at first be the mystic feeling of the heart, but it is also at last the reasoned conviction of the mind and then our total faith is deeper and stronger.

Let knowledge grow from more to more,
But more of reverence in us dwell;
That mind and soul according well,
May make one music as before,
But vaster.

II. PERSONALITY IN MAN

We begin our investigation as close to ourselves as possible, down on the ground of personal experience, as the astronomer, when he is about to cast his measuring line out among the stars, takes his stand on the ground under his feet.

1. The first bit of reality we indubitably know is our own soul, self or consciousness. We know this by immediate awareness, or intuition. External objects are known to us through the mediation of the senses, which are of the nature of colored lenses that impose the secondary qualities of matter upon these objects and thereby give them their sensational appearances. A change in the senses, as in the retina of the eye or the tympanum of the ear, would thereby effect a change in the sensational nature of the object and might even transform it profoundly. Sense perception thus gives us knowledge of reality at second-hand, or knowledge that has passed through a process of transmission and transformation. Not so with our knowledge of the self. We look into our consciousness, not through senses, but directly without any transmitting and transforming medium. We are imme-

ately aware of the self, of its states and activities, and there is thus no room for error or perversion in a process of transmission. The self is at once subject and object with nothing thrust in between them, like the senses, to dim or blur the vision. Consciousness becomes self-consciousness, the knowing subject and the known object are identical in one and the same self.

Such knowledge is the clearest and surest we can have. Its stream is not mixed and muddled with the admixture of the senses or perverted with their transforming processes, but it is direct vision and pure light. We thus know ourselves better than we know anything else. Here is our first knowledge of reality. It is not knowledge of a phenomenon, as is our knowledge of the external world which consists of appearances or symbolic representations of things, but our self-knowledge is knowledge of the noumenon, of immediate reality, or of the thing in itself. We have in our own self a bit of ultimate reality, and this leads us strongly toward the conclusion that we have in the soul a sample of all reality, one of the tiny bricks of which the universe is built.

2. We now note that this first piece of reality is personal spirit or is constituted as a personality. Personality is a unitary consciousness consisting of thought, sensibility, and will. We are immediately aware of these three fundamental faculties or modes of activity fused into the unity of our consciousness. We think, we feel, we will; we do these three things, and we never can do more or less. In our consciousness we are always thinking and feeling and willing simultaneously. Any one of these modes may at any one moment be predominant and seem to submerge

the others, but the three are always acting together, though in varying degrees and combinations.

The intellect is the knowing power of the mind, by which we are aware of our mental faculties and processes by immediate intuition and of external objects by the medium of the senses. The streams of sensation pour in upon us through the senses, and then the mind works up these raw materials into objects, or casts the fluid material in its own mental molds, and thus makes the products of its thought. In this process the faculties of perception, apperception, association, memory, imagination, and reasoning are active and contribute each its own peculiar element to the product, and thus the intellect, or person, knows.

Feeling is a general state of excitement that is experienced by the soul on occasion of its cause. Sensations are the result of the direct action of objects on the senses, or nerves, and emotions are feelings excited by ideas or the presence of objects. It is the feelings that create our interest in objects and give us our sense of their value. Without the play of our feelings objects of knowledge would present to us the aspect of colorless reality, and one thing would not mean more to us than another; but our feelings invest them with various degrees of value so that they appear to us with varying degrees of interest. Feelings are also the motives that pour as a stream upon the will and move it to action. We never act until we feel, and the volume and intensity of the feeling determine the degree of decision and energy with which we act.

The will is the soul in action or the soul controlling itself. The stream of ideas and feelings that pour into consciousness is not an ungovernable flood on which the self drifts helplessly, like a log or a boat without

rudder or engine on a swift current, but the soul has a rudder and an engine by which it can steer and drive its boat to its own destination. It chooses and acts, not arbitrarily or under the compulsion of necessary forces, but by its own free choice under the play of motives. These motives, however, are not dead and fixed weights dropped upon the soul from without, which necessarily determine it, but are subject to the soul's own judgment and evaluation. We make and choose the motives that move us, and this fact is the very center and pivot of our free agency and responsibility. The will is thus the spinal column and unifying power of personality, the throne of this kingdom, the crown and captain of the self. The soul with all its faculties and activities is a unitary organism in which the whole enters into each operation, and it is characterized in its totality by growth, habit, law, liberty, purpose, and responsibility. It is this unitary self that constitutes personality.

3. Yet the soul is a very complex and wealthy world, its unity diverging into variety and deep distinctions. It has a varied and rich capacity of perceiving and feeling and acting on different kinds or aspects of the manifold of reality. When acting on objects in their intellectual nature it has knowledge; when acting on them in their esthetic nature it has a sense of beauty; when acting on them in their ethical nature it has a sense of duty; and when acting on them in their relations to God it is exercising its sense of worship and experiencing religion.

The complexity of the soul further consists of a trinity in unity. One cleavage of its unity into trinity is found in its threefold division of thought, sensibility, and will, which we have already studied. The

soul acts in these three constitutional ways which are distinct and yet cohere in a deeper unity. Another and perhaps more significant trinitarian cleavage of the unity of the soul is into subject and object and their relation. In self-consciousness each one knows himself, first, as the conscious subject which is thinking; second, as the conscious object which is thought about; and third, as the conscious relation and unity of the two. This trinity makes the soul sufficient in itself for maintaining a conscious life, constituting it as a kind of society capable of self-examination, meditation, communion, and a whole inner life of its own. Without this constitution the soul would be incapable of self-consciousness and reflection and would be reduced to the level of animal objective awareness. This constitution is the foundation and beginning of the social nature and life of the soul, unfolds in the social life of human society, and reaches its full completion and satisfaction in fellowship with God. This trinity in unity of the human soul will be found to be of fundamental significance when we come to consider the constitution of the personality of God.

4. Personality is also subject to degree and growth. It begins in the human being as a germ in the child, unfolds into its full-blown powers in the man, and exists in a wide range of degrees from the peasant to the philosopher. It rises into full tide and glow of thought and feeling in consciousness in a state of excitement, then subsides into dulness and drowsiness, and finally sinks into the subconscious in sleep. This subconsciousness is a great deep, the underground world and night life of the soul, where all our memories and experiences are stored, to emerge at call into consciousness; and it may be much deeper and

arger than our conscious self, just as seven-eighths of an iceberg is submerged in the sea. Though we know our own self better than anything else, yet it is full of vast unexplored deeps and unfathomable mysteries. "We attribute far too small dimensions to the rich empire of the self, if we omit from it the unconscious region which resembles a dark continent. The world which our memory peoples, only reveals in the revolution a few luminous points at a time; while the immense and teeming mass remains in shade.

* * We daily see the conscious passing into unconsciousness; and take no notice of the bass accompaniment which our fingers continue to play, while our attention is directed to fresh musical effects."

Below personality in man we find subpersonality in animals, and this descending and ascending scale logically runs up, as we shall later see, into superpersonality in God.

Our knowledge of this constitution of the soul, it may again be said, is not a product of our sense perception or of any kind of inference, but is an intuition of an act and fact of immediate awareness, the identity of the conscious subject and the conscious object, which is the primary and most certain knowledge we have.

The soul, or self, may be subjected to fierce criticism designed to prove its instability and unreality, a mere bubble floating on the stormy sea of the world, as F. H. Bradley attempts to do in his *Appearance and Reality*; but the same dialectic that thus dissolves the soul dissolves its own argument along with the soul and leaves no result; and the fact remains that the soul not only survives this criticism but perdures through all vicissitudes, and however violently it may be strained under the stress of inner experience or

shocked by the impact of the outer world, it abides as a unitary consciousness and identical self.

This self is the starting point and foundation of all our knowledge from the lowest and least up to the greatest truth. The inner world of the soul is a miniature copy of the great world of the universe and of God Himself. We see things, not only as they are, but also as we are, and what we see without depends on what we are within.

Watch narrowly
The demonstration of a truth, its birth,
And you trace back the effluence to its spring
And source within us; where broods radiance vast,
To be elicited ray by ray.

—BROWNING.

III. THE PASSAGE FROM MAN TO GOD

We are now prepared to make the passage from man to God as the astronomer leaps from his tiny arc on the earth to the sun and stars. In all our science we are constantly stepping up on small things to things inconceivably great, even from the finite to the infinite, and we are only following this principle in passing from the personality of man to the personality of God. When once we find a center we do not hesitate to sweep the circle, however long its radius and vast its circumference.

1. The first fact to note as the initial step in the argument at this point is that human personality is a part and product of the world. It is self-evidently not a self-existing and eternal being, but a finite entity that had a beginning and a cause. It arose in a

terminal form out of the womb of the world and by process of growth attained its full development. It is therefore an effect, and this origin is written all over and through its constitution. That human personality is a product calling for a sufficient cause is one of the most solid and certain facts of our knowledge.

2. It is an intuition and axiom of all our thinking that every event must have a cause, every product is sprung from a power. This is a self-evident truth which cannot be proved by any logical process because it is an ultimate unanalyzable principle that cannot be dissolved into simpler elements. It is more certain than any proof that could be brought either for it or against it. All our reasoning does not strengthen it, and all our speculative doubts do not weaken it. Try as we will we cannot conceive of anything springing into existence without a cause back of it. We may not know what the cause behind an event is, but we know it is there. And the cause must be sufficient to account for the whole of the effect, otherwise there is a part of the effect that is not accounted for, and something has been come into existence without a cause.

The application of this principle to personality in man is now direct and conclusive. Man being a personal product, the Cause of man must also be a personal Power. The simple statement of this step shows its logical soundness and necessity, and there is no escaping it. The Power that produced man must at the least and lowest be personal, whatever the process, whether by evolution or otherwise, by which the effect was caused. If this Power is not personal, then it has produced in man something higher than itself, and thereby the Cause falls short of the effect and some-

thing has come out of nothing. The effect always shows what was potentially in the cause and never can go beyond it; the stream, to use the classical illustration, never can rise higher than its source. The personality we find in the world is therefore a proof that there must at least be an equal kind and degree of being in the Cause of the world, and thus we mount with sure footing at one step from the personality of man to the personality of God.

This argument is short and old, but its simplicity and the fact that it has stood the test of time are its strength, and it has lost nothing of its certainty amidst all our modern knowledge. It is true that we may be staggered by this momentous conclusion and think that a basis apparently so narrow and frail cannot bear a weight so tremendous. But the astronomer does not fear that the minute arc of earth under his feet will crumble when he rests on it the whole mass and magnitude of the heavens, and the mathematician does not lose faith in his curves and equations when they sweep out toward infinity. The validity of a conclusion is not affected by its vastness when its logical basis is sound. The principle of causation is the surest logical basis in our mental constitution, and we should not doubt its validity and verdict when it carries us straight from our own personality to the personality of God. Our human personality reflects the divine personality as the tiny dewdrop mirrors the mighty sun.

Take all in a word: the truth in God's breast
Lies trace for trace upon ours impressed:
Though he is so bright and we so dim,
We are made in his image to witness him.

—BROWNING.

V. THE WITNESS OF THE WORLD OF NATURE TO
THE PERSONALITY OF GOD

The world of nature, on any philosophical view, is an outgrowth and manifestation of the First Cause that underlies it. It is a product on a vast scale. Does this product reveal in any degree the nature of the power producing it? Can we read backward from the effect to its cause? This principle underlies all our science and reasoning and is trustworthy on the largest as on the smallest scale.

The world bears witness to the personality of God because it discloses intelligence, sensibility, and will wrought into its whole fabric and constitution. This fact has been written out in great and ever-growing libraries of books and can here only be hinted at.

1. That the world is orderly, intelligible, and purposeful is the principle that underlies and guides the whole search of science, and all science confirms this as its final result. The astronomer finds that he can understand the heavens and read them like a book. The vast expanse of the sky is the real astronomy which he reads and then copies upon the tiny pages of his book. The geologist, physicist, chemist, and all other scientists are doing the same thing, each in his own field. They find that the whole web of the world of nature, down to its finest filaments, is woven of intellectual threads and is a tissue of mental ideas and relations. They have absolute confidence in its intellectuality down into its deepest depth and darkest corner and to its last atom and electron. They believe that they could understand it through and through if they could get at it or bring it under the power of their faculties. There is not a particle of unreason or mental absurdity in the whole universe. The world

is thus found to be a mental construction that reveals the presence and working of a Mind as certainly as a book reveals to us the mind of its author. Intellect is one of the essential constituents of personality, and it shines out through the whole face of nature. In the eloquent words of Dr. James Martineau: "What have we found by moving out along all the radii into the infinite? That the whole is woven together in one sublime tissue of intellectual relations, geometrical and physical—the realized original, of which all our science is but a partial copy. That science is the crowning product and supreme expression of human reason. * * * Unless therefore it takes more mental faculty to construe the universe than to cause it, to read the book of nature than to write it, we must more than ever look upon its sublime face as the living appeal of thought to thought."

2. In a similar way the world is found to be a manifestation of sensibility. It stirs every emotion of our souls, or it is a million-stringed harp which responds to and evokes all the feelings of our complex emotional nature. It is stamped with majesty and sublimity, richly carved and painted, embroidered and jeweled with beauty, and saturated and drenched with music. Joy suffuses the world of life. Nature even strikes deeper ethical notes. At least the germs of honesty and righteousness are exhibited in the law and order and reward and retribution that are imbedded in the constitution of the world. Ethical sensibility comes to its fullest expression in nature in its altruism. Mother love is a strong and beautiful affection in the higher animals, and the altruistic principle runs down into the primal cells of life. As Henry Drummond has so strikingly shown, the strug-

for life is more than matched by the struggle for life of others, beginning with the first division of cell, and evolution is thus not simply a tale of battle with nature "red in tooth and claw with ravin," but is also a love story as beautiful as any romance. And thus nature leads us to see in it a great Artist, and to feel beating in it the heart of a great Lover. And, as feeling is another constituent element of personality, we again mount through nature up to the personality of God.

3. The world also manifests itself to us as will. When we press on it at any point, it presses back against us, just as one hand may oppose the other hand, will acting in both; and the harder we press against it the harder it presses against us, acting like another will opposing our own. Will is essentially activity, and nature is universally and ceaselessly active in all its masses, molecules, atoms, and electrons. Will is energy, and all the energies of the world act as manifestations of will. We never catch nature except when it is doing something and acting like a will. Gravitation operates like a mighty muscle or system of muscles, and all the energies of nature admit of the same interpretation. Will acts toward ends, it is purposeful, and all the energies of the world are teleological, working according to plan and purpose. The whole system of the world appears to be a living will, and the world is thus pervaded by this third constituent of personality.

4. As intelligence, sensibility, and will are fused into the unity of consciousness, so are the intelligence, sensibility, and will manifested in the world fused into the grand unity of the universe. The soul, as we have seen, is marked by growth, law, habit, and purpose,

and these are inwrought into the whole constitution of nature. And thus the universe manifests itself in terms of personality, or as a vast if not infinite Person. As the soul is a little world, so the world is a great Soul.

It may be said, however, that the world does not present the appearance of a person, as does our body organized as the manifestation and instrument of the soul. Where is there any slightest semblance of organs, body, brain, and nerves, in the world? But life does not always organize for itself the same form or type of body. Vegetable life assumes various shapes, animal life breaks into myriad bodily forms, and man has developed his own type of body. God does not manifest His Spirit in a body after any of these types because He does not need such a body and transcends it. But none the less He does manifest in the world His intelligence and sensibility and will in their unitary nature and operation, and thereby reveals Himself as clearly, and accomplishes His purposes as fully, as He could do through a body organized after the type of our own; rather such a body would be an encumbrance to Him and infinitely inferior to the universe in which He is immanent.

The world thus confronts us with a threefold aspect of thought, sensibility, and will, and these point with direct and inescapable logic to the manifold nature of the First Cause and the complex personality of God.

So, the All-Great were the All-Loving too—
So, through the thunder comes a human voice
Saying, "O heart I made, a heart beats here!
Face, my hands fashioned, see it in myself!
Thou hast no power nor mayst conceive of mine,
But love I gave thee, with myself to love."

—BROWNING.

THE WITNESS OF RELIGION TO THE PERSONALITY
OF GOD

We have already seen that our human personality reflects the personality of God, but we now pass to reflection of the divine personality in our human world in its moral and spiritual nature.

1. The moral nature of man imposes on him a sense of the obligation of right, which implies a Law-giver and falls to the ground without this support and moral validation. Conscience becomes an empty voice and mockery in the infinite void of the universe without a Supreme Court and Judge. Through all the ages rolls the solemn voice of human conscience witnessing to a moral Person on the throne of the world. "If death gives final discharge," says Dr. Martineau, "like to the sinner and the saint, we are warranted in saying that conscience has told more lies than it has ever called to their account."

2. The religious nature of man is a still clearer and more convincing witness. Through all ages and in all lands the whole earth has been one great altar upon which has risen worship by humanity. The deepest feeling of humanity is its sense of dependence on God, and its greatest need and most urgent cry was voiced by Augustine: "O God, thou hast made us for thyself, and we cannot rest until we rest in thee." While in some forms, notably in the pantheistic religions of India, religion has lapsed into impersonal views of God, yet in its most general, and especially in its highest and purest forms, it has borne witness to the clearest and intensest convictions and voices to its personality; and even pantheistic religions are found, more or less indirectly and unconsciously, to slipping into faith in and worship of some personal

form of God. All the elements and activities of religion demand a personal God as their object and fulfilment. Dependence, penitence, faith, obedience, fellowship, love, loyalty in service and sacrifice, trust in life and in death—these are meaningless except as they find their appropriate object and satisfaction in a personal God and Father.

Worship cannot be resolved into mere wonder at the majesty and mystery of the universe according to Herbert Spencer's theory, or into John Morley's "feelings for the incommensurable things," or J. R. Seeley's "permanent and habitual admiration," or Edward Caird's "a man's attitude to the universe," or Matthew Arnold's "morality touched with emotion." Men simply cannot in any legitimate sense pray to and worship an "Unknowable Power" or Infinite Conundrum or Eternal Interrogation Point. Such an exercise of the soul would be bitter mockery.

In his experience man finds a personal God in prayer and worship, fellowship and obedience. He seeks Him by a deep primal instinct and impulse which drives him to God as hunger and thirst drive him to food and water. He speaks to Him with the confidence of a child to a father and pours out his soul to Him. He confesses to Him his open faults and secret sins and beseeches Him for pardon, purity and peace. He looks for indications of God's guidance and follows the gleam. "Thou wilt light my candle." He catches from God visions of right and goodness, ideals of perfection, of duty, of service and sacrifice, of battles to be fought against hosts of darkness, and of a kingdom of truth and light, of brotherhood and love, to be built; and he girds himself up for the battle and throws himself into the service and

ours out of his heart the last drop of devotion and sacrifice. His very sorrows only drive him closer to the throne of grace as he falls on the great world's stair stairs which slope through darkness up to God.

Religion is one of the deepest, widest, and most powerful and permanent facts of the world. Professor Alfred Marshall opens his great work on Economics with the statement that "the two great forming agencies of the world's history have been the religious and the economic. Here and there the ardor of the military or the artistic spirit has been for a while predominant: but religious and economic influences have nowhere been displaced from the front rank even for a time; and they have nearly always been more important than all others put together." This religious nature of man finds instinctive and necessary expression, and the great religions of the world are its outgrowth and fruit.

Religion, then, is not a superstition that is waning and withering in the light of our modern knowledge, but it is a constitutional principle in humanity which grows with all human growth and comes to its highest and purest forms and greatest worth in our highest civilization and culture. Science and philosophy cannot kill it, but only plant it more deeply than ever in the world. Reason did not create it, and reason cannot destroy it. It has given birth to all that is noblest and best in our life. It is the vital breath of this world and the hope of the next. All other instincts of our nature find their appropriate satisfaction. Shall the instinct of the bird and the bee be true, and this instinct of the human heart be false? Unless religion is all a lie it is a true witness to the personality of God.

I go to prove my soul!
I see my way as birds their trackless way.
I shall arrive; what time, what circuit first,
I ask not: but unless God send his hail
Or blinding fireballs, sleet or stifling snow,
In some time, his good time, I shall arrive:
He guides me and the bird. In his good time!

—BROWNING.

VI. THE WITNESS OF CHRISTIAN REVELATION

That Christianity is the highest and purest form of religion will be denied by few, and that it is the universal and final religion is affirmed by its adherents. While it has universal elements in the universal sovereignty and Fatherhood of God and in His immanence in the world as "the inspiration of the Almighty that giveth understanding to man," "the true light that lighteth every man coming into the world," yet it was specially introduced into the world through a particular people.

1. The Hebrews were endowed with religious genius, as the Greeks were with intellectual and artistic gifts, and the Romans with political organization and power. They were the most sensitive race in the world to the presence of God, the mountain peak that caught the light of His face earlier than other people and reflected it down upon the world. Their great prophets in the Old Testament times, Moses and Isaiah, stood on the tip of this peak and saw the light so that their own faces shone and men saw in them the reflection of Jehovah. They looked at God face to face and told the world what they saw. In the New Testament the comparatively dim and reflected light of the Old burst clear and full from the direct presence of God

Christ and was further reflected in the teaching and work of the apostles. John and Paul stood close to the Light of the World and caught its beams and threw them far and wide out over succeeding centuries.

All this light has been gathered into the Bible as to a focus, where it shines to this day. The whole potential spiritual experience of the Hebrew people, from their earliest prophets down to their latest apostles, has been recorded in this Book which transmits it to us and recreates it in us in words which are spirit and are life."

The outstanding fact in this inspired people and their inspired Book is the personality of God. Abraham, the father of the faithful and the founder of this remarkable race, born and bred in the midst of heathen idolatry and polytheism, saw and seized the great truth of the one true and living God and followed the gleam of this light out of his native country to the promised land, where this truth was to take root and grow into the religion that is now beginning to dominate the world. The name by which God revealed Himself to Moses, "I am that I am," intensified to the sharpest point the divine personality and drove it deep into the consciousness and worship of the whole Hebrew race. The prophets of the chosen people, through all their racial and national vicissitudes, development in religious experience and political power, temptations and tears, trials and triumphs, captivity and deliverance, never lost sight of Jehovah their personal God and Redeemer; and the whole history of the Hebrews prepared the way for the fulness of time when the Messiah, the fulfilment of their prophecies and prayers and passionate hopes, came into the world.

2. In Jesus Christ we have the Messiah whose divine nature and Saviourhood are established by many proofs. His matchless character, combining into balanced poise and power and perfection all virtues and graces, even those that seem somewhat irreconcilable and contradictory; His wonderful life, compressed into one shining line, "who went about doing good" His mighty works in mastering nature, the sparks of His divinity; His compassion and tenderness and forgiveness that drew people of all classes and conditions to Himself; His spirit of service and sacrifice, culminating in His sacrificial death on the cross; the great seal that was put upon His divinity in His resurrection and ascension; the Christian church, which is His mighty monument; and all the Christian centuries that date their calendar from His birth and revolve around Him as their pivotal center—all this light converges on Him and declares Him with power to be the Son of God.

And now Jesus bears witness to the personality of God in His experience and teaching and in His own person. In His experience He held constant fellowship with the Father, ever called Him "my Father," and declared: "The Father hath not left me alone." In His teaching He taught men to say: "Our Father," and ever presented God in the light of His Fatherhood. In His own person He was filled with the fulness of God, and was the express image of His person and the brightness of His glory. Jesus is the revelation of God, the incarnation of His nature, the unveiling of His glory, the sunrise and sunburst of God. Jesus is God come down so that we can see Him. "And we beheld his glory, glory as of the only begotten from the Father, full of grace and truth." All the glory

God that could be crowded into human flesh and soul was in Him and shone out of Him. And so He stands transfigured before us, steeped and soaked in the splendor of God. In seeing Him we see the Father. Jesus is thus a visible image of God, and therefore the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is a personal God.

Jesus was not only a human person, but He also escaped human limitations, transcended human consciousness, and slipped away into the infinite and eternal. His personality had divine capacities and contents. He lived in space and time and yet transcended them. "Before Abraham was, I am." "I and my Father are one." "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father." These words, that would be absurd and indicate insanity or imposture on other lips, calmly fall from His as transparent sincerity and truth and were perfectly natural to Him. He stepped up upon the throne of the universe and sat in judgment upon the world, and yet such an act was not infinite presumption and folly in Him, but was only His proper right and dignity.

The problem of the person of Christ is one of the profoundest in Christian theology, and is so mysterious that it is for us insoluble. No theory of it we can construct can be carried through without encountering grave embarrassments. That He is both human and divine is the teaching of Scripture and the verdict of the ages. We see Him as a person of like passions with ourselves, and we see Him escaping these limitations into the divine. His personality, then, cannot be constructed on and confined to our human pattern. His consciousness cannot be crowded into our human mold. He transcends us and shoots above us into the

infinite. His personality, therefore, is of a higher type than ours, and again we are approaching the conception of superpersonality which we have already encountered.

3. The complex personality of God is set forth in the Scriptures in the threefold constitution of the Godhead as Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The doctrine of the Trinity is not specifically mentioned in the Scriptures, but the fact is imbedded in every part of them. It begins in a germinal form in the Old Testament and unfolds into clearer forms down to the end of the New Testament. Each of these Persons is represented as distinct from the others, and yet together they constitute one Godhead. The personal names and pronouns, I and thou, he and him, are constantly applied to them, and never are they represented as impersonal forces or influences. They speak and act as persons in all their relations to one another and to the world. Of course, the doctrine must be kept clear of tritheism, for polytheism in any form was foreign and abhorrent to Hebrew thought, as it is to our modern philosophy. It is also true that the word person is unfortunate and misleading in some of its implications as implying human limitations and a separate substance. The three Persons in the Trinity are truly Persons in the sense that each one has a degree of independent thought and feeling and will, and yet these three cohere in the higher synthesis of one unitary spirit and life, which is the complex personality of the triune God.

The personality of God is thus of an infinitely higher type than our human personality and leads us to the conception of superpersonality, which will come up later for fuller discussion. We shall then see that

the doctrine of the Trinity is not an outworn and absurd dogma of medieval or ancient ecclesiastical speculation, but is a distinction imbedded in the constitution of God and the necessary condition of His infinite life. As Dr. Samuel Harris states it in his work on God Creator and Lord of All: "The Trinity proves itself to be, in its essential contents, the only worthy and satisfactory philosophical conception of God and of his revelation of himself in the finite. As revealed in the God in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, it is essential to supplement the half-truths of philosophy, to clear away its seeming contradictions, to harmonize the philosophical conception of God with that of religious faith and the revelation in the Bible, and to give a reasonable, comprehensive, and self-consistent idea of him."

In the same line of thought Dr. J. R. Illingworth writes in his *Personality Human and Divine*: "The Unitarian imagines his conception of God, as an undifferentiated unity, to be simpler than the Christian. But it cannot really be translated into thought. It cannot be thought out. Whereas the Christian doctrine, however mysterious, moves in the direction, at least, of conceivability, for the simple reason that it is the very thing towards which our own personality points. Our own personality is triune; but it is potential, unrealized triunity, which is incomplete in itself, and must go beyond itself for completion, as, for example, in the family. If, therefore, we are to think of God as personal, it must be by what is called the method of eminence (*via eminentiae*)—the method, that is, which considers God as possessing, in transcendent perfection, the same attributes which are imperfectly possessed by man. He must, therefore, be

pictured as One whose triunity has nothing potential or unrealized about it; whose triune elements are eternally actualized, by no outward influence, but from within; a Trinity in Unity; a social God, with all the conditions of personal existence internal to Himself."

It is true that this doctrine launches us out upon deeps our longest plummet line cannot fathom. God is infinitely greater than we can know or conceive; but the infinitude of God does not impair the validity and value of our finite knowledge of Him. "Lo, these are but the outskirts of his ways: and how small a whisper do we hear of him! But the thunder of his power who can understand?"

Christian revelation, then, in all its elements, history and development, prophet and apostle, sacrifice and symbol, Psalm and proverb, Gospel and Epistle, in all the books of the Bible in Old Testament and New, bears witness to the personality of God; and all its light is converged on Jesus, the Christ, who stands forth enveloped in its splendor and crowned as the Son who is the express image and bright glory of the personal God.

I say the acknowledgment of God in Christ
Accepted by thy reason, solves for thee
All questions in the earth and out of it,
And has so far advanced thee to be wise.

—BROWNING.

VII. TENTATIVE CONSTRUCTION OF THE PERSONALITY OF GOD

We have now reached a point where we may attempt a tentative construction of the personality of God. The goal lies infinitely beyond us, and yet we cannot escape the desire and endeavor to catch a glimpse of

or at least to throw our thoughts out toward it. The effort is legitimate and necessary, but in this attempt we need to restrain any dogmatic presumption and exercise the utmost caution and modesty.

1. The analogy of the human to the divine personality gives us a clue to follow. We have already seen the basic identity of personality in man and in God, and this stands as the foundation of our reasoning at this point. The personality of God is the cause of personality in man, and cause and effect are necessarily of like nature. Cause and effect, however, may differ widely in degree. No effect shows the whole capacity and contents of the cause. A single beam of light is not the whole sun. Personality in man is only a gleam of personality in God. God is infinite in nature and power, and therefore human personality only reflects a finite image of the divine personality. It is true that we must hold that human personality is similar in nature to the divine personality as far as it goes; but it goes only a little way, and the human is only a tiny copy and pale reflection of the divine.

Personality, as we have seen, is subject to growth and is found in widely different stages of development and degrees of mental power. There is an enormous difference between the soul of an infant and that of a mature man, and between that of a savage and that of a philosopher.¹ Vastly greater differences separate the mind of man from such soul-life and subpersonality as we see manifested in animals. The mind of even the highest animal falls immeasurably below the mind of man. While it exhibits degrees of intelligence,

¹Some paragraphs, in this connection, are taken with modifications from the author's *The World a Spiritual System: an Outline of Metaphysics*.

sensibility, and will, yet these are in such a rudimentary stage that they do not rise into self-conscious thought and free will, and so do not reach personality. Animals are at best only partial selves, and so belong to a lower order of beings than man. But now, as there are orders of being below man, are there not also orders far above him? May there not be faculties of mind and heart higher and more powerful than any we know, and may not these be organized into personality that lies infinitely above the level of human personality? It is not at all likely that the human soul is the topmost and ultimate blossom on the mystic Tree of Life; rather we may think of it as only a bud or germ which points to a perfect Mind or Spirit in which all human limitations and imperfections are transcended, so that intelligence is omniscience and will is omnipotence. The vastness and complexity and mystery of the universe indicate a causative Mind which is inconceivably if not infinitely greater than our own. The divine Mind, or God, then, rises above the human mind into personality which is infinitely higher in its faculties and organization. Such a Mind transcends our mind as ours transcends that of an animal or vegetable.

2. We cannot conceive such a Mind, because it lies above the level of our experience, but we are not without some chart and compass in launching out upon this deep. The divine Mind cannot be anything lower than our consciousness, but must lie above it, and we naturally attempt to gain some hint of it by removing the imperfections and limitations from the human mind and projecting it toward the infinite and absolute. Of course we must at once set aside all imperfections and faults due to our human sin. Sin has deeply infected

l perverted our human personality, blunting its intellectual faculties and corrupting its passions and weakening its will, but no such stain or shadow rests upon the personality of God.

Does God think and feel and will as we think and will and will? We must believe that He thinks and wills and wills, but not after our finite fashion or degree. His thinking is to be conceived as being free from all human limitations. Our intellect is limited in all its operations, so that we never can reach the utmost bound of truth. Every problem it solves only brings into view a hundred others that are not solved, and that its ignorance, so to speak, grows faster than knowledge. However vast the circle of light of expanding knowledge, vaster still is the outlying sphere of darkness that shuts it in. Doubt also constitutionally inheres in human knowledge, and no human thinker can escape from doubt any more than we can escape from his own shadow or slip out of his own skin. Again, the human mind uses the instrumental processes of sense perception and discursive reasoning by which it gathers facts and builds up knowledge, and thus its knowledge of objective reality is only mediate and not intuitive. We can imagine all these limitations upon our human mind widened out indefinitely, and in perfect personality all such limits would be completely removed or transcended and this would be us omniscience in the mind of God. God knows all things by immediate awareness or intuition. "His understanding is infinite."

Does the divine mind think in the intuitions or mental forms of space and time as we do? God projects His thoughts upon the field of our consciousness in these forms, but are the forms purely sub-

jective in our minds, or are they also forms of His mind? It would be rash to give a dogmatic answer to this question, and here even speculation grows thin to the vanishing point. We cannot affirm that God thinks in terms of space or projects His thoughts in spatial forms, and it may rather be that this form lies wholly within the field of our human consciousness. But, on the other hand, as our minds are copies of His, it may be that the spatial form we experience is the shadow or symbolic representative of some corresponding though transcendent form in His experience. The temporal form inheres more closely than the spatial in the reality of the mind itself, its experiences being successive but not spatial. Our temporal experience depends on the length of our time-span, or the period of consciousness during which successive objects or moments of consciousness are simultaneously presented to the mind, a period that is usually estimated at two or three seconds. Removing this limit from our time-span would result in a consciousness in which all things are logically successive and yet eternally present. Such a temporal consciousness, we may suppose, is a hint of the divine mind. God is conscious of time, but not in time, and all time is to Him an eternal now. He does not exist in temporal succession, but all temporal succession exists in Him. The poet Henry Vaughan had some such dream of eternity in his strangely beautiful lines:

I saw Eternity the other night,
Like a great ring of pure and endless light,
All calm, as it was bright;
And round beneath it, Time in hours, days, years.
Driv'n by the spheres
Like a vast shadow mov'd; in which the world
And all her train were hurl'd.

As to feeling, we must remove from our thought of God's emotional life all the imperfections of our emotional experience. Anything in the nature of evil disposition or passion in Him is abhorrent to our thought; and we must also remove all fitfulness and fickleness, uncontrolled gusts and outbreaks of feeling, irritability and fretfulness, ill-balanced and extreme deficient emotions, personal bias and selfishness. There must be vast masses and profound depths of emotion in the life of God, pure and calm, deep and strong, rich and joyous and jubilant, compared with which the deepest and most glorious emotional experiences of humanity are only as single gleams of light compared with the total splendor of the sun. Not only the emotional life of God not only rises to higher levels and fathoms deeper depths, but it also may differ in faculty and organization from that of the human soul.

The will of God must differ deeply from the human will. The human will is obstructed by barriers without and within and must use means to effect its ends. But the divine mind has immediate knowledge of all things, and is freed from the use of sense perception and discursive processes, so the divine will must achieve its ends without the use of intermediate means. God is not hampered as we are by limited power, but power is His, and with Him thought and action, the will to do and the deed itself, are one. "God said, let there be light: and there was light." With Him, to speak is to do, to think is to create. Thought and action are fused into one free and frictionless stream of life.

It may be thought that a consciousness possessed of such powers of omniscient intelligence and omni-

potent will cannot be called consciousness at all, and that, in particular, it cannot be supposed to have personality. Does it not differ so radically both in degree and in nature as to be something other than consciousness and personality as we know these modes of reality? This difficulty, especially as regards personality, will come up later, but for the present we may say that we are not without some gleams of light. We know that consciousness exists in different degrees and that these differences may be enormous. We are able to widen out the barriers of ignorance that bound our knowledge, and we can imagine this process carried out indefinitely. Genius grasps by intuition many things that ordinary minds must reach through slow discursive processes. The gap between will and deed is often shortened up in our human experience. A musical genius thinks and wills a musical theme and composition by one stroke of mind, and poetic thought and poetic expression may coincide in the poet's imagination. We can conceive all these processes carried indefinitely toward the point where human limitations would disappear, and these forms of genius are hints and germs of unlimited consciousness. While then, the divine consciousness rises above all our imperfections and limitations, yet it does not lose its fundamental character as mind and personality.

3. We proceed further with unfolding the analogies of our human personality into its implications in the divine personality. We have seen that our human personality, while unitary, is yet a complex, world of elements and organization. Does this complexity reflect the mind of God in its elements and organization? Does the trinity of thought, feeling, and will and the deeper trinity of the conscious subject, the conscious object, and the

conscious union of the two, that enter into the very constitution of human personality, also inhere in the divine personality, or is the consciousness of God absolutely unitary? Reflection drives us with a strong degree of probability toward the former rather than the latter view. An absolutely unitary consciousness involves us in grave difficulties. It would obliterate distinctions in the divine consciousness and thereby make conscious reflection and feeling and will impossible. There could be no subject and object in such a consciousness, and this would nullify the fundamental condition of thought. It would obliterate all variety and activity in the field of consciousness and reduce it to a static condition, like an eternal frozen ocean. Such a view of the divine consciousness cancels consciousness and issues in pantheism.

May we go further and infer that the trinity in our human personality points to an infinitely higher trinity in God? The analogy of degrees of consciousness is not exhausted until we have followed it up to its utmost summit and climax. Subpersonality in animals and incomplete personality in man are an ascending series leading up to superpersonality in God. The distinctions of thought, feeling, and will and of subject, object, and their union in man may be germinal hints and buds of a complex personality in which there are distinctions that may be viewed as personal and capable of holding mutual relations of fellowship. God must be sufficient in Himself apart from and independent of any created beings. What was He doing, how was He employing and enjoying Himself, before that "beginning" in which He created the world and finite persons? The question startles us, and on its answer depend portentous consequences.

If God is a complex personality, having in Himself distinctions that form a kind of society in which mutual thought and love and activity are exercised, then God is sufficient in Himself and has an eternal life of thought and love and joy, "God blessed forever." But if God has not this self-sufficient personality, then we are driven again into a pantheistic Absolute, which is the most terrible specter, as we shall later see, that agnostic philosophy has ever created. From this horror we are delivered as we find reasons, broad as the universe and deep as the human heart, for believing in a God who lives and loves in Himself and can impart the same joyous life to His created children. We thus climb and are driven up the stairway of philosophical thought to a conception of God that approaches, if it does not coincide with, the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. The Godhead is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, a higher personality that fulfils all the conditions of our logical demands.

4. Somewhat similar results have been reached by many of our profoundest thinkers. Friedrich Paulsen in his *Introduction to Philosophy*, in describing his "idealistic pantheism," writes: "Pantheism, as we understand it, has no intention of depriving God of anything or of denying him anything but human limitations. It will not permit us to define God by the concept of personality simply because the notion is too narrow for the infinite fulness and depth of his being. Still, in order to remove the apprehension, we might call God a *suprapersonal* being, not intending thereby to define his essence, but to indicate that God's nature is above the human mind, not below it. And pantheism might add that it finds no fault with anyone for calling God a personal being in this sense

in so much as the human mind is the highest and most important thing we know, we can form an idea of God only by intensifying human attributes."

In his *Appearance and Reality* Mr. F. H. Bradley says: "The Absolute, though known, is higher, in a sense, than our experience and knowledge; and in this connection I will ask if it has personality. At the point we have reached such a question can be dealt with rapidly. We answer it at once in the affirmative or negative according to its meaning. Since the Absolute has everything, it of course must possess personality. And if by personality we are to understand the highest form of finite spiritual development, then certainly in an eminent degree the Absolute is personal. For the higher (we may repeat) is always the more real. * * * If the term 'personal' is to bear anything like its ordinary sense, assuredly the Absolute is not personal. It is not personal, because it is personal and more. It is, in a word, superpersonal. * * * It is better to affirm personality than to call the Absolute impersonal. But neither mistake is necessary. The Absolute stands above, and not below, its internal distinctions. It does not eject them, but includes them as elements in its fulness. To speak in other language, it is not the indifference but the concrete identity of all extremes. But it is better in this connection to call it superpersonal."

And even Herbert Spencer, while persistently declaring that his "Unknowable Power" is absolutely unknowable, yet cannot keep from expressing an opinion as to its ultimate nature and makes bold to say that it is "probably psychical" and "hyperpersonal."

While these thinkers deny that God is personal according to the level and limitations of human per-

sonality, yet they affirm that the personality of God lies above the human level and is of a higher type, and this is an affirmation of immense significance. If they deny us a personal God after our human type, they believe that their "God has provided some better thing for us." Their philosophy is really moving in the direction of the triune God, though they may know it not, and their eyes may dimly catch a glimpse of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the Absolute "who is over all, God blessed forever."

Our tentative construction of the personality of God thus starts with our human self as a finite image of the Infinite, a drop of dew that mirrors the mighty sun, and unfolds this analogy in its psychological and philosophical implications into the superpersonal Absolute of philosophy and the triune God of Christian faith. But here we know only in part, and again we must exclaim: "Lo, these are but the outskirts of his ways: and how small a whisper do we hear of him!" Yet we know enough to worship and serve God in faith and fellowship, and in the presence of these unspeakable mysteries to "be still and know that I am God."

There is a universe within,
The world we call the soul, the mind:
And in this world what best we find
We stammer forth, and think no sin
To call it God, and our God, and
Give heaven and earth into His hand,
And fear His power, and search His plan
Darkly, and love Him, when we can.

—GOETHE.

(TO BE CONCLUDED.)

THE TASK OF THE MODERN APOLOGIST

By LOUIS MATTHEWS SWEET, S. T. D., Professor of Christian
Theology and Apologetics, Bible Teachers Training School.

AN UNDERTAKING of a character so serious and responsible as the advocacy and recommendation of the Christian religion to the rational consideration of mankind demands a whole-hearted and unequivocal dedication to the service of righteousness and truth. The advocacy of Christianity on the part of one who is not unreservedly committed to the Christian position, *historically defined*, is, of course, an absurdity. The advocacy of Christianity, even by one sincerely persuaded of its truth and permanent value to the world, by the *ex parte* methods of the hired attorney or special pleader, is an impiety the deep disgrace of which is only increased by the sacredness of the subject.

The Christian apologist, in view of the fact that this undertaking is justifiable only on the ground of sincerity of conviction, is pledged in detail to a flawless, corresponding sincerity of utterance throughout. Nothing less than this high dedication to the service of truth is worthy of so great and noble an enterprise. In laying such stress upon sincerity as a demand of the new Christian defense, we do not intend to cast a slur upon the apologetics of the past nor to suggest that previous defences of Christianity have been lacking either in sincerity of conviction or candor of utterance. We do not believe this to be true. In fact, we believe that the easy condemnation of all apologetic writing as special pleading is the outcome of a peculiarly subtle and dangerous tendency of our

day, to identify the modern and scientific method with a given set of results and to arrogate to denial and radicalism a monopoly of the spirit of free and genuine research. We simply wish to remind our readers that the advocacy of Christianity as true is a task undertaken in the interest of truth. Christians, surely, do not need more than a reminder that it is the truth which makes us free.

The danger is that the most sincere advocate may forget, in the intensity of his conviction, to look at intellectual issues broadly, and, in the enforcement of what he sincerely believes to be true, may lose his perspective and do violence to the balance and harmony of truth. All that we have to say in this paper as to the work of the defender of Christianity in our day is really the expansion and application of this text. If Christianity is true, then *ex necessitate* it is in full harmony with all else that is true. The task of the Christian apologist is simply to exhibit and expound this primary and comprehensive fact. There need be no uneasiness as to the possibility of discovering and exhibiting the broad and basic truthfulness of the Christian system, historically, psychologically, and philosophically.

I. The Christian apologist of to-day must believe in the capacity of the human mind to receive and interpret the revelation of God.

Apologetics is an address to the human intelligence on behalf of Christianity. The undertaking itself implies a conviction that Christianity is true; that is it is a rational system capable of rational interpretation and vindication. Such a belief involves, as it logical *prius*, a deep-seated conviction of the essential worth and constructive power of human reason. A

belief in Christianity as a divine revelation, given through supernatural acts and recorded through inspiration, implies a thoroughgoing confidence in human reason as being capable of receiving and interpreting a revelation from above, of recognizing supernatural acts, of being inbreathed of God and brought to a knowledge of Him. To minify the human factor in this divine-human process is to discredit the process itself. The age-long historic movement whereby God has unveiled Himself as the Lord and Redeemer of men is articulated throughout with the corresponding human experience to which and through which God has thus spoken. The higher aspect of this interlocking process depends upon the integrity of the lower. The logical result of discrediting or depreciating human reason is agnosticism, which is a state of mind wherein the power of evidence is lost because of a fixed belief in the infirmity of the human mind as the organ of divine knowledge. The false and artificial antithesis which has often been established between reason and revelation spells ruin to the task of the apologist. Reason becomes a blind faculty which tells us nothing about God. Revelation becomes a sphere of extra-rational beliefs indistinguishable from superstition. Faith becomes an asylum for the feeble-minded. Christianity becomes a mode of interpreting the unknown, the truth of which it is impossible to establish on any recognizable rational grounds.

On the other hand, it is essential that the Christian apologist should understand the normal workings of the human reason and the clearly defined boundary within which it works. In the region of religion, as elsewhere, reason is conditioned by *objective facts*, and cannot construct the world without these facts. Rea-

son, apart from facts as disclosed in experience, cannot construct an atom or an amoeba, much less a solar system, a universe or the being of God. When Hegel says that there are no mysteries in the absolute which reason cannot penetrate, he makes a statement which would be false and absurd if he were speaking of so trivial an object as a tea biscuit. Such arrogant and measureless claims for reason are absurd and suicidal.

The rational task of the apologist for Christianity is just the natural task of the advocate and exponent of any great generalization of science, to vindicate it, on the basis of evidence, as *the most reasonable hypothesis to explain undoubted facts*. Here are the facts: The world, human nature and human history, religion, the Hebrews, the New Testament, Jesus, the Christian church, Christian experience. How are these facts to be explained? If the universe is intelligible, then these facts are capable of a rational explanation. If Christianity is true, it is this sought for rational explanation. Christian apologetics is the explication of the fact that the Christian religion explains the world, man, and human history more comprehensively and more satisfactorily than any other explanation which can be devised. This is our task and the whole of it. To be sure, it is a great undertaking, but is quite intelligible and quite within the bounds of reason. But, let it never be forgotten, that for Christians and for disbelievers in Christianity alike agnosticism destroys the foundations upon which we stand. Discussion of Christianity or any other subject which touches upon fundamental realities upon the terms of agnosticism is an interchange of views as to the world of reality on the part of lunatics or imbeciles. How else could one possibly interpret these words from the pen of

Herbert Spencer? "Respecting the origin of the Universe three verbally intelligible suppositions may be made. We may assert that it is self-existent, or that it is self-created, or that it is created by an external agency. Which of these suppositions is most credible it is not needful here to inquire. The deeper question, into which this finally merges, is, whether any one of them is even conceivable in the true sense of the word" (First Principles, p. 36).

The Christian apologist must untiringly wage war upon such a belittling conception of human reason. He affirms revelation, inspiration, authority, but on the basis of an implied affirmation that human reason can receive, interpret, and establish truth which is from above. The faith that men may know God and recognize and interpret truth he must never betray. Religious affirmation, in all ages, has borne the brunt of attack on the part of skepticism. Christian apologists have had to meet not only doubts as to the truth of Christianity, but doubts as to the possibility of any valid knowledge whatever which passes beyond the range of empirical observation. The epistemological burden of the Christian apologist has been so great that twice, at least, within a single recent century, the courage of the advocates of Christian faith has broken down and they have ingloriously thrown their shields away, making a pitiful and ineffectual attempt to advocate Christianity on the premises of a philosophic skepticism. We do not so read our charter nor so interpret our task. We stand for the rights of reason and the integrity and validity of our intellectual processes. We assert with all confidence, making due allowance for the fact that reason is conditioned by subjective and concrete experience, and that man is a

being who learns through trial, failure, and trying again, falling but to rise, that human reason when brought into contact with the facts can know the truth.

II. The Christian apologist must cultivate the habit of looking at both sides of controverted questions, including the most fundamental and sacred truths of the Christian faith.

A man may be an able and effective preacher of the Gospel, who neither knows nor cares much about unbelief. Such a preacher, provided he has a genuine prophetic insight into the truth, a knowledge of the human heart, and an intense sincerity and earnestness, may have a message even for unbelievers all the more searching that it does not and cannot deal with the intellectual problems of unbelief. But the task of the apologist is quite different from this. His work is to meet organized and articulate unbelief which is buttressed by argument and supported by alleged facts presented in the name of reason, and which, on historical, scientific or philosophical grounds, assails the truth of Christianity. To meet such assaults with the naïve assumption that nothing in the way of effective objections can be urged against Christianity, or, still worse, with the dogmatic judgment that all unbelief is impiety to be met with anathema, is to surrender a great battle without a blow.

The Christian apologist must know what men have thought and said against Christianity and must allow himself to feel the whole force of these objections. He must do far more than meet specific objections. He must develop the intuitive sense of an intellectual climate in which such objections flourish. He must argue the case against his own convictions with all the severity, and more, of the most relentless opponent.

He must remember that his chance really to win in this great controversy, unlike that of the lawyer or the debater on the hustings, depends not upon his intellectual finesse or his cleverness of cut and thrust, but absolutely upon his *having the better case*. Unless he believes with all his soul that more can be said for Christianity than can possibly be urged with fairness against it, no man has heard the authentic call to be a defender of the faith. The apologist, therefore, is compelled to the attitude of one who holds himself ready to discuss with every comer the grounds of his most fundamental and sacred convictions. In order to do this he must have met, in the solitude of his own inner thought, in that arena of dialogue and debate where the voices of Assent and Denial answer each to each within his own soul, the unbeliever with whom he is openly to discuss the grounds of belief. He must know thoroughly and sympathetically the mind of the unbeliever and the psychology of unbelief. He must know not only how to meet an objection, but how that objection arose. He must reach behind the argument to the mind which formulates the argument and graduate the mental trend to which the argument appeals. His task is to remove the difficulties which certain types of mind, or certain groups of men, feel with respect to the principles and doctrines of the Christian religion.

The one necessary element of training for this task is that the apologist shall establish the rational ground of his own convictions. He must understand the psychology of his own belief. He must have subjected his attitude toward belief, pro and con, to the severest possible rational test. He must thrust mercilessly through question to the assurance which lies

beyond doubt. He must spare no labor in the task of deepening his religious experience and grounding his beliefs on the basal facts of human life and history.

III. The Christian apologist must obtain and present the results of genuine and thorough research.

He must maintain the convincing attitude of the searcher for truth. The primary postulate of his undertaking, as we have said already and cannot say too often, is that the facts are on the side of Christianity. This being so, the apologist's task resolves itself into the prosaic and laborious undertaking of digging up facts. Patient delving for hidden treasure is the only method of effective service in this field. The great apologetic achievements of the past have, invariably, been due to the work of scholars who have dug beneath the feet of attackers upon Christianity and, on the basis of deeper and more thorough scholarship, have met and refuted assaults made upon it.

Mention may here be made of Origen's reply to Celsus. The original work of Celsus, the earliest and the keenest of the pagan controversialists who attacked Christianity, has been lost, primarily because Origen refuted him so completely that even the opponents of Christianity did not care to keep alive their champion's work. But Origen dealt so comprehensively and minutely with the work of Celsus that we are able to reconstruct it practically in its entirety. We are, therefore, able to see that the refutation is achieved not by brilliancy of argument nor superficial cleverness in debate, but by the solidity of the statement built up, fortified, and buttressed by facts. Origen has the better case, Celsus is infinitely clever but superficial—the facts are against him. Truth wins the debate—

of Origen—which in the interests of mankind is the only victory worth having.

Another illustration of the same truth is to be found in the case of Supernatural Religion. Some time ago there appeared anonymously in England an elaborate attack upon Christianity, entitled Supernatural Religion. The treatise was detailed and extensive and the various phases of the attack were supported by an appearance of learning which gave the work an extensive vogue, and promised for it, at first, a widespread and lasting influence. The work came under the eye of Bishop Lightfoot, who at once detected the fact that the citations, which were numerous and apparently cogent, were inaccurate. The writer who had amassed a great body of references was not an accurate scholar, nor, to say the least of it, did he make a fair and proper use of his materials. The scholarly bishop proceeded, in the finest spirit of courteous debate but with merciless effectiveness, to expose the monumental inaccuracies of this unknown assailant of Christianity. One who follows the course of the discussion will be convinced that Lightfoot broke the force of a powerful and dangerous attack upon Christianity simply through the force of superior scholarship. He knew more than his opponent and won his monumental victory, not by virtue of a superior cleverness, but because the facts were on his side, and he knew the facts.

Another striking illustration of the point we are endeavoring to enforce is to be found in the treatment of himself by Professor J. George Romanes. When Romanes was a young man he published (under the pseudonym of Physicus) an essay entitled: A Candid Examination of Theism. In this discussion he exam-

ined the arguments usually advanced on behalf of the theistic view of the world and reluctantly but definitely abandoned them all and, with them, belief in a personal God. When Professor Romanes died, in 1894, he was a communicant of the church and left behind him, in the form of incomplete notes, a review of his own former work which, of course, involved a discussion of the whole religious question. The importance of this discussion for our present purpose lies in the fact that Romanes' change of view was due to his going over the same ground as in the former treatise, *with the plough-share set deeper*. Repeatedly he uses the formula: "I did not sufficiently consider," or "I failed to notice," etc. In other words, he corrected himself by deeper thought and fuller knowledge in the interests of faith.

One more striking instance of the value for Christian faith of this delving for facts is to be found in the case of Professor Sir W. M. Ramsay. In 1892 Professor Ramsay delivered his Mansfield Lectures: *The Church in the Roman Empire before 170 A.D.*, in which he gave to the world the first results of his archæological investigation into the origins of Christianity. Incidentally it signalized the beginning of Professor Ramsay's break with the prevailing radical school of New Testament criticism. This schism grew more and more pronounced as Professor Ramsay's researches advanced until it became quite clear that criticism could no longer afford to ignore his studies and that it must either refute his arguments for the early date and general historical trustworthiness of the New Testament writers, particularly Luke, or admit their force. The results of this new movement, in one aspect of it, at any rate, appear in the famous

ries of New Testament studies published by Professor Adolf Harnack, beginning with *Luke the Physician*, published in 1907 (*Lukas der Arzt*, 1906). While in this work scant reference is made to Ramsay (see preface to the English translation), nevertheless the gauge thrown down by Ramsay *fourteen years before* is taken up by the Berlin professor—not as a assentiant but as a fellow-challenger to current scholarship. Here is what Harnack says:

“The genuine Epistles of St. Paul, the writings of St. Luke, and the history of Eusebius are the pillars of primitive Christian history. This fact has not yet been sufficiently recognized in the case of the Lukan writings; partly because critics are convinced that these writings are not to be assigned to St. Luke. And yet, even if they were right in their supposition, the importance of the Acts of the Apostles at least still remains fundamental. *However I hope to have shown in the following pages that critics have gone astray in this question, and that the traditional view holds good.*” “The Lukan writings then recover their own excellent value [*einen ganz eigenartigen Werth*] as historical authorities; for they are written by a Greek who was a fellow worker of St. Paul, and companied with Mark, Silas, Philip, and James the brother of the Lord” (Preface, dated Berlin, May 17, 1906, and translated by J. R. Wilkinson. Italics mine).

In general, the entire critical situation with respect to the New Testament changed between the publication of Ramsay's Mansfield Lectures and Harnack's *Lukas der Arzt*. How was this revelation brought about? Two things are to be noted.

First, Professor Ramsay was a genuine investigator, committed to nothing at all in the way of results but only to the consistent application of a scientific method. His challenge to current criticism was made on that basis; and on that basis alone. Incidentally we wish to emphasize, in this immediate connection,

that really powerful attacks upon the historical basis of Christianity can be met only by the rigid use of a scientific method which has no regard for results or partisan advantage. No true investigator can guarantee that his results shall be orthodox—he can only promise to be diligent and accurate in the use of a correct method. Orthodoxy must take care of itself. If it is true it need have no fear. In the long run truth, which is mighty, shall prevail. Here is Professor Ramsay's challenge as issued with his first great work—a challenge which became more insistent and commanding as he went on with his investigations.

"The books of the New Testament are treated here simply as authorities for history; and their credit is estimated on the same principles as that of other historical documents. If I reach conclusions very different from those of the School of Criticism whose originators and chief exponents are German, it is not that I differ from their methods. I fully accept their principle, that the sense of these documents can be ascertained only by resolute criticism; but I think that they have often carried out their principle badly and that their criticism often offends against the critical method" (*The Church in the Roman Empire before A.D. 170*, p. VIII. The entire paragraph should be carefully read).

Second, the facts were on the side of the traditional view. As Professor Harnack says: "The traditional view holds." The scholarly diligence and candor of Professor Ramsay, dealing with the facts and controlled by them as his studies uncovered them, brought this noted scholar from a somewhat slavish adherence to current critical views to the defense of a view of early Christianity and its sources which is more in accord with the historic tradition and faith of the church. This is the only kind of intellectual defense of Christianity which we need or can possibly use.

is based upon facts and consists in the exposition of those facts. We must remember that any defender of the faith is necessarily a critic and is compelled to use the method of criticism. Criticism is not an occult symbolism for the destruction of truth—but simply a perfectly ordinary and, in itself, innocuous instrument for the ascertainment and expression of truth. The misuse of a method condemns not the method but those who misuse it. Professor Ramsay's invaluable contributions to the truth were the outcome of investigations carried out primarily not to prove anything or to disprove anything, but simply to ascertain the facts. All Christian history indicates that Christianity has everything to gain and nothing to lose by investigations of this character.

The loss which has resulted to the cause of Christianity through neglect of opportunities on the part of recent leaders of Christian thought to do an underground work of this sort is incalculable. In three instances at least the results of this neglect are apparent. Until very lately the field of Old Testament investigation has been left almost entirely to the more radical schools of criticism, with the result that these writers and teachers have gained control of the instruments of dissemination to such an extent that it is somewhat difficult for more conservative views even to get a hearing. Evidence is now beginning to come in that this surrender of the critical field is not due to lack of facts, which can reasonably be urged on behalf of the Bible, but to a lack of Ramsay's scholarly work in the gathering and preservation of these facts. The case has been allowed to go by default.

Again Christian thinkers and leaders have failed to occupy, with sufficient energy and effectiveness, the

important field of religious psychology. To such an extent the pioneer work in this department received a powerful anti-Christian and even anti-religious impress. Professor Leuba's recent book shows that a larger percentage of psychologists are anti-Christian or un-Christian than of any other class of intellectual leaders—and that in spite of the fact that these teachers are dealing directly with religious thought and experience. This result is the more inexcusable in view of the wealth of material which is at our disposal. Christian teachers are just beginning at this late day to appreciate what the profound and scientific study of Christian experience can do on behalf of our faith.

Once again we cannot but feel that recent leaders of Christian thought have failed to keep abreast of the needs of the day in the matter of Christian origins and particularly the pagan surroundings of nascent Christianity. There are workers in this field, but many more are needed, for the wealth of material still unused is great. In short, one of the most crying needs of the hour is a vast increase of scholarly activity on the part of those who believe in the truth and finality of the Christian religion. Why is it that so few who really believe thus in Christianity are willing to give themselves with unstinted devotion to the work of amassing such a treasure of Christian scholarship as shall present with some adequate degree of fulness the Christian case to the scholarly world? We have much to do. The work must be organized. The field must be subdivided. Adequate means of distribution must be provided. A definite program for a great and worthy propaganda must be prepared and carried out. The cross of a new crusade of Christian scholarship must be lifted and carried forward. But we must remember

that the basis of this ambitious undertaking, and the one condition of its success, is the recognition of the fact that the Christian apologist is the Christian scholar—a discoverer and interpreter of facts. We have had too many rhetoricians and stump speakers in this undertaking. We need a new generation of consecrated, tireless Christian scholars.

IV. The Christian apologist of to-day must be a genuinely catholic Christian.

We are of course using the word catholic in its legitimate etymological sense. There is a place and a work in the world for the provincial type of sectarian or partisan Christian—but neither his place nor his work is in the field of apologetics. The first task of the apologist is the difficult one of self-emancipation from views of truth which are exclusively individual or narrowly partisan. It is necessary to remember that the apologist faces an unbroken solidarity of negation. However much those who disbelieve may differ among themselves, they are one in their opposition to Christianity. And this opposition to Christianity is directed against the system *in limine* and as a whole. In such discussions the *essence* of Christianity is at issue and that alone. The unbelieving world has no interest in the *minutiae* of interpretation within the system of historic Christianity as it presents itself to the world without. Christianity and anti-Christian world views face each other at the center. It is imperative that the advocates and interpreters of Christianity present a united front and sink minor differences in devotion to those essential principles which we hold in common, and, which, for that very reason, are of vital importance to the world. Voltaire once said that Christians were fiercely debating whether Christ had one will or two,

while the Saracens held possession of the Holy Sepulcher.

All debate on minor points of interpretation or emphasis are fundamentally frivolous in the view of the world's great need and its searching elementary questions. Why should Christians debate the inscrutable relations between the divine will and human freedom when men are asking whether God is or not? Why should we divide as to the time or manner or program of the last things in the world's history, when men are asking whether Christ is coming at all or not, nay, whether He rose from the dead—even more, whether He ever came or not?

The apologist has no interest in questions which divide Christians from each other, but only in those deeper and more vital issues which divide all Christians from the non-Christian world. A former missionary in Japan used to tell this incident in its bearing upon his life and thought. He was sailing one glorious starlight night on a river in Japan, in company with certain intelligent and thoughtful Japanese. They had been talking about the cosmic system—the greatness, the exactness, the splendor of it all. Suddenly one of the Japanese gentlemen turned to the missionary with this query: "You have come here to tell us that the Maker of all this [with a sweeping gesture] was born of a woman, at a given moment in the world's history, in a given spot of the earth's surface! How dare you preach such a doctrine?" The missionary said that in that very moment all interest in any question that could reasonably divide Christians was burned out of his soul forever.

Any man who has come into authentic communication with the mind of the unbeliever necessarily recog-

izes the vital necessity of concentrating the defense of Christianity upon vital and essential points. It is Christianity itself which is at stake. It is Christianity, therefore, in the broad, essential, historic sense which we are to defend.

The very carrying out of such a task, which visualizes an unbelieving world, reaching out groping hands after God, will broaden the mind to the compass of a world-wide, comprehensive Christianity and emancipate from narrow and provincial views of Christianity. The defender of the faith will need and desire to have the essential system at his back and all genuine believers on his side.

We have thus endeavored to state, in simplest outline, the task of the advocate and defender of Christianity in the present era. The call goes forth for men of the highest type for this most exalted task—sincere, scholarly, industrious, broad-minded, constructive, patient, penetrating, able in amassing facts, equally able in presenting them. Who is sufficient for these things? We should be discouraged were it not for the fact that God always raises up men for His tasks, and sets them for the work they have to do. "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit. And there are diversities of ministrations, and the same Lord. And there are diversities of workings, but the same God, who worketh all things in all."

HEAD AND HEART

SOME THOUGHTS ON RELIGIOUS THINKING

By H. C. G. MOULE, D. D., Bishop of Durham

MY TITLE asks for some explanation and perhaps for some apology. No ambitious aim is present to me as I put pen to paper. The prompting thought has to do with a matter common in experience and eminently practical as to its issues. It is the question how far, in the sight and acquisition of the facts and truths of our faith, we are to use our reasoning faculty without reserve or rather without assistance, and whether such sight and acquisition does not also demand, if it is to be full and valid, the use of other internal powers—perceptions, instincts, emotions—which may be grouped under the word heart rather than under the word head.

The apology at which I hinted is called for, perhaps, by my perfectly popular use of such words as head, heart, reasoning, and the like. I know well that it is true neither to psychological theory nor to experience, when we take experience and examine it, to classify the actings of our conscious being (not to speak of the subconscious) into compartments neatly defined and rigidly separated. The word reason, for example, as S. T. Coleridge taught us, properly and actually denotes something very much larger than what Tom Paine meant by it when he entitled his coarse and crude assault on the Christian faith *The Age of Reason*. It is a word of wide embrace and high transcendence. It includes indeed the activity expressed in the syllogistic treatment of collected data,

which we commonly call reasoning. But it also includes those intuitions, those sights of "necessary" truth, which lie behind and above all syllogistic proof, and whose proof is that we cannot think without them. It may be extended to include the whole mental and moral phenomena of consciousness. To the syllogistic activity, if I remember right, Coleridge assigned "understanding" as the title. And he loved to dwell upon the narrowness of understanding as against the sublime width and depth of reason. Even there, perhaps, apology was needed. For the word understanding has, in actual use, some very noble and elevated affinities. But I quote Coleridge's nomenclature only to illustrate my request for indulgence toward my own use of terms.

With a purpose thus popular and in a simple sense practical I venture to take up and use my imperfect classifying words, never forgetting how, in the play of our inner experience, the activities denoted inevitably in measure overlap. Such examples as will make the staple and substance of my paper will, I think, justify my appeal for indulgence.

Let me draw my reader's attention then to some specimens, in the field of religion, of the objects presented to our notice, which, if I see aright, demand reasonably, in a high sense of reason, the use not of head only but of heart, if they are to be truly seen.

1. The supreme mystery of the Holy Trinity is my first specimen. I name that object of thought with bated breathing and, as it were, on the bended knees of the soul. I take it as granted for our present purpose that the legitimate summary and expression of the data of Scripture, especially of course of the New Testament, are just this, that the supreme

Existence is One and Three; that, while the testimony of the whole Book is overwhelmingly monotheistic, it does nevertheless present to us not one Name but three Names—prevalently given as to the Father, the Son, the Spirit—as each bearing divine characteristics, in the full sense of the word divine, as that word is used by a monotheist. Upon this mysterious and startling position of Christian teaching a great deal of “head” activity and energy has been, from certainly the fourth century onward, expended, both in attack on its supposed impossibility to the understanding, and in its defense as reconcilable with the understanding’s necessities, though above its complete grasp. What I emphasize here is that such defenses, if conducted by logical processes alone, can never ultimately satisfy the man who seeks a complete assurance. The head needs the auxiliary force of the heart. To the heart, not to the head, belongs the intuition, the conscious certainty, which finds pure love to be supremely excellent.

Let it be suggested to the heart that the belief of the Trinity in Unity is not a sheer proposition presented to the understanding, to be worked up into a certainty by logical treatment of objective data, but has infinitely much to do with love. Then the teaching that God is One and Three takes, for the man who views it so, a form of glory, altogether other than that of a challenge for submission to a syllogism. Let him see the great tenet as a disclosure of the presence and interaction of infinite affections within the supreme Existence; let him see that it only sheds new splendor on the majestic simplicity of the text, “*God is love*”—not only exercises but *is* love, that He is Himself an ocean, fountain of mutual delights, and is thus the supremely natural source of an outflowing love to the

sinner and to the world; let this be reverently brought in to suffuse and vivify all study of the express statements of Scripture upon the mystery of the Godhead; then, and not till then, will the Trinitarian faith begin to appeal not to a part of the man but to the whole. His reasoning on data will only be the surer when he sees them glowing with what satisfies his love, and through his love sways his will.

2. The Atoning Sacrifice of our Lord is another supreme case in point. I mean the Scriptural teaching (so without hesitation I call it) that He died, He suffered, "he poured out his soul unto death," as "the propitiation for our sins," as "a ransom for many," as the offering once offered in view of the awful claims of eternal law, embodied in the Holy Lawgiver Himself, that He was slain on purpose—not only to set a wonderful example of patience, not only to manifest a mighty love, but to "bear our sins," as we deserved to "bear" them, and to deal with them, in thus dying, so that God "might himself be just, and the justifier of" the believer in His crucified Son.

There is no need to dwell upon the literature of discussion which the labors of the head have piled up around the cross, in attack and in defense of its proper propitiatory value. Nor need I elaborate the thought that no defensive discussion, not the best, can be held to preclude all doubt and difficulty from the side of the heart. Enough here to say that on this great matter indeed the heart has its claim to speak. Let the heart pass into an experience such as Scripture in a hundred ways implies that it behooves it to pass into—an experience of conviction of sin; let the man, in the light not of logic but of God in conscience, see himself; let his "mouth be stopped" by that discovery;

let him know himself, with what is nothing less than a fundamental intuition, to be "guilty before God"; then the "doctrine of the atonement," in its old evangelical form, is *known*, not as a theory but as a living thing, a thing as vital as food to the starving. Not a part but the whole of the man understands it as the truth which, however imperfect may be the mental statement, proves itself as the key proves itself by complete adjustment to the lock.

3. I may instance next a very different matter of thought and debate, as to which, as it seems to me, the assistance of the heart is important if the conclusions of the head are to be true to the fullest fact. I mean the problem of the Old Testament beliefs concerning personal immortality. It is a large subject. I indicate data rather than discuss them. Every thoughtful reader, certainly since Warburton wrote *The Divine Legation of Moses*, in the eighteenth century, knows how relatively few and reserved on the whole are the utterances of the Old Testament as to the future, certainly as to the glorious future, of the soul of the righteous. On the other hand we have the Lord's word for it that Abraham rejoiced to see this day. We have the Epistle to the Hebrews assuring us that Abraham and his sons desired "a better country, that is, a heavenly," and "the city which hath foundations," its holy capital.

The conciliation of the two phenomena is difficult while we work at it only along the lines of induction from particular passages, using the head alone as we might use it over a question of chronology. But has the heart nothing to say as it brings its receptivity to bear on the pages of Genesis, or on Samuel, on the Psalms, on the Proverbs, and on the Prophets? I think

t has this to say, that a weighty witness for the fathers' hope of glory, however inarticulate was that hope to what ours is meant to be, since (in St. Paul's words, 2 Tim. 1:10) the Lord Christ "brought life and immortality *out into the light* by the Gospel," is offered by the whole attitude of the fathers' souls toward their God. What a wonderful study that attitude is! Consider the deep, while worshiping, intimacy of Abraham's friendship with Jehovah, the passionate enthusiasm, for it is no less, of the psalmists for the eternal King upon whom they delight to shower every epithet, every attribute of admiring, rejoicing, and self-surrendering love.

Read the Prophets through from that one viewpoint for once, and sum up, if it be possible, their jealous devotion to His glory who is their Master, message, and most intimate companion, in whom they are inexpressibly happy, "though the fig-tree should not blossom," though their dear city must fall under her sins before the foe. What I think, what my heart thinks, over this grand display of the passion of human souls for God is that, whether or no the fathers could have given a reasoned account of the revelation of life and glory allowed them, they had some such revelation. Such delight in God is not thinkable, certainly not naturally thinkable, on the hypothesis that those who enjoyed it, and lived in and by it, really thought that either they should pass out of being at death, or that they had nothing before them but a "Sheol," shadowy and forlorn as Homer's underworld. Can we not trace again and again the breaking out inarticulately of a hope, an outlook, a revealed prospect, whose light was commonly, perhaps, less bright but not therefore absent? "Thou shalt guide me with thy

counsel, and afterward take me to glory," or "in glory," for either rendering may be given to the grandly abrupt original. I read those words, which cannot naturally be explained away, as indicating like a narrow ray through a sky of clouds, a world of light beyond infinitely larger than the clouds. But it is heart rather than head which reaches the conclusion.

4. Turn now to illustrations of our theme from the quarter of more strictly literary, documentary, study. I need not take up time by reminding my reader of the vast fact of modern literary controversy over the pages of the Bible, if only from the time Astruc wrote, nearly two centuries ago, on the Divine Names in the Pentateuch, down to the latest discussion of the synoptic problem or of the Fourth Gospel. And I need not elaborately say how little I dream of merely brushing aside the claims of literary discussion over the supreme literature of the world. But what I do think is that, to a very great degree and in very various quarters, the function of the heart in this study has been unduly belittled, if not absolutely neglected or rejected.

In discussions upon Genesis, for example, or to take a very different example, upon Daniel, the heart's perception of the literary as well as moral majesty of the writing has been quite inadequately recognized and weighed. But this majesty is a real and momentous element in the phenomena. In Genesis certainly it is worth our most reverent weighing when we are asked to believe that a book as symmetrical, and as elevated in the literary sense as, let us say, Virgil's *Aeneid*, was the compilation, immensely later than the alleged periods, of a floating medley of mythical material, done in a narrow and declining age. Divine

inspiration apart, a great mind lives behind Genesis. So the heart says. And it is a more competent witness to this fact, as to many of its essentials, than the head.

But the particular illustration of my position which will leave with the reader lies nearer the other end of this wonderful Book, this volume, library, manifold yet one, and so one in its multiplicity as to show itself to be more than human at least in its structure. I refer to the Second Epistle to Timothy.

This remarkable letter, as we know, is one of a group, the Pastorals. The three documents of the group somewhat obviously stand or fall together, as genuine and authentic or "pseudepigraphical"—writings professing, but untruly, to bear a given author's name. The head has in modern times found a hundred difficulties in the way of the acceptance of them as St. Paul's own. The style has been put under the literary microscope and pronounced to be irreconcilable with that, for instance, of Thessalonians or Philippians; the same mind could not have expressed itself in both. The indications of surrounding historical conditions, the development of church order, the conflicting beliefs emerging in church life, these and many other features of the Pastorals, have been adduced to prove, to the satisfaction of many "heads," the spuriousness of 1 and 2 Timothy, and Titus.

I am very far from thinking that any of these difficulties is really such that it cannot be met by counter considerations purely rational. But what I do think is that, to a large and instructive degree, a great contribution to the solution of the problem can be made by the heart and that this is often ignored. I allude to the emotional phenomena of that wonderful little document, the Second Epistle to Timothy. Will

my reader take it up again and peruse it, as if for the first time, with just this question in his thoughts: What is the place of the human heart in this, professedly, dying letter? He will find, if he reads it naturally, putting all preconceptions aside, that the human heart beats in well nigh every paragraph. We almost see the tears of the writer dropping on the page. We almost feel the struggles of his deep and tender spirit, the internal motions and energies of sorrow, the sense of change and solitude, the yearnings of memory, the aching longings of personal affection, the springing upward of an indomitable courage, the glory of a mighty hope based upon the rock of a Christ who in a midnight of seeming failure and desertion is felt immovable beneath the feet of faith.

The Epistle, putting inspiration once more aside, is infinitely and most amazingly human; so says the reader's heart, responsive to the soul of the writer. And I affirm without the least fear that the invention, within the first two Christian centuries, by a literary personator, of a letter claiming to be Pauline and pulsating with the emotions of a great and tender soul, was a psychological impossibility. From the point of view of the history of human composition it was as complete an impossibility as would have been the production at that date of a work in modern English.

But if so, the letter is genuine. And if so, the Pastorals, which all hang together, are a group of genuine Pauline writings. And the difficulties of style and contents have to be restudied, leaving room for that fact, which fact is the contribution of the heart.

The line of inquiry thus rapidly and imperfectly suggested may, I believe, be usefully followed out in

merous directions, alike in matters of faith and in matters of record. The head will never lack material for arduous and momentous labor. But it is but a part of man. The heart, certainly in its Biblical sense, is a vastly larger and deeper part. And without its aid for reception and for perception the head will often be only darkness under the light of noon.

CHRISTIAN HISTORY IN RELATION TO THE ART OF PAINTING

IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES

By REV. T. H. WRIGHT, late of the Scots Church, Dresden, Saxony

HUMAN life and human art are one. The vital movement in each of these spheres reacts upon the other and the perennial difficulty is rightly to adjust the both to the real and the ideal. The difficulty in man's life is magnificently portrayed in Browning's *Sordello*, although it cannot be said that "he who runs may read." He who runs must cease from his running and take time to think, and then there will emerge from beneath the overgrowth of imagery and allusion which gives such a fine opportunity to the idle and shallow scoffer, a fascinating personality and a most significant human experience, of which the tragedy consists in the failure to adjust the real with the ideal. In human development neither of these two must be allowed to lose sight of the other. A man must keep a firm foothold on the reality of things and not lose himself in a visionary ideality—head among the clouds and feet in the mud. Even in golf he must perform moderate his swing unless his feet are able to grip the solid earth. So in art, "a powerful naturalism is the Alpha and the Omega of all," without which it wanders into strange aberrations and falls into weakness and sickliness. But on naturalism must be built that which expresses the soul of life, of nature, and of humanity. The artist must never lose or neglect the vision of, or aspiration after, the ideal which is the life of what we call the real. Without vision the people and the art alike perish.

The history of painting discloses this constant swinging between the two extremes, either of which is disastrous to the true excellence of art. In the early Christian period we see developed an unnatural idealism, out of relation to real life. The Renaissance pressed the balance but eventually toppled over to the other side. The tendency was to exaggerate naturalism and to land in a soulless realism. The modern movement is toward an idealism which is not forced from a wholesome naturalism, although in the present ultra-modern schools of painting one is impelled to see this divorce only too apparent. The mark and calling of Christianity are to supply the spiritual impulse, without which things are but so much kindling fuel waiting for the fire; and it is significant that in quarters where modernism has discarded or mutilated Christian truth there prevails in the schools of painting either a materialistic realism or a ridiculous idealism which one would never call by the name of art. I do not the artist insist that this is his quest, so far from it being alien to the superabundant beauty of life. But it is to anticipate. This article seeks to trace the connection of the movements within the world of Christian thought and action with those fluctuations between the real and the ideal through the course of the two centuries after the Renaissance and the Reformation.

Recalling previous discussions of this theme (in *The Bible Magazine*, December, 1913, March and August, 1915), we may make clear once again that the Byzantine mosaics and paintings from the sixth century to the end of the first millennium represented, in this domain of art, the dominant mental attitude toward life and religion in the church under the ægis of the

Roman Empire. The formalism and unreality of the thought and spirit of the church during this period are accurately reflected in the unnatural idealism of the presentation of religious facts and doctrines. The teachers of this generation earnestly desired to impress the people with the teaching of the church, but owing to their own lack of freedom and inward vitality they succeeded in producing only works which are most conventional and inanimate. As their doctrine and life, their organization and hierarchy, were made after the pattern of the Imperial Court, so their art was made in the likeness of their thought and religion.

The church was saved from this deadness in its Christianity and in its art by the revival of religion through the great personalities of St. Francis and St. Dominic in Italy and the Mystics in Germany who brought men back to the simplicity of Christ and therefore to the reality of life. The fuller flood of this impulse to reality was seen in the Revival of Learning which enormously increased the striving after the truth of nature everywhere, and not least in the art of painting. The culmination of this noble artistic impulse is seen in Raphael, with his serenity of outlook and sanity of idea; in Michelangelo, with his massive strength and overmastering vigor of conception and execution; and in Leonardo da Vinci, with his profound sense of the mystery of nature and of man. The Renaissance influence is also manifest, in Northern Europe, in the brothers Van Eyck, in Holbein, and in the works of genius produced by Albrecht Dürer, although his supreme imaginative power must be traced to his native Teutonic raciality.

In all these masters the religious motive and interest are clearly manifest. They were all too near to

ality to ignore the most real of all facts, the unseen and spiritual. And this side of painting was preserved and stimulated and made to prevail, in a critical context, through the fine witness to the larger truth and practical faith by the pre-Reformation leaders of religion, among them the mighty Florentines, Dante, and Savonarola, and by those who more definitely bear the name of reformers.

The sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in Europe were times of stern conflict between rival systems of religion. The Roman Church, which was being dispossessed of its secular power in the lands of Northern Europe, did not surrender so many of its fair and fertile provinces without a desperate struggle, and it was not until near upon the middle of the seventeenth century that boundaries were laid down between Roman and Reformed Christendom; and even then the same strife, under other names, was continued far beyond this measure of recognition. During this century and a half Rome, assailed in its vital part, expressed its arrogance and its consciousness of power—power laboriously built up during a long conflict with imperial prestige, culminating in Hildebrand's signal victory when he compelled the mighty Emperor Henry IV to make abject submission to papal power at the Apennine fortress of Canossa—by bitter attempts to strangle this infant Hercules of religious freedom in its cradle. The holy office of the inquisition lay ready to its hand. Established in 1229 for the purpose of exterminating the heretic Albigenses, it was continued with less success against the Waldenses until the time of the Reformation, and thereafter its ruthless espionage working in the dark, its mockery of judicial investigation working in the light, its

brutal torture, its *auto-da-fé*, were persistently pressed against all new heretics that came within its power. Spain, Italy, and Germany felt the force of its tyranny, and indeed the holy office was not finally abolished until the year 1835.

This mighty spiritual upheaval, the Protestant Reformation, cannot be understood unless it be affiliated with those stirrings among men and nations inspired by the earlier reformers who, by the sheer force of religious vitality and by their desire to follow the actual Jesus of Nazareth, broke through the darkness and stagnation surrounding them. But when their vows of poverty and celibacy, being essentially unnatural, were corrupted, as all such exotic growths are in process of time, into luxury and greed, the impulse which originated them did not perish with the fervor and simplicity of the religious orders. The animating principle was the Holy Spirit who never leaves the children of men, and this divine power did not pass away. It abode in the heart of the obscure faithful ones who truly absorbed the teaching of the Founder of Christianity, and when the fire from Heaven was again brought to earth by some Prometheus of the spirit, these faithful hearts were ready for the divine flame and were kindled into enthusiasm which had larger results than ever St. Francis and his compeers dreamed of. The rise of Wyclif and the Lollards in England, of Hus and Jerome in Bohemia, carried on the spiritual influence until it fruited in the great humanists, Reuchlin and Erasmus, and in Zwingli, Luther, Melancthon, and Calvin.

Under the inspiration of these great personalities the religious movement in the sixteenth century became more than the uprising of a purpose to purify the

ctrine and practice of the church. It was no longer constitutional agitation for the enforcement of better discipline among the clergy and people or for the strait of arbitrary despotism among the popes, but a series of national or quasi-national rebellions against the entire ecclesiastical system which had become a grievous yoke of bondage, political and spiritual, which was intolerable to people growing in the passion for freedom. The one enthusiasm assumed different forms in various lands. Under Farel and Calvin in France, more vitally under Calvin later in Switzerland, the movement was profoundly intellectual as well as spiritual. John Calvin has been truly styled the Aquinas of the Protestant Church, and over against the imposing system of church doctrine so nobly reared by the Dominican schoolman, he raised a system of Christian thought as massive, and far more substantially founded upon the Word of God in the Scriptures and upon the inward spiritual witness. The spirit of Calvin is thus summed up by a master-hand:

No scene in the history of this period is more touching than that which a famous picture has made familiar—the emaciated and dying Reformer, surrounded by the saddened senators of Geneva, stemming for a brief space with iron will, amid acute bodily pain, the fast-ebbing tide of his strength, in order humbly to acknowledge his personal failings, but at the same time to affirm his doctrine, with all the emphasis of a farewell testimony, to the very truth of God. Reserved and apparently cold in disposition, compared with the genial and emotional Luther—the very impersonation of the snowy grandeur of Mont Blanc, the source of the mighty current of the Rhine—Calvin lacked Luther's power of moving directly a vast nation; but he not only moved, he molded, the intellectual few who came within the spell of his impressive personality. He molded the magistracy of Geneva so as to make its government a virtual theocracy. He imbued with

his spirit the representatives of many lands, so as to constitute the Genevan Church a legislatrix for reformed Christendom.

In Geneva the Reformers clearly recognized their duty to the state, and elsewhere the political impulse closely joined with the religious. This is notably the case in Scotland. Patrick Hamilton, George Wishart, Knox, and Melville were first of all religious reformers but all of them—least perhaps Patrick Hamilton, most of all John Knox—had the keenest interest in the political freedom of the people. Knox discerned in Queen Mary the most dangerous enemy of his cause and he was not wrong in his instinct.

In England the course of the Reformation was determined by political considerations, even by royal self-will, and only subordinately by religious conviction, and the fact appears in the imperfection of the process and of the result. But in the mass of the people the religious passion held a far deeper place while the longing for human freedom was no less insistent. In common with multitudes in all progressive lands they would be free, as one of a later day, in much the same spirit, sang:

Thy winds O God are free to blow,
Thy streams are free to drive and flow.
Thy clouds are free to roam the sky;
Let man be free his arts to ply,
Give us freedom! Give us freedom!

It would be a poor conception of Christianity which did not recognize this impulse as one worthy of acceptance among the ideals of the religion founded by the Carpenter of Nazareth and inspired by the ever-living Saviour of Man. Also he would be blind

¹Cowan, Landmarks of Church History.

²Ebenezer Elliott, Corn-law Rhymes.

who failed to discern the vital place of that impulse toward liberty in the development of a worthy art. The purpose of this recalling of the main facts of history is to make this, among other things, plain and convincing.

Summing up the great events of these two centuries, we see how fundamentally they are all concerned with the allied interests of religion and human freedom. In the sixteenth century a widespread revolt breaks out against the Roman Catholic Church to secure a purer and more Scriptural truth and a deeper ethicizing of historical Christianity. Even the Counter-Reformation, within the bounds of the papacy, was as much a part of the reformation of religion as the Protestant secessions which usually monopolize the name. It was a prolonged attempt to make its doctrine and its practice more in consonance with the public conscience. The revolt of the Netherlands against the tyranny of His Most Catholic Majesty of Spain and their successful resistance of his power, the defeat and destruction of the Armada of Spain directed with papal benedictions against the liberties of England, the Massacre of St. Bartholomew in which 20,000 French Protestants perished, were all incidents of the one great struggle. In the seventeenth century the sailing of the band of English Puritans for a new world where they might have liberty to worship God according to their own conscience, the beheading of Charles I for high treason to the commonwealth, and the final ejection of the Stuarts by the Revolution of 1688, were all part and parcel of the same conflict for the freedom of the Gospel and of the citizen.

With these facts in mind it will not be surprising that the period which witnessed these happenings which

are landmarks of the centuries did not show any marked progress in the art of painting, but rather a signal decline. Religion had been preoccupied with a prolonged struggle which both sides regarded as a life and death conflict with alien powers. It was therefore incapacitated from revealing in thought and action its essential life with God, and it is most significant that during these long years the art of painting withered and drooped throughout the greater part of Europe. The center of artistic impulse passed from the Romance nations of the South where the ancient church retained its supremacy, and made its home in the Northern lands where Protestantism prevailed, and there, not in Germany, but in Holland, as we shall see. In Germany, even in the sixteenth century when the Renaissance stimulus was still at work, the immediate effect of the Reformation might appear to be a widespread deterioration of painting. The two Cranachs, for all their artistic virtue, were a poor substitute for Holbein and Dürer. The galleries in Berlin, Dresden, and Munich contain admirable examples of their work, naïve in conception, quaintly German in execution, and all thoroughly Protestant and Scriptural. We owe to the devotion of the older Cranach several portraits of Luther and Melancthon. But we are in another planet from that of the masters. After Dürer, inspired by his example and genius, came the artists called the Little Masters, chief among them the brothers, or cousins, Sebald and Barthel Beham and Aldegrever. They followed their master in devoting much of their talent to engraving, in which they achieved a measure of grace and charm which alone would make them significant, and which does render them a most welcome transition from masterful

enius down to the most appalling mediocrity which succeeds them.

Considering these phenomena, one realizes afresh that a new birth of religion cannot be accomplished without some sacrifice. But the sacrifice, here as elsewhere, in turn brings its own reward in the consolidation of the new-born life of nations. When the work of reformation is done with a measure of completeness, the life of humanity has been enriched with a well-developed sense of its right in private judgment over against all ecclesiastical tradition and authority, a more decided individuality, a new desire for reality in all spheres of our existence, a deeper feeling for the spiritual in and behind, above and beneath, all existence. These will in due time come to their own, for freedom in spiritual life is freedom in all directions of human thought and activity, including art.

In Italy, the native home of painting and the headquarters of the papacy, the decline in art was most of all manifest. The high-water mark of Italian painting had been attained in Raphael, Michelangelo, and Leonardo da Vinci. With this great triumvirate may be associated Correggio, who in his brief space of forty years displayed remarkable gifts as a painter. He was always a young painter, full of vigor and overflowing energy, delighting in exercising his great skill in anatomy and foreshortening to a point where it became a source of peril to his art, and abounding in the exuberance of life. We see his powers and his failings in his famous picture of the Birth of Jesus, where the shepherds can scarcely contain the ecstasy of their nature, and where the angel spectators in their wild rejoicing display a very tumult of limbs. This canvas in the Dresden Gallery reveals the artist's

magic power in the manipulation of light, which here proceeds from the Holy Infant. The whole feeling of the painting is one of unrestrained and yet reverential gladness. Correggio's Madonnas are always joyous, and he loves to bring into their presence representatives, not only of martyrs and apostles, but also of human valor, St. George as well as St. Francis and St. Sebastian. He would associate the noblest and gladdest things of earth with highest spiritual realities.

The followers of these painters bring in the age of feeble imitation. The disciples of Leonardo tend to become copyists. The master created, for example, a type of face which has puzzled and fascinated the generations, the face of the Mona Lisa. The artist has depicted a similar expression of human mystery in the countenance of the central figure in the Last Supper. And you find the same type reappearing in the paintings of da Vinci's many followers, Salaino, Salario, Sodoma, and Luini. The last named, however, has an independent genius which is not that of a copyist. The influence of the master is so penetrating that it maintains some measure of excellence even amidst the undoubted decline.

Already in a painter contemporary with Raphael and Angelo, and da Vinci a phenomenon had appeared which might seem to be the herald of the coming deterioration, had not this failure been due to personal character. Andrea del Sarto, "the faultless painter," was, in the executive power of an artist, surpassed by none of the greatest and approached by few. The sheer skill in painting which his canvases show almost blinds you to the deeper deficiencies of his art, until you go to his pictures with the freshness and vitality of the uncorrupted painters in your eyes and in your

ind. Then their feebleness in idea is only too evident. So long as the theme calls for no expression of spiritual emotion or of any deep human experience, del Sarto need fear no rival, but that requirement being made, the essential weakness of the painter becomes pathetic. The Dresden Gallery contains two paintings by this artist, *The Betrothal of St. Catherine with Her Divine Spouse*, and *Abraham's Offering of Isaac*. In neither of them is any expression given to the transcendent spiritual experience of this ardent bride of Christ, or to the profound tragedy of that offering. In the latter painting the conception is theatrical. The look of agony in the father's face, the rolling of his eyes, and the brandishing of the knife are quite unconvincing. As a good German critic expresses it, there is no blood in the picture. In both the works, as in the other famous paintings of this Florentine artist, everything else is perfect, but the faultlessness only serves to make more pitiful the fatal lack of soul.

Browning has accurately delineated the facts about Andrea del Sarto, and with a deep sense of the artistic tragedy. And this failure is typical of the after course of Italian painting. In many ways the artists retained their skill in externals, but a desperate shortage of ideas became apparent. Instead of nature they give us allegory; instead of actual forms, ideal forms; and the ideals being low-pitched for want of spiritual impulse, decline was inevitable, and it came. You find a painter, for example, like Bronzino, who has a fine skill in portraiture, but instead of confining himself to these lines he tries to imitate the great men of the past. He tries to paint, as they do, large canvases representing the great religious facts of the world unseen, but being without their vision or conviction

he depicts only religiosities. He employs a subject of which he has no inward knowledge, and in consequence he creates "a turmoil of the nude which he took to be in the grand manner of Michelangelo." In the same spirit many second and third-rate painters in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries filled the palaces and churches of Italy with acres of theatrical and inane productions which show a faculty for painting not to be despised, but are desperately lacking in genuine artistic feeling and invention.* There was, in fact, a definite school in Italy which bore the name of the Mannerists, largely because they were each the imitators of some particular artist, Raphael, Leonardo, Michelangelo, Andrea del Sarto or Correggio. They have the manner of the masters without their matter, their style, or an imitation of it without their spirit.

There was also the Neapolitan School, toward the close of the seventeenth century, led by Michelangelo, Amerighi, Caravaggio, and his pupil Ribera, the latter a Spaniard by birth who lived and worked in Italy, especially in Naples. They are styled Naturalists because they sought to protest against the insipidity of the art of their day, but the undoubted force they possessed tended always to become violent, coarse, and painfully realistic. Ribera revels, apparently, in scenes of horror—martyrdoms, tortures, and executions—with materials for which the church of his time provided only too many examples.

Both these schools help to constitute an artistic collapse which was plainly visible in these centuries. The only arrest of this decline was temporarily effected by the Eclectic School of Bologna. The name they bear signifies that they borrow from the many artists

*Poynter and Head, *Italian Painting*.

ther than imitate one. The school was founded by the Caracci (Ludovic, Agostino, and Annibale Caracci), who spent the main part of their working lives within the sixteenth century. The chief members of the fraternity, Guido Reni, Domenichino, and Guercino, belong to the seventeenth century. Guido Reni's paintings are very diverse in quality, his earlier works being violent in style and his latter careless, while those of the middle period show genuine grace and true artistic feeling. But his religious expression never to be despised. Domenichino was far simpler and less encumbered in his paintings than was usual with the Eclectics. But the whole school lacked spontaneity and initiative. Their chief merit is that in a time difficult for art they kept the fire burning on the altar.

For our present purpose, also, it is significant that these painters took their rise during the period of the Counter-Reformation, which was concentrated and organized at the Roman Catholic Council of Trent (1548-1564), a movement which disclosed a remarkable reserve strength within the ancient church, which initiated or stimulated great activity in educational and missionary enterprise, and which may be presumed not to have been without influence in the realm of painting. If it failed to revive the glories of a former age and to carry on the noble succession to nobler triumphs the fact may without lack of charity be ascribed to feebleness in its grasp of spiritual principles. The reformation it sought after, and in measure effected, was too much concerned with things external, and this feature is reflected in the paintings which derive their virtue from this movement within the Roman Church. The large canvases produced by the

Eclectics are in the main thoroughly ecclesiastical, but fail of being impressive religiously. But for such virtues as the school undoubtedly possessed credit must be given to that form of religious life within which the artists lived and worked. The Roman Church cannot be charged with indifference to the development of art, even although under its influence during these centuries the decline of painting in Italy had been brought about as part of a general deterioration of the nobler elements of national life. "The ambition of man, the new virility, folded its cloak and silently flitted over the northern fastnesses of the Alps, and departed to other peoples. Italy reeled back, a slave under the heels of servile politics; her literature a mere feeble and academic scholarship, her art grown into a mere futile imitation of her former greatness."

But before we follow painting to its new sphere one part of Italian art requires separate consideration. The world-famous Venetian School has a character and history of its own. Founded in the fifteenth century by the Bellini and the Vivarini (two Venetian families renowned for the artistic gifts of their sons), it very early proved its independent spirit, its ability to maintain it, and the fine genius of its exponents. Among the free independent citizens of the Republic, an art of painting was produced which was characterized by stateliness, sumptuousness, superb coloration, and richness of entire effect, by the glorious light which played everywhere and an atmosphere which is all-pervading and by the sense of undisturbed freedom which animates and crowns the whole. Nor were ideas lacking ideas of noble humanity and of the purpose of existence. The third in order of birth of the Bellini family

*Haldane Macfall, History of Painting.

ovanni, maintained a fine religious aim along with the Renaissance ambition after true artistic excellence. In his famous studio in Venice the crowning painters of that school were trained, Titian, Giorgione, and in some degree, Tintoretto. Jacopo, the elder Bellini, deeply influenced another most significant artist of the sixteenth century, Mantegna, whose paintings represent perhaps the finest Early Renaissance spirit outside of Florence. The men in whose work the Venetian genius came to its highest attainment were far from being destitute of religious aspiration in their painting. The Venetian art was, like the people, free in life and spirit, unhindered by ecclesiastical tradition and convention which in other parts of Italy we have seen to prevail along with most munificent help given by the church. Its art was neither proscribed, prescribed nor patronized by religious authority, and the fact is seen not only in its freedom but also in its limitations. Its most characteristic quality was largely due to the marvelous condition of the light and atmosphere around that sea-port, sun-swept city. Also the pomp and circumstance of life in Venice, the stately, luxurious existence of its nobles and of its merchants whose argosies were on all the seas, had their effect in the strength and breadth and magnificence of Venetian painting.

But while we rejoice in the wealth and harmony of color of the vast canvases, we are compelled to realize that the ease and luxury which surrounded the artists have their effect also in lessening the deeper element in their representations. All is too much on the surface both with the artists and their conceptions. They have little or no experience of the deep places. In fact, all the Venetians reveal the genuine artistic virtues of the pure, or shall we say the unspiritualized,

Renaissance along with the deficiencies of that spirit. But the instinct for nature and for reality which operated in that spirit led them all, though in different degree, to a profound realizing of human individuality. They excel in portraiture of strong, stately men and women, and this skill and insight when applied to noble human themes, and to distinctly religious subjects reaches its finest power. One of Titian's masterpieces is *The Tribute Money*. Its delineation of Jesus as He discerns the crafty hypocritical spirit of the Pharisee is surely one of the most convincing of the many attempts to depict His personality. We see the face of the Pharisee only in the countenance of our Lord. Here is the Master of Life. In His expression is portrayed a combination of strong, sane judgment which cannot be confused, deep scorn and reprobation of all guile, and a genial tolerance of human frailty which understands too well to be resentful or harsh. One thinks, before this consummate painting in the Dresden Gallery, that in that long life of the painter covering a century all but a few months, he never reached a higher point of discernment or of artistic inspiration. His achievement here reveals a reverence for humanity which is never far from the highest veneration and in this instance blends with it.

In the gigantic paintings by another of the supreme Venetians, Paolo Veronese, representing religious scenes, there is no discernment approaching this of Titian, leaving out of account the fact that Veronese never paints anything but Venetian life even when his subject is Oriental and Scriptural. In him the decorative interest submerged all others, and in consequence his religious paintings are signally non-religious. "His Christs and Marias and martyrs of all sorts are com-

sed, serious, courtly, well-fed personages, who, like people of the world accidentally overtaken by some tragic misfortune, do not stoop to contortions or express more than a grave surprise, a decorous sense of pain. His angelic beings are equally earthly." There seems, even in his vast canvas in the Louvre, or in the smaller, though still large, painting of the same subject in Dresden, no room for any expression of the deeper sentiment of the miracle of Cana.

Yet there is no antagonism between the religious and the decorative interest of a painter. He may combine both with admirable effect. Tintoretto, with his immense energy, his dramatic instinct, his decorative sense, his superb imagination, could and did enlist these in the service of an ardent religious interest. His *Last Judgment*, in the Ducal Palace in Venice, his *Michael and the Dragon*, in the Dresden Gallery, illustrate this fine achievement and realize his own declared aim to combine "the design of Michelangelo and the color of Titian." Titian's *Assumption of the Virgin*, now in the Venetian Academy, has been produced as an example of a similar combination of qualities. Tintoretto was well named *Il Furioso* from the immense speed of his painting, and his compatriots only declared that he had three pencils, one of gold, one of silver, and one of lead. Blemishes in his work are not hard to discover, but the strength of his genius can carry them all. And lack of ideas, of high thoughts and aspirations, were never among the blemishes. He was the last great painter of the Venetian School. By the middle of the sixteenth century art in Italy reached its autumn, and with the death of Tintoretto, in 1594, even Venetian glory in painting had departed.

*John Addington Symonds, *Renaissance in Italy*, *The Fine Arts*.

In the seventeenth century the imitators of the masters maintained a not ungraceful art; witness Palma Giovane, nephew of Palma Vecchio, and Tinelli. These with a few others, with more or less profit to the world, occupied the uninspired years, and led the way down to what has been called the "delightful decadence" of Tiepolo, Longhi, Canaletto, and Guardi, in which the influence of the glorious past, with all its vividness and fresh impulse, all its life and light, are not altogether unreflected.

In Spain during the same period the art of Murillo may be claimed as a not unworthy product of the Counter-Reformation in that least Protestant of all European countries, and with its lack of strength and decisiveness may express the accent of religion as Spain knew it. More doubtfully could Velasquez be so classified. In his earlier years the position of this great artist as court painter to Philip IV freed him from the proscription of the church and allowed him to develop freely according to his inner impulse, and in his later years frequent visits to Italy enabled him to study the great Venetian colorists, notably Tintoretto, and to imbibe and assimilate many of their finest qualities. Rubens, also, in Flanders, the other home of the Roman Church in the seventeenth century, probably owed more to his intercourse with Italy and Venice, and to his friendship and artistic exchange with Velasquez, than to the influence of the religion of his time and country. Neither Rubens nor Velasquez are ecclesiastical painters. Both of them belong more to the future than to the past, for they anticipate some of the achievements of the modern schools. At the same time they belong to that movement which, after the breakdown of sixteenth century painting, took u

theme of fresh realistic art where it had been broken off in the fifteenth century. "In the full cultivation of the seed that was contained in the Early Renaissance, and not fully developed in the height of the Renaissance, lay the future activity of the artist, which all the great men of the seventeenth century, whether in Naples or Flanders, Spain or Holland, shared equally."

But it was in none of these countries so vitally as Holland that the revival of genuine art was to be. The art of painting found its freedom in that land which had won its liberty after perhaps the fiercest and most heroic struggle that ever history had to record. The close connection between art and life, between truth in thought and truth in painting was ever more clearly demonstrated.

The long trial Holland had endured so courageously had led to truer vision in many ways. The people had discovered their fellow countrymen, had seen a new light, not in the eyes of a Madonna, but in the eyes of men and women around them. A halo of glory rested not upon saint or "sacred" martyr, but upon the head of honest burghers, their wives, and children. The painters were inspired to paint what they saw with fresh vision, and consequently the art true, vivid, and convincing. Jan Steen, for example, the happy painter of domestic enjoyment, of father, mother, children, in family festivity. His children are delightfully human and naturally irresponsible, not full or oppressed but full of gaiety and charm. If he has to paint a sad scene, he leaves the children out of the sorrow. His picture of poor Hagar being banished from the only home she had depicts her sorrow

*Muther, History of Modern Painting.

and the feeble solicitude of Abraham most realistically but amidst it all the boy Ishmael, the storm-center in this domestic tragedy, is playing with his bow and arrows in complete unconsciousness of any trouble. Just a happy boy, whose griefs will come soon enough.

The people had also discovered the beauty and sacredness of their soil, their own towns and villages, their own homes, however humble and obscure they might be. The scenes of their own land, defended even unto death against tyranny and outrage, had a new charm and appeal to their hearts. The painters gave themselves with avidity to paint the hills and valleys, the waves of the sea, the peasant houses and farmyards, the dark woods and smiling level pastures, the streets and alleys and market places of their towns. We see the result in the innumerable small paintings, and larger, which delight all who can appreciate truthful and sincere artistic work. Here is no production of sham, shoddy sentiment disguising poor craftsmanship and slovenly execution, but the work of men who put their best and utmost into their painting because of their love of what they paint.

Humor of a rough and homely brand is also characteristic of the Dutch, whose native liveliness had not been suppressed even by the stern ravages of war. Expression is given to this by Jan Steen, Teniers, and Brauwer. But humor, vivacity, and piquancy can only too easily degenerate into vulgarity and offensiveness. The works of Teniers and of Brauwer and also of Ostade demonstrate how near to the worthy realism in which Dutch painters excel, an unworthy realism lies in wait. The desire to get into the heart of life's reality is of the essence of all human endeavor, and therefore of painting, and a kindly, genial tolerance

and charity toward human foibles and frailties is a mark of true insight as well as of genuine humor. It is not stupid revelling in ugliness and degradation is the sign of deterioration in the inward life of the artist who depicts it.

The finer qualities of the Dutch painters which have been mentioned constitute truly religious painting, truly as if they had been concerned with the most sacred personages and events of Holy Writ. Insight into and love for humanity is a vital part of Christianity. The truly spiritual person, rightly understood, is he who can discern most of the spiritual in common things, as well as in the uncommon, everywhere. And we may take this Dutch artistic work as a clear witness to the better truth and nobler character they had achieved in their patriotic struggle, a testimony to the life in their spirit which the divine spirit animated.

But a more direct expression had to be given to the living essence of religious fact than any of these Dutch artists named could compass, and this is forthcoming in the master genius of Rembrandt. All the upward tendencies of Dutch painting were concentrated in this supreme artist who anticipated so much not only of modern art but of modern vision. It has been said that, while the art of Rubens, his contemporary, was gloriously pagan, that of Rembrandt was sadder, calmer, modestly Christian and humane." We may add that the Christianity is mainly expressed through the humanity. This artist has little sense of the spiritual that transcends the human tabernacle. When he leaves the ground he is apt to lose himself in the sky. Witness his grotesque representation of

¹Wedmore, *Painters and Painting*.

the beautiful Ganymede being borne upward by the eagle to be Jove's cupbearer. The beloved of the god is transformed into a squalling ugly child. In his painting of Manoah's Offering, an angel disappearing in the smoke of sacrifice is a solid, ungainly figure from a Dutch marketplace. But no one knew as he did how to glorify plain humanity with a mystic glory of marvelous chiaroscuro, while leaving his subject essentially and frankly of the earth. He loved to portray, with the exquisite resources of his art, simple men and women, especially such as had passed through the experience of trial and bore the marks and scars of the conflict. He was an intensely human painter as he was an intensely human being. He may be compared with Burns, both in his art and in his life, and also in the deep sense of religious values which both poet and painter maintained amidst their irregularities. Their very failings and frailties were those of a lovable personality, never of one crafty or self-seeking; such a person as Rembrandt's self-portraits reveal, of a lavish, reckless, and jovial, and withal a tenderly affectionate disposition.

Rembrandt's religious paintings are such as you might expect from one like Rembrandt. They could scarcely be of the finest spiritual quality, any more than the poems of Burns could be. The artist's conception of incidents in the career and sufferings of our Lord is always reverent and full of human insight. But his true expression of himself in this sphere is given in those paintings which deal with homely religious experience. He is strongly Protestant, both in his choice of subjects and his treatment of them, frank, naïve, and natural to his time and the sentiment of it. He is more at home in the Old Testament than in the

w. And there is a very significant fact respecting
 e of his famous paintings in the Dresden Gallery,
 Offering of Manoah. This picture of the father
 l mother offering their sacrifice and beseeching the
 rd for a child to bless their home, and for wisdom
 know what to do unto the child which should be
 n, was painted in the year that Rembrandt and his
 e had lost two children by death and were anxiously
 waiting a new birth. The painting grows in human
 ue from the circumstance, and one gains a fresh
 upathy for the artist in his checkered and wayward,
 never wholly forgetful, life.

In this touch which brings the man and the artist
 ge together we may see the promise of a more vital
 yet to be, when the travail of things works out the
 vers of humanity. And we are glad to leave paint-
 , for the present, with its face toward the sunrising,
 h a light in its eyes and a vision in its soul, genuine
 hough imperfect, which have come out of great tribu-
 on endured for human freedom, for truth, and
 religion.

STOICISM AND CHRISTIANITY

By E. G. SIHLER, PH. D., of New York University

[NOTE.—The following have been used in the preparation of the subjoined study: *Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta*, collegit von Armin, 3 vols., 1903, 1905. Diogenes Laertius, Book VII. L. Annaeus Seneca, ed. Hase, 1871. Epictetus, ed. H. Schenkl, *editio minor* 1898; my references are to the pages of that edition. Marcus Aurelius, ed. Stich, 1882; here, too, the pages of that edition are cited. *M. Cornelii Frontonis et M. Aurelii Imperatoris Epistolae*, ed. Naber, 1867. *Iulii Capitolini M. Ant. Philosophi (in Scriptores Historiae Augustae*, ed. H. Peter, 1865). The First Apology of Justin Martyr, ed. Gildersleeve, 1877. Celsus, ed. Th. Keim, 1873. The *Octavius* of Minucius Felix, ed. Halbach, 1867. Zeller, *Stoics*, etc., transl. by Reichel, 1892. Cassius Dio, ed. Dindorf, 1864, Epitome of Book 71. Th. Zahn, *Der Stoiker Epiktet und sein Verhaeltniss zum Christenthum*, Erlangen, 1881. Doellinger, *Judenthum und Heidenthum*, 1857. (The English translation has long been out of print.) L. Annaeus Seneca, the Versatile, and the Rome of Seneca. Chapter XVIII in *Testamentum Animae*, 1908, New York, by E. G. Sihler. Article, *Pantheismus*, in Herzog's *Realencyclopaedie*, by H. Ulrici.]

IN A former paper, in THE BIBLICAL REVIEW for October, 1916, I presented an outline of classical civilization, in its spiritual aspects, and I summed this up as failure. I said but little of Stoicism. Now, the body of thought and that system of ethical axioms which have held and always have held a certain pre-eminence with many moralists. A book by an English latter-day deist (J. A. Farrer, 1892 and later) has *apertamente* challenged the sovereignty of Christianity both in the domain of morals and of religion. It is a somewhat belated product, I take it, of the deism of Toland.

ndal, and Gibbon, exceptionally fanatical in its
red of Christianity, and quite absurd also when
wed from the standpoint of sober and critical
olarship. Farrer's enthusiasm (and versified
eans) for Epicurus, Seneca, Epictetus, M. Aurelius
cannot share, because I know these too well. As for
arrer's commendation of pagan idolatry coupled
th the well-worn injection of an exegesis of higher
eanings, I cannot take this seriously, because these
egories are as old as Zeno and Chrysippus, and quite
stale.

In a period of some forty-four years of classical
udy, with unswerving devotion I have striven to
tther and appreciate whatever spiritual elements
uld be met or traced in the recorded and transmitted
terances of the classical world. I am deeply con-
nced that those who would understand the history
Christianity should possess more than a few gen-
eralizations or commonplaces—dry leaves from her-
baria, often passed on from manual to manual, from
mpilation to compilation, from commentary to com-
mentary, and often also, it must be said, from sermon
sermon. We are living in a time when Greek is
disappearing, with appalling swiftness, from our liberal
education. The time, indeed, to speak seriously, is
not far away when those responsible for, or who are
patrons of, the teaching of divinity and Biblical learn-
ing must safeguard that essential prerequisite, Greek,
somehow and somewhere; for the New Testament and
its cultural and historical setting are certainly fully
needful for the highest welfare of mankind as are
siphammers, microscopes, steel, oil, gas, and coal.
Even somewhat more so, we dare say. Who will gain-
say this?

When St. Paul came down from Philippi, from Amphipolis and Apollonia, to Thessalonica and to Berœa, he took ship and sailed for the Piræus (Acts 17). At Athens he was impressed (cf. Pausanias I) with the exceptional vastness of figures reared for pagan worship. Poor Paul! he evidently lacked the proper requisites for archaeological appreciation and probably failed to feel the esthetical rapture of mandatory ecstasy so often inculcated by the diluted humanism of later times. He was indeed strongly stirred (θεωροῦντος κατείδωλον οὔσαν τὴν πόλιν). But Athens was then also what she had been since the days of Plato and Aristotle, the central point, the metropolis of Greek philosophy. Here the schools called Academic, Peripatetic, Stoic, and Epicurean still had regular chief professors, transmitting system, doctrine and polemic from generation to generation, leaders who as a rule were born at a considerable distance from the renowned but now quiet and mainly academic town born, I say, at some point far away within the vast periphery which quite properly we call not the Hellenic but the Hellenistic world. And it is, further, in entire harmony with our knowledge of the history of Greek thought, that these two schools, the Epicurean and the Stoic, are specifically named (in Acts 17) as those which came into contact (συνέβαλλον) with Paul. They had a vitality and a wide acceptance greatly surpassing the others. Academic leaders, these, of the world of that time, before whom Paul proclaimed the faith in the God who made the universe and all there is in it (Acts 17:24), that He dwelt not in temples made with hands, that He was self-sufficing, that it was He who gave to all life and breath and everything, that all mankind was of one original stock, and that He was

far from each one of us, and before whom he cited
 the exordium of Aratos: Τοῦ γὰρ καὶ γένος ἐσμέν.

If the Stoics of the university who heard him had
 been theists they would have felt some positive affinity
 to these theses. It was some three hundred and fifty
 years before that Zeno of Kition in Cyprus had estab-
 lished his school in Athens, in the Painted Porch by
 the Market. In the main, however, Paul's message
 was to the Greeks who sought wisdom (ἐπειδὴ καὶ Ἕλληνες
 πάντες ζητοῦσιν, 1 Cor. 1:22), foolishness (μωρία, 1 Cor.
 1:28).

Let us now look more closely at certain funda-
 mental tenets of the school of Zeno, Kleanthes,
 Chrysippus, Panætius, Seneca, Epictetus, and the
 Imperial Stoic. At bottom the Stoics were no less
 materialists than the followers of Democritus and of
 Epicurus, for everything, they held, which affects an
 object, and everything which is affected, must needs
 be corporeal; and in their larger and fundamental
 conception they held that cause and matter were the
 two prime factors of the universe. It seemed to them
 a simple exchange of terms to call that cause, or
 formative principle, God. "Matter lies inert, a some-
 thing ready for anything, if none stir it" (Seneca,
Epistolae, 65, 2). Everything that really *is* must be
 material, or some form of matter. Now that power
 or force which organized matter was heat, or fire, a
 creative but essentially physical agency, immanent in
 matter and interpenetrating it and bearing within
 itself, nay, being itself, the creative reason (λόγος
 δημιουργικός), containing within itself the germ or germi-
 nation of all organic life and the causes of all that
 has happened, is now happening, and is going to
 happen; and the interdependence and sequence of

these are *fate* and *knowledge* and *truth* and *law*, absolute and defying escape for all being. By this all things in the universe were administered exceedingly well, as in some civil polity enjoying the best laws (Eusebius, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, XV, p. 816). Some day this universe will be dissolved in heat, and heat alone will remain: "God will take everything back into himself." Then this gaseous substance, by a process of cooling, will once more produce the four elements in their sequential metamorphosis; the germ of reason, will resume its activity, everything will come forth once more in a fresh process of life and reason. These cycles have been from eternity, and they will follow each other into all eternity—creation and dissolution of the same cosmic and divine substance forever and ever.

Now this universe, the Stoics held, is divine, for God is the universe and these are convertible terms. This then is a system of pantheism. The universe is one being, it is animate and rational, endowed with the faculty of perception. They gained this not so much by scientific speculation as by abstract reasoning as thus: "A living being is better, more efficient, than a non-living being; nothing is better than the universe therefore the universe must be a living being. And it is animate, as is clear from our vitality being a detached particle (*ἀπόσπασμα*) of the universe" (*Diogenes Laertius*, VII, 143). Mind and reason permeate the universe, as our own vitality permeates ourselves. We are a part, then, of the universe and therefore (sic) there is something divine in us also. We are an articulation of, are associated with, this divine universe ("et socii eius sumus et membra," Seneca, *Epistolae*, 92, 30). It is curious to see how

s all-pervading animation, the material organic heat, claimed to be at the same time rational, the source of thought, nay, wisdom and law itself, with which we are bound up, if only we recognize this dependence we ought. We may, therefore, we can, reason from ourselves to the universe or God, and from the latter back to ourselves again, *ad libitum*; their favorite term, however, is nature (φύσις).

As for Seneca indeed, the dramatist, orator, advocate, brilliant stylist, essayist, student of nature, man of the world and reader in the closet, contemporary of St. Paul, educator of Nero, administrator for some years of the Roman Empire, satirist, moralist, courtier, admirer of the simple life of the Cynics and still in possession of fabulous wealth—his Stoicism often reminds us of the iridescence of certain brightly plumaged birds, whose crests, according as the sun's rays strike them so or so, now appear as gold, now mauve, now violet. The famous Corduban, I say, sometimes appears a genuine Stoic and consistent sectary, and again his penetration of soul concerns attains a dignity and profundity of utterance which seems indeed almost to preclude anything but distinctly theistic, nay, Christian, conceptions, rising positively above the ether, or above the breath, of Zeno or Chrysippus, and above the cosmic mechanism of his own school. We are sometimes reminded of St. Paul's words on the Areopagus: "That they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him [grope, ἐπιψηλαφήσειαν], and find him, though he be not far away from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being" (Acts 17:27, 28).

Let us look then at the curious Janus-faces in Seneca's utterance, curious because he is a sectary

of pantheism, and still he often seems to aspire, at least, to theism. "It is a great consolation [sic] to be whirled along [*rapi*] with the universe." "Whatever it is that has ordered us so to live, so to die, by the same necessity it binds the gods also. An irrevocable course carries along human and divine affairs equally. He himself, the founder and ruler of all, has once indeed written the fates, but he follows. Always he obeys, once he has issued his orders" (Prov. 5, 8). "The world also, embracing all things, and the ruler of the universe, God [He is identical with the world], strives indeed for outward things, but nevertheless entirely from everywhere returns unto himself" (in the ἐκπύρωσις of the Stoics, *De Vita Beata*, 8, 4). "Whoever was the moulder of the universe, whether he is that God and powerful over all, or incorporeal reason, craftsman of stupendous works, or a divine breath spread through all the greatest and smallest things, with equal energy; or Fate and an immutable series of interdependent causes" (*Ad Helviam*, 8, 3). "The mind, viewer and admirer of the world, most magnificent part of it" (*ib.*, 8, 4). "For what else is Nature, but God and divine reason injected into the universe and the parts thereof" (*De Beneficiis*, 4, 7, 1). "Nor is Nature without God, nor God without Nature, but both are the same [*idem est utrumque*] * * * thus now call it Nature, Fate, Fortune, all are names of the same God using his powers in various ways" (*ib.*, 4, 8, 2-3). "Whether the universe is a soul, or a body governable by Nature" (*Naturales Quaestiones*, 3, 29, 2). "He [God], makes himself, before all things" (*Fragmenta*, 15). Now for the other, loftier side of Seneca's thought. "To obey God is Freedom" (*De Vita Beata*, 15, 7), "driving out the

reed for another's possession, from which rises every evil of the soul" (*De Clementia*, 2, 1, 4). "If you mitigate the gods, bestow benefactions even upon the ungrateful: for even for the criminal the sun arises, and for pirates the seas are expanded (*De Beneficiis*, 26, 1). "Now could a law be set for showers that were to fall, that they should not flow down upon the fields of the evil and wicked" (*ib.*, 4, 28, 3). How to combat anger: "Nor will anything be more wholesome than thinking of your own mortality" (*De Ira*, 3, 42, 2). "Should anyone nurse anger? Challenge him with acts of kindness" (*ib.*, 2, 34, 5). "That I should persist praising the life, not which I lead, but which I know I ought to lead, and follow, even at a mighty distance, crawling as it were" (*De Vita Beata*, 18, 2). "Sins do not wait in one spot, but restless and at odds with one another they are in an uproar: they charge and are routed in turn: but the same confession we will always have to make of us, that evil we are, evil we have been, and, unwillingly must add, evil we shall be" (*De Beneficiis*, 1, 10, 3). "Nobody knows God, many conceive him meanly, and with impunity" (*Epistolae*, 31, 10). "Oh, when will you see that time, when you will know that *Time* has nothing more to do with your being?" (*ib.*, 32, 1). On the conscience: "A sacred spirit is seated within us, an observer of good and evil, and a guardian. As he has been treated by us, so he himself treats us" (*ib.*, 41, 2). "A good conscience defies the mob, an evil one even in solitude is troubled and distressed" (*ib.*, 43, 5). "What avails it to have something kept from a human being? Nothing is barred to God. He attends our minds, and drops right into the midst of our reflections" (*ib.*, 83, 1). Sir William Ramsay

even thinks Seneca knew something of the Gospel. I do not think so. Let us proceed.

As to life and conduct, the Stoics laid down the rule, from Zeno onward, that man follow nature, or the universe, or God—*sequere deum!* to live conformably to “nature” (ὁμολογουμένως τῇ φύσει εἶν). They interpreted and injected into this “nature” every possible moral perfection. As a matter of fact, their “nature,” like their pantheistic “God,” was an abstraction of their sect, a creation of their school. Nowhere else did they so utterly ignore, nay, stand on its head, that *testimonium animae*, which both the broad experience of our race, as well as the honest voice of the individual conscience, is bound ever to attest. There is a chasm between the Stoic “nature” and the actual one, which even the most fervid declamations and protestations of your radical deist will find it difficult to bridge over. The empiric truth, indeed, of the ages here confounds human pride, and from the unfathomable potentiality of sin (which honest and sincere men will and must designate as hereditary sin) ever comes forth the actual and concrete lapse. Jesus knew what He did when, in that simplest and that most comprehensive prayer of spiritual needs and spiritual conditions, He gave a place to that petition which is known as the sixth: “And lead us not into temptation.” Or is there any one born of woman whose spiritual strength and confidence makes, for him, this element in the Lord’s Prayer dispensable? Where is he? As for the brilliant Corduban, he, too, like all genuine Stoics, lights up his pages with the wonderful perfections borne by the sage alone, invincible by men or misfortune. Alone truly good, ready to defy mankind, whom no one can really injure, even though they slay

him, content with himself, whose state is the world, who has no needs, all ages wait upon him as a divine being. He never changes his purpose, is utterly devoid of emotions, hoping nothing, desiring nothing. "There is something in which the sage excels God" (the pantheist's God); "the latter owes his fearlessness to nature, the sage to himself" (*Epistolae*, 53, 11). It has always been so; in pantheism man is the apex of all, in whom only (cf. Hegel) that divinity becomes conscious. Such are the antinomies of human wisdom. (One voice: "Be as God! Humanity [as in *Compte*] is the only God." The other voice: "Get down on all fours, like Nebuchadnezzar; reduce yourself to your essential beasthood, and get your true, your primeval meaning for the γνῶθι σεαυτόν of that Delphic monition.")

There was some common clay in Seneca's composition. He rings the changes in his vindictive reminiscences of Caligula, who once came near destroying the brilliant orator. Seneca's satire on Claudius was inspired in the main by revenge. Claudius once exiled him to Corsica. Finally Seneca, lending his pleader's power and his brilliant pen to justify or defend the imperial matricide, Nero—this is simply an awful incident in his public life. No John the Baptist he. Seneca's brilliantly sententious pages do indeed mirror and rebuke the decadence of his times with searching ethical acumen far beyond the more coarse and superficial rhetorical indignation of the later Juvenal. That Neronian age, I say, is stripped naked by the pen of the famous moralist, but his contemporaries naturally felt more vividly than we do the worldly side of his career and pointed to his thirteen millions (in our standard; Tacitus, *Annals*, 13, 42) and the six hundred tables of citrus wood with ivory feet. They did not,

in fact, take the brilliant satirist and moralist quite as seriously as he took himself. Thus, too, Tacitus, one of the keenest analysts of character known to literature, is very cool and reserved in dealing with that character and that life.

But we must in fairness, cast more than a glance at one or two further elements in Stoic ethics, elements highly commendable in themselves. What is the aim and end (τὸ τέλος) of life and living? Only those things which "are in our power" (τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν), the things in which the onset of our will (ὁρμή, προαίρεσις) is directed at mental, moral things, soul-boons; in a word, those things which are good and wholesome to the inner man. What actual men mainly pursue, wealth, pleasure, honor, are either evil or at least indifferent (ἀδιάφορα or *fortuita*). These are the body of worldly quests, which prove noxious to the average man. Among these *adiaphora* the consistent Stoics (who prided themselves on their rigid consistency) placed even health and death. Calm, a soul unruffled (ἀταραξία), is in fact the great end of life, for I need not say they had no transcendental hope. Here, too, they analyzed with keen psychological insight, and reprobated, all passions and emotions (cf. von Arnim, *Fragmenta Stoicorum*, vol. III, pp. 92-133). These, all of them, even pity or mercy, are weaknesses of the soul, which must not merely be controlled but uprooted, for they are disloyal and disobedient to that which is the sovereign element or dominant power (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) in man, to wit, reason. Such are cupidity, fear, grief, pleasure, all proceeding from wrong mental images (φαντασίαι) and directing the onset of our will at those things which are not within the purview of soul-concerns. Here further belong (*ib.*, p. 96, sq.) wrath or anger in all its forms,

terness, hatred, grudge, sexual passion, yearning, will, a sense of want, feuds, fondness of pleasure, covetousness, ambition, gluttony, ebriety, even excessive fondness of life. For the Stoics, as the hierophants of freedom and absolute self-determination, made suicide, in certain circumstances, an integral part of their ethics, particularly when hemmed in by tyrants. Wherever you look, there is an end of troubles. Do you see the precipice? There is a descent to freedom. Do you see that sea, that river, that cistern? Freedom here abides at the bottom. Do you see your neck, your throat, your heart? They are modes of escape from slavery" (Seneca, *De Ira*, 5, 15, 4). It was this practical assertion of freedom which endowed with peculiar renown some of the members of the Roman aristocracy under Claudius, Nero, and Domitian. And the same Pliny who extolled these was also, as governor of Bithynia and supreme justice of that province, so rigorous in dealing with the poor Christians brought before his tribunal (*Epistolae*, 10, 96), the emperor's representative who calmly sent them to execution simply because he resented their obstinacy, when they refused to worship the idol of Trajan, and who applied the torture to two deaconesses to ascertain more exactly their religious belief, which he sums up as "superstitionem pravam immodicam."

It was about this time that there flourished, at Nicopolis in Epirus, Epictetus, once a slave of Nero's freedman Epaphroditus, trained, through the latter's kindly interest, as a Stoic, in Rome, by Musonius Rufus, and ultimately, under Domitian, expelled with all the philosophers from Rome and from Italy. Epictetus has been greatly extolled as a lofty moralist. He taught Stoicism under Trajan and Hadrian for

his material support, but even more he seems to have acted toward a great many individuals as a kind of spiritual counsellor and confessor. My illustrations are mainly from Arrian's records of his discourses and monitions. While Epictetus was indeed a Stoic, he was far from being a mere exegete and scholastic. Very often, indeed, he seems to rise to a positively theistic conception, which cannot well be reared on purely Stoic pantheism and materialism. When Arrian knew him he was an old man, and lame. "Epictetus the Lame, said the enemy of Christianity, Celsus (Keim, p. 115), was a moral hero in suffering his lameness, and therein superior to Jesus on the cross." To Arrian he once said: "What shall I, an old man, do but praise God?" But this, which we may call his personal quasi-theistic aspiration and afflatus, existed like two chestnuts in one burr, side by side with the pantheism and the spiritual pride and self-sufficiency of his school and sect, where the supreme court and the judge of last resort is the *ego*. If St. Paul's sweeping judgment had been presented to his attention: "For all have sinned, and come short of the glory of God" (Rom. 3:23), he would have protested for himself, against such a classification. Or this (Rom. 7:18 sq.): "For I know that in me (that is, in my flesh,) dwelleth no good thing: for to will is present with me; but how to perform that which is good I find not. For the good that I would I do not: but the evil which I would not, that I do." "Because the carnal mind is enmity against God: for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be" (Rom. 8:7).

Now for Epictetus. If only we hold on to our rational and dominant element, all is well (p. 126, ed. Schenkl). All we need is practice and training

cordance with the right reason (*ib.*). "For in the
 course of long time we have been habituated to do the
 opposite and hold as practical assumptions those which
 are contrary to the right." A proper course in
 psychological analysis (*sic*) will rectify all that. By
 our original and fundamental design we are indeed
 good. We must conserve ourselves (p. 126) as we
 are by our intrinsic nature, viz., reverential, faithful,
 steady, not liable to be dazed, free from emotion, free
 from disturbance. I cannot (p. 127), like Zeus, be
 ageing and immortal, "but I can die divinely, endure
 sickness divinely. These things I possess. These
 things I can do. I will show you the sinews of a
 philosopher." To admit fundamental sinfulness would
 have been, in his eyes, a denial of the divine reason,
 the nature, of which man's soul is a detached part
 (ὁ ἀπόσπασμα εἰ θεοῦ, p. 125). So he often speaks of the
 will of nature," and "to follow the will of nature"
 παρακολουθεῖν τῷ βουλήματι τῆς φύσεως). Our own nature is
 also the nature of the universe (69). He denies the
 axiom of Epicurus, that man by nature is set to pursue
 his advantage; it is from this vicious axiom that there
 have arisen wars, revolutions, usurpation, conspiracies
 (p. 72). "This is a law of nature and of God, that
 the better shall always overcome the worse" (p. 93).
 Our nature is to be faithful, but the adulterer destroys
 this design" (p. 112). Epictetus admits that "women
 are common by nature" (112), but the adulterer,
 instead of a human being, is a wolf or an ape (113).
 What is the strongest among men, nature, dragging
 us (ἔλκουσα) toward her own will, even against man's
 will and with man groaning" (p. 177). "There is a
 law of nature, that the better man shall have the
 advantage over the worse" (254).

I shall now present a number of his utterances where pantheism and theism (at least a quasi-personal conception) seem to follow each other in a puzzling manner. "If thou followest him who administers the universe, and bearest him about in yourself, do you still hanker after jewels and artistic marble?" (p. 257). In moral struggle "remember God, call upon him for aid and assistant" (168). Duty fulfilled, I may say to God: "I have not, I dare say, transgressed (παρέβην) your commands. Have I used my mental faculties aright?" (223). "We must not find fault with his administration" (*ib.*). "If God wills me to have fever I too will it" (328). Zeus made you one endowed with the faculty of endurance (ὑπομενητικόν), endowed with a lofty soul (231), "what then shall befall?" "As God wills" (263). "To raise your hands in death to God, and say that you have been faithful in perceiving his administration and following it" (385). "Man must not censure the giver for taking away" (330). "What attestation do you give to God?" (96). "Only rational beings (τὰ λογικά) can by their nature have life with God" (33). "Will not the fact, that we have God as Creator and father and as him who cares for us, lift us out of sorrows and fears?" (33). Such willing conformity makes one "equal to the gods" (48). God is aware of every movement of the soul (p. 51) "inasmuch as it is of his own household and cognate with him." But really man is autonomous, and he will must decide. "As for one's determination (προαίρεσις), not even Zeus can overcome it" (8). We are so constructed as not to be hinderable or constrained by Him (God) or anyone else, otherwise He "would not be God" or care for us *in the manner He must* (59). "Nothing that happens must happen against

our will" (145). The faculty of determination (ἡ προαιρετικὴ) is the faculty *par excellence* (193). "No one is sovereign over another's volition" (42). Over and over again Epictetus repeated in his discourses: "This law God established," and he says: "If you want any boon, take it from yourself" (91). Epictetus was an enthusiastic follower, in these reflections, of Socrates, whom he incessantly extols as the exemplar of freedom: "They can slay me but they cannot injure me" (92-93) (283, 109). "The beginning of wisdom is the finding of a standard" (εὕρεσις κανόνος) (136). But is not passion the bare negation of clear ideas (we might object), and not at all the substitution of the faulty mental image for the sound one? Epictetus also strove to employ the inductive manner of the famous Athenian, and the *Memorabilia* of Xenophon had a curious palingenesis in the life and manner of the lame moralist of Nicopolis. He admits, it is true, that Socrates did not really affect one thousandth part of those with whom he came in contact (209). He often rebukes the mere erudition of his own sect; we must not be mere exegetes of other men's ideas and conceits (129). Schooling in philosophy is inadequate; we advance there as far as syllogisms and the like, but not one iota beyond (134). One may analyze syllogisms as aptly as Chrysippus, and still fail in the real aim of philosophy (197). Some philosophers are "lions in the school, but foxes outside" (360. Cf. Lucian's *Piscator*).

There is a single allusion in Epictetus to the Christians; it is a curious passage, and, when we look at it closely, a very positive attestation of their martyrdom. He had (p. 376) just spoken of a certain type of men, to whom children, fortune, possession or

non-possession, nay, life itself, are merely as shells on the beach with which children play, no more. To such no tyrants or guardsmen are awful, nor swords. "Then it is from insanity that someone may be disposed toward these things [to treat the dearest things of life as mere shells] and the Galileans from habit" (ὕπὸ ἔθους), but not from philosophical conviction. We record, then, this important admission of the contemporary Stoic, albeit he belittles their motive as mere "habit." But we know their motive, faith in the risen Christ. The passage in Epictetus is a precious illustration of Pliny's report on the Christians (*Epistolae*, 10, 96). And we know also that this "habit" had been a continuous one from Stephen onward to the Bithynian Christians under Pliny's proconsulate, whom that highly cultured gentleman sent to the block so coolly because they were so obstinate. If only they had had motives duly wrought out by Stoical dialectic and psychological analysis, then the philosopher of Nicopolis might have brought himself to admire these Christian martyrs. Little doubt that, herald of freedom though he was, he went through the forms at least of the emperor-worship at anniversary times, and found it easy to justify the cult of beneficent deities who brought to men grain or the grape (18). Of the Galli, the self-emasculated priests of the Phrygian Great Mother (p. 177), he speaks with much less respect than his recent disciple and admirer, J. A. Farrer. Otherwise the Stoics, from Zeno downward, practised an easy accommodation to the figures of popular religion, by physical and etymological interpretation of the same, quite sufficiently to keep themselves out of trouble. Earlier Christianity, in fact, was not the "interpenetration" of Greek and Roman civilization (one of the quite conf

ent and quite absurd generalizations of Auguste Comte), but a veritable revolution against them, and a struggle which did not, indeed, end with Diocletian; the world, that totality of non-spiritual forces, has not yet submitted itself to the call of the Gospel and never will. The church of Christ will always be an *ecclesia militans*.

Let us hear now Epictetus on death. "It behooves us to avoid evils, and death is something necessary" (84). "There is no place to flee from it" (loc. cit.). How long must we endure life? As long as reason constrains us to be associated with our poor little body (συμμεῖναι τῷ σωματίῳ). "That which was born must also perish" (114). "What difference does it make to me, now I shall pass away?" "If you do not die this time, will you not die some time?" (237.) Into nothing awful, but whence you came, into the elements (τὰ στοιχεῖα); what was heat, to heat, what was earth, to earth, air to air, water to water; there is no Hades, Acheron, Kokytos, Pyriphlegethon, but all is full of gods and spirits; death is a cosmic necessity (301). Life is a fair, in which we are "spectators of God's administration" (330). And finally, if the banquet ends, the guest may leave it by his own act, "the door stands ajar" (244), suicide is at our service (232).

As for Marcus Aurelius (ruled 161-180 A.D.), who died at 59, in many books and in much of current tradition he is canonized, just in what conception or mold of perfection is not always very definite. We may say at once that his lofty station, in most respects, did not cut short the Stoicism of his life and conviction, derived and imbibed, e. g., from its most eminent representatives, such as Junius Rusticus, whom in time he appointed *Praefectus Urbi*. The imperial sage came

upon evil days, when Danube and Euphrates often seemed to be precarious frontiers of Roman world-despotism. His keen mind cannot but have fully grasped the moral inferiority of his wife, Faustina, and her lack of genuine loyalty, or the self-indulgent and shallow character of his younger fellow sovereign, Verus, or the germs of depravity in his only son, Commodus. His stray notes and scattered apothegms, "to himself" (πρὸς ἑαυτὸν) one may call a record of self-communion, often jotted down in his own prætorium in Austria, campaigning against the Quadi or Marcomanni, "night thoughts" in many ways. Marcus was not vain, and he was infinitely patient in dealing with most men, even self-denying, nay, self-effacing. We will come closer to him if we transcribe from these utterances of self-communion of the last, troublous stage of his life, largely consumed in frontier wars beyond the Danube. The Stoic system could be recomposed from these pencillings if other records had perished, but we will endeavor in some degree to excerpt the more personal of these notes. At once we are arrested by the frankness with which he himself enumerates his own various excellencies and the persons to whose example, incentive or precepts he owed them. Such achievements were: His moral character (τὸ καλόηθες), his freedom from anger, his reverence for the gods, his charitable open hand, his aversion for showiness and shows of all kinds, including the Roman races, his endurance of hardships, the simplicity of his wants, his dislike for mantics and theurgy, his rational control of conceptions, his aversion for rhetoric (letters to Fronto) which he conceived as inextricably bound up with vanity, his readiness for forgiveness and reconciliation, his study of Epictetus, his spiritual

edom, and his indifference to chance or fortune (τὸ βεβηκέναι), the equableness of his soul amid pains or the suffering of chronic disease, further, the highest concern of his sect, viz., to live in accordance with nature (κατὰ φύσιν ζῆν) and to be patient with non-philosophers (τὸ ἀνεκτικὸν τῶν ἰδιωτῶν).

That buoyancy of joyous energy and a certain optimism generally bound up with robust health were denied him; he rarely was a thoroughly well man. The contents of his night thoughts are meant to give or maintain energy, perseverance, tranquillity in his own mind and frame of being. I would hardly call them consolations. As a whole, it is one of the sternest and gloomiest books that one can read, a companion piece to Ecclesiastes. Like all night thoughts of a man so placed, so limited, these imperial jottings deal much with the end of things, with death. It is merely "an operation of Nature" (φύσεως ἔργον), and who fears that is a child (p. 17); it is nothing but the dissolution of the elements of which every living organism is compounded (20). Heraclitus (who taught the ἀπύρωσις, the conflagration of the universe) died of dyspepsia, Democritus of lice, Socrates of other lice; what of it? You embarked, you set sail, you arrived, now disembark. If for another life, nothing is vacant of worlds, not even there; but if in non-sensation, you will escape from troubles (23). Death, like birth, is a mystery of nature (33). If the souls endure, how will the ether hold them all from eternity (37)? Fame is an empty sound. What is now Camillus, Cæso? And a little further hence, what Scipio, Cato, and then Augustus, Hadrian, Antoninus? There is simply nothing always remembered (41). Suicide is the *ultima ratio* of freedom (60). This life is short; even

now all but ashes or mummy, and either a mere name or not even a name (61). Cheerfully thou awaitest either extinction or translation (62). Alexander and his stable boy reached the same status (cf. Lucian *Dialogi Mortuorum*) (71).

After all he was an agnostic here, as all men with the limitation of mere nature are bound to be; "either a scattering, if atoms, but if union, either extinction (σβέσις) or translation" (87). "The elements of the dead become elements of the universe" (100). Reputation is short-lived, and the whole earth a mere dot (101). Our poor little soul (ψυχάριον) is materially dissoluble (123). A little span, and you will rest, and him who buried you another will mourn (141). Little that each one lives, little the tiny angle of the earth where he lives, little, too, the most extended reputation with posterity (27). Always keep in view the bond between divine and human things (29). Adjust yourself to whatever befalls (30). Renew yourself (ἀνανέωσεαυτόν). Be sovereign over hardships and pleasures (32). The little bubble reputation (δοξάριον) is nothing when measured against the eternity of past and future (32). Be just, large-souled, temperate, sensible, not precipitate (one of the axiomatic virtues of the sect incapable of being deceived, reverential, free (46). "To practice benefaction is as natural [sic] to man as for a vine to produce grapes" (50). The worse is for the sake of the better, and the better for the sake of reciprocity (57). A calm and imperturbable soul the aim, or a calm current of being (εὐροια) (122).

The Emperor makes much of the inner voice, which he calls the *daimon* within man. "It is sufficient to be close to the power within oneself," and to serve that in genuine fashion (καὶ τοῦτον γνησίως θεραπεύειν), with

emotion, no haphazard decision, no displeasure with what befalls from gods and men (17). "The God in you shall be the director (προστάτης) of a being masculine and elderly and devoted to the state, and Roman" (24). And the power seated within your breast you must not confound (φύρειν) nor disturb with a mob of mental images, but maintain it gracious and following God in an orderly fashion (30), whatever the Power wants, whom Zeus gave to each one as a director and guide, a detached particle (ἀπόσπασμα) of himself. And this is the intelligence and reason of each one (60). "Do perceive that you have within yourself something better and more divine than those who realize their emotions" (162). What Christians would call sin is to the imperial Stoic the soul's disloyalty to its nature and universal design, in fretting, anger, yielding to pleasure or hardship; the soul insults itself (ὕβριζει ἐαυτήν, 18 sq.). The soul is materially an exhalation (ἀναθυμίασις, a term of Heraclitus and the Stoic founders) from the blood (62). And hard by this crude materialism the other notion: "The sovereign element in man (τὸ ἡγεμονικόν) is constructed or organized (κατεσκευάσται) toward holiness and pity" (153). Ever and again he seeks consolation and anchorage in his pantheistic consciousness and perspective. "O Nature, from thee are all things, in thee all things, to thee all things" (38). "Remember that philosophy wills those things alone which your nature wills" (53). "What soul is trained in its proper craft (ἐντεχνος) and informed? The one that knows the beginning and the end, and the reason that permeates all essence and administers the universe through all time in fixed cycles" (61). "As you breathe the circumambient air, so also you must have your intelligence in harmony

with the mind which embraces all" (110). But the basic note of his soul is weariness and gloom: "Nowhere did you find how to live well" (96). Fame is but ephemeral (122). He bemoans the deep insincerity of actual men (123). Hunting Sarmatians is no great satisfaction (133). There is nothing beyond life and death (135). All the great names are gone, mere smoke (138). All things are transitory and always the same (163). "Take thy leave graciously, for he, too, who dismisses you is gracious" (167).

But even so, pantheist that he was, Marcus strove to be faithful to the established religion of Rome. He defends sacrifice and prayer and swearing by the gods (the forces of nature which support this life and state), which, as a political person, it behooves him to do. "The sun and the other gods" (101). The gods aid men through dreams and mantic art (130). How harmonize piety toward the gods with the conviction that extinction is our lot (159)? The prayers of many men are wicked, as some pray for the satisfaction of an adulterous desire (124). We see, in brief, how his consciousness was curiously composite, the state and tradition, the sect, and his own deeper aspiration, all furnishing elements. In one passage in these notes of self-communion he refers to the Christians. As to death, above all, readiness and a decision resulting from personal determination, not by way of mere bare rank and file (or lining up) as the Christians (144) (*κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν*). What does it mean? It seems to point, with all the disdainful Stoic's lofty superiority, to martyrs, and to martyrs of his own time or reign. We think of Polycarp at Smyrna (Eusebius IV, 15), of Justin at Rome condemned to

ath by the *Praefectus Urbi*, Rusticus, once his own stoic teacher; we are reminded of Maturus and Priscus and Blandina and Attalus at Lyon and Perpetua and Felicitas (Eusebius V, 1). Both in Smyrna and on the Rhone the fury of the city mobs was mightily stirred against the Christians, under Marcus. And the hue and cry were always the same, that they were cannibals, consuming little children in their conventicles, that they had practised unspeakable debaucheries. Such charges, by the by, were uttered in a discourse by Fronto himself—Fronto, the Quintilian of his day, raised to consular honors, and high in the confidence of Antoninus Pius and of Marcus himself. Minucius Felix, the cultured Roman advocate of that religion, who refers to Fronto as “Cirtensis noster” (*Octavius* 9, 6), credits Fronto with the charges against the Christians. In his *Octavius* then, that admirable first apology of our faith in Latin, we are brought into *medias res* of Rome’s religion. This was the pagan and patriotic view, attested by the universal way of Rome (6, 1). The Christians were at bottom disloyal in being Christians. And they were atheists. No simulacrum or cult figure was in evidence, where they worshiped (ἐνθένδε καὶ ἄθεοι κεκλήμεθα) (Justin, *First Apology*, 6). The mere name still furnished adequate cause for condemnation, as it had done more than a generation before to Pliny in Bithynia. No further argument was needed, and a denial of that name was generally followed by acquittal. It was indeed under the Antonines, whom not to extol is reputed almost a sin against history, that the passionate prejudice against the Christians reached an intensity not recorded before, when “they were unjustly hated and treated despitefully by all mankind” (Justin, loc. cit. 1).

Let us transcribe from the *Octavius* of Minucius Felix (9, 2 sqq.). We must remember that the Christians in Rome then had a history of more than one hundred years. What, then, was still the prevailing pagan conception of the Christians? "With sacred marks and badges they identify and love one another almost before they are acquainted; indiscriminately there is practised among them as it were a certain ritual of forbidden appetites [*quaedam libidinum religio*] and they call themselves promiscuously brothers and sisters, so that even in a customary way debauchery is done under guise of a holy name. * * Others say that they worship the genital organs of their very bishop and priest, and adore as it were the nature of their own sire; perhaps this is false, but certainly suspicion attaches to rites secret and nocturnal. And they who talk of a man who was punished with the severest form of execution [the cross] for crime, and [who talk] of the deadly wood of the cross as an emblem of their religion, assign them altars which befit depraved and criminal men, so that they worship that which they deserve. Further the current talk [*fabula*] as to how neophytes are initiated is as awful as it is familiar. An infant covered with grain, so as to deceive those who are not apprized, is placed before him who is to be initiated. This infant by the means of a covering of grain, slain by the neophyte (who has been invited as it were to deal some harmless stabs by unseen and secret wounds. The blood of this [infant], for shame! they lap with eager thirst, the limbs of this they dissect in eager rivalry, with this victim [*hostia*] they are bound in association, through this complicity of crime are they pledged to mutual silence. These rites are more abominable than any

rm of sacrilege. And as for their banquet [the *ápê* probably is meant], it is a familiar thing. Everybody everywhere speaks of it, and this also the discourse of our Cirtensian attests [viz., Fronto, in a published discourse]. For a feast they assemble on a stated day, with all their children, sisters, mothers, young of every sex and of every age. There, after much feasting, when the carousing has become warm, and the glow of unchaste lust in them, intoxicated as they are, has flared up, a dog tied to a lamp, to which they toss a rib of meat beyond the space of a line where he is tied, is made to start and jump. Thus, after the witnessing light has been overturned and extinguished in the shameless darkness, they tie the bonds of unspeakable lust by indefinite chance and though not all by performance, still by complicity are equally unchaste, since by the aspiration of them in their totality is sought whatever can happen through the act of individuals."

Clearly neither the impartial philosopher, who in his notes of self-communion protests incessantly his justice, fairness, and his natural altruistic bent (*τὸ κοινωνικόν*), nor his representative officials ever cared enough to ascertain the truth. "You poor and ignorant folk, see what your lot is among us. Behold [*Octavius*, 22, 4] your lot is threats, executions, tortures, crosses not to be worshiped but to be suffered, fires which you also predict and fear; where is that God that can aid those who rise from the dead but cannot succor the living? Do not the Romans hold sway and rule without your God, do they not enjoy the whole world and are your masters? But you in suspense and anxiety abstain from honorable pleasures, you do not visit shows, you do not share in parades. * * *

Therefore [12, 7] if you have any philosophy or modesty, cease to investigate curiously the crash of the heavens and the fates and the mysteries of the universe; enough it is to look at what is before your feet, for you who are pre-eminently unlettered, uncultured, rude, boorish, to whom it is not given to understand matters of state, to whom much more it is denied to discourse on matters of the Gods." Thus the pagan scholar Cæcilius.

"We too," says the Christian Octavius (28), "have been pagans; we believed the monstrous stories about the Christians, stories which were so bruited about, but never investigated or proven." The following seems to point outright to Lugdunum, to Blandina, and Ponticus: "Boys and young women make sport of crosses and torments, of wild beasts and all the terrors of executions, and with an inspired endurance of pain."

NEW YORK.

EXEGETICAL OUTLINES

PAUL'S USE OF ΚΑΤΑΡΓΕΩ

By JAMES COFFIN STOUT, Professor of Greek Exegesis, Bible Teachers
Training School

THIS suggestive verb is a favorite one with the Apostle Paul, twenty-five of the twenty-seven instances of its usages in the New Testament being found in his writings. This in itself is interesting. Does it perhaps merely indicate a personal idiosyncrasy in the use of words, or was καταργέω peculiarly adapted to the setting forth of certain truths which Paul emphasized?

It is compounded of κατά and ἀργέω. Ἀργέω and its cognate nouns, ἀργός and ἀργία, are formed from ἔργον, work, and α privative, not working, idle, inactive. In the recently issued Vocabulary of the Greek New Testament Illustrated from the Papyri and Other Non-literary Sources, Moulton and Milligan begin their discussion by saying that "ἀργός is the opposite of ἐνεργός, at work," and give a variety of connections in which both the verb and the nouns are found with the general notion of idleness. For instance: "A certain Apollonius is described as belonging to the 'leisured' class of Memphis; an oil-press is 'out of working order'; and the noun ἀργία means a 'holiday.'"

The κατά of our verb gives a causative, transitive meaning to ἀργέω, to cause to become idle, to render inoperative or inactive. Thus it is important to notice that latent in the verb is the idea that there is, or was, capacity for activity, yet there was idleness; a real potentiality, which has been rendered powerless. This may be illustrated from Luke 13:7. Of the barren fig tree Jesus said: "Why doth it also cumber [καταργεῖ] the ground?" "A barren fig tree renders the land useless by occupying valuable space" (Bruce, Expositor's Greek Testament). It does not bear fruit itself, and it also causes the ground, which might otherwise have been productive, to remain unproductive. The fruit-bearing qualities are truly in the ground, but have been caused to become idle.

Even when the translation in our English versions is "cause to cease," "put an end to," "do away with," "annul," "abolish" or "destroy," one can usually feel this double implication. On the one hand, power, or perhaps better, potentiality; and on the other, inactivity. For reasons which are suggested by the context this power is not working. That which is said to be destroyed is often still existent, but its potential power has been nullified, rendered inoperative, made to be of none effect. Thus the American Revision has very properly changed the Authorized Version of Hebrews 2:14, "that he might *destroy* him that had the power of death, that is, the devil," to "that he might *bring to nought*." The devil has not been "destroyed," but with respect to his "power of death" he has been rendered impotent, his sway has been broken.

Apparently our verb sometimes suggests a more thoroughgoing and absolute destruction than this. Language, especially when used popularly, is fluid,

and words cannot be bound by mechanical limitations. And it is doubtless natural that the finer values of this word should occasionally be lost sight of. But, making room in our thinking for the possibility of such exceptions, both its derivation and its usage suggest that its double implication is of the essence of its meaning. The value of all this to the preacher may be illustrated from Paul's use of *καταργέω* in the Epistle to the Romans. In this Epistle it is found six times. Each message well repays study, and in connection with each the present writer takes the liberty of suggesting a sermon-theme.

Romans 3:3, 4: Unhindered by Unbelief.

"For what if some were without faith? shall their want of faith make of none effect [*καταργήσῃ*] the faithfulness of God? God forbid."

"God's good faith, his plighted word, cannot be reduced to empty words" (Moule, Expositor's Bible). "What he has promised, he is able also to perform." Always and everywhere, and specifically within the sphere of his "oracles" (v. 2), "God is faithful" and "God is able" are supplementary facts. Man's unbelief cannot make inoperative (*καταργέω*) the faithfulness of God.

Romans 3:31: The Co-operation of the Apparently incompatible.

"Do we then make the law of none effect [*καταργούμεν*] through faith? God forbid: nay, we establish the law."

Here, as in Galatians 3:15-22, where, in verse 17, *καταργέω* is again very characteristically used, the essential relation between the law and grace is set forth. God forbid, says the Apostle, that anyone should say that the law is "against the promises of God" (Gal.

3:21). Indeed, "the law is become *our tutor* to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith (Gal. 3:24 and 22). Even so, God forbid that anyone should think that "we cause the law to become impotent through faith: nay [ἀλλά], the exact opposite is the case, we establish the law." Apparently, καταργούμεν in reality, ιστάνομεν.

Romans 4:14: An Argument from the Impossible (This phrase is used by Erasmus of the similar statement of Galatians 2:21.)

"For if they that are of the law are heirs, faith is made void, and the promise is made of none effect [κατήργηται]."

Paul is defining another aspect of the relation of law and grace. "If they that are of the law are heirs, faith is made void," κεκένωται made to be κενός, void, shown to have no inner reality of truth, "emptied of its contents, and so void and worthless" (Liddon) and the promise, potentially so powerful, is rendered inoperative, κατήργηται.

Romans 6:6: Powerful, but "Paralyzed" (Sanday's rendering, International Critical Commentary)

"Knowing this, that our old man was crucified with him, that the body of sin might be done away [καταργηθῇ], that so we should no longer be in bondage to sin."

Here our verb is translated "done away," but every sincere believer, who is seeking to walk by the Spirit that he may not fulfil the lust of the flesh, well knows that "the body of sin" has not been "done away" in the absolute sense. Sanday's rendering "that the body of sin may be *paralyzed*" or "reduced to impotence" (quoted from Sanday by Denney Expositor's Greek Testament). As in Hebrews 2:1

the sway has been broken, the tyrant has been rendered powerless.

Romans 7:2 and 6: A Broken Connection: Its Cause and Its Result.

"If the husband die, she is discharged from the law of her husband." "Now we have been discharged from the law, having died to that wherein we were bound."

In each verse "discharged from" is the translation of *καταργέω*, only in this case it is used with the connecting preposition *ἀπό*. This construction is found in at least one other passage, viz., Galatians 5:4, *κατηργήθητε τοῦ νόμου τοῦ Χριστοῦ*. The usual explanation of this unusual combination of words is "what is called '*constructio adnegans*'; *ἀπό*, strictly considered, not belonging to *κατηργήθητε*, but to some word which can easily be supplied, e. g., *κατηργήθητε καὶ ἐχωρίσθητε ἀπὸ Χριστοῦ*" (Ellis, Lightfoot, Meyer, Winer, *et al.*) Evidently emphasis is being laid upon a complete lack of connection between those who had been, or might be conceived as connected. And in regard to the inter-relationship of illustration and application in Romans 7:1-6, Eldon, Meyer, and Stifler seem particularly clear in their comments. (Although, see Sanday, Denney, and Moule for a somewhat different exposition.)

It is not the purpose of this article to attempt a detailed treatment of the entire usage of *καταργέω* in the New Testament. It is intended only to offer a few suggestions, but, it is hoped, trustworthy and practical homiletic suggestions. In order to set bounds to the paper, only the passages from the Epistle to the Romans have been discussed, but the entire usage of *καταργέω* is appended for the sake of any who may desire to pursue their investigations still further. Luke 13:7; Romans

3:3; 3:31; 4:14; 6:6; 7:2, 6; 1 Corinthians 1:28; 2:6:13; 13:8 (twice), 10, 11; 15:24, 26; 2 Corinthians 3:7, 11, 13, 14; Galatians 3:17; 5:4, 11; Ephesians 2:15; 2 Thessalonians 2:8; 2 Timothy 1:10; Hebrews 2:14.

COLLATERAL READINGS ON THE INTERNATIONAL SUNDAY SCHOOL LESSONS

August 5. Manasseh's Sin and Repentance. 2 Chronicles 33:1-20.

The reform of Hezekiah undone (v. 3). Read for connection 2 Chronicles 29.

The idolatry of Manasseh (vs. 3-6).

- (a) Star-worship. Read Jeremiah 44:15-19 in connection with Psalm 136:8, 9; Genesis 1:16; Amos 5:26 (see commentary).
- (b) Child-sacrifice. Read Leviticus 18:21; 20:2-5; Deuteronomy 12:29-31; Micah 6:6-8.
- (c) Sorcery. Read Leviticus 19:26; Deuteronomy 18:9-14; 1 Samuel 28.

The punishment and repentance of Manasseh, his return from Babylon, etc. See G. A. Smith, Jerusalem, II, p. 182. Cf. Psalm 51, International Standard Biblical Encyclopædia, article, Manasseh, p. 1978.

August 12. Josiah's Good Reign. 2 Chronicles 34:1-13.

For Josiah's period in general read Zephaniah throughout; Jeremiah 7:1-15; 11:1-13; Nahum throughout.

For the impression upon national consciousness of Josiah's character compare account in 2 Kings 22:1-23:30 with that of 1 and 2 Chronicles.

August 19. Finding the Book of the Law. :
Chronicles 34:14-33.

1. Review readings under 1 immediately preceding especially Jeremiah 7:1-15.
2. Read the two accounts of the end of Josiah's career 2 Kings 23:21-30; 2 Chronicles 35:20-27.

August 26. The Captivity of Judah. 2 Kings 25:1-21

1. Read parallel and illustrative passages: :
Chronicles 36:11-21; Jeremiah 52 throughout.
2. On the meaning of captivity and exile, read Psalm 126; 137; 84 (in order named).
3. Last events preceding the captivity. Read Habakkuk 1:5-11; Jeremiah 25:11; 22:13-19; 2 Kings 24:2; 2 Chronicles 36:6; 2 Kings 23:31; Ezekiel 19:1-9; 2 Kings 24:10-17; Jeremiah 24:1-10; Ezekiel 1. (This brings the course of events down to Zedekiah and the present lesson.)

September 2. The Shepherd of Captive Israel. Ezekiel 34.

1. The prophetic confidence in the return. Read Isaiah 61:1-11; Jeremiah 31:1-9.
2. Jehovah the shepherd of Israel. Jeremiah 31:10-14. Compare Numbers 27:17 (the "Undershepherd") Psalm 80:1; Isaiah 40:6-11.
3. The Good Shepherd of the New Covenant. John 10.

September 9. The Benefits of Total Abstinence.
Daniel 1. Read Isaiah 28:1-8; Proverbs 20:1;
23:29-35.

September 16. The Fiery Furnace. Daniel 3.

The unbending knee (v. 12). 1 Kings 19:18;
Acts 4:5-22; Hebrews 11:32-40; Revelation
2:12-17.

The unfailing companion (v. 25). Read Isaiah
43:1-7; Matthew 28:16-20; Psalm 23.

The glorious victory. Revelation 7:9-17.

September 23. Daniel in the Lion's Den. Daniel 6.

Daniel's defiance. Read Matthew 5:10; 2 Peter
2:1-22.

The safety of God's people. Isaiah 49:22-26;
Revelation 3:7-13.

The defeat of God's enemies. Esther 9:1-10;
Revelation 14.

September 30. Review. The Goodness and Severity
of God. Daniel 9:3-19. Read Deuteronomy
30:1-20; Job 42:10-17; Isaiah 40:27-31.

October 7. Psalms of Deliverance. Psalms 85; 126.
Psalm 85: Deliverance from captivity. Read Isaiah
61; Luke 4:14-30. Psalm 126: Read Exodus
15:1-18; Judges 5:1-31; Luke 1:68-79; Revelation
5:9-14.

October 14. Returning from Captivity. Ezra 1:1-11

1. Cyrus, the Great. Read Isaiah 45:1-7; 2 Chronicles 36:22, 23.
2. The return promised. See Isaiah 35; Jeremiah 16:10-21; Micah 4:1-8.

October 21. The Temple Rebuilt and Dedicated. Ezra 3:8-13; 6:14-18.

1. Love for temple and city. Read Isaiah 2:1-5; Psalm 137; Revelation 14:1-3.
2. The actual and ideal temple. Read Revelation 21:1-27. Cf. Isaiah 4:2-6.

October 28. Ezra's return from Babylon. Ezra 5:15-36.

1. The king's highway. Isaiah 35.
2. God, the Redeemer. Read Isaiah 42:1-25; Ephesians 1:3-14; Titus 2:1-14; 2 Chronicles 5:11-19; Hebrews 5:1-10.

LITERARY REVIEWS

[Authors and publishers are requested not to send either books, periodicals or pamphlets for review. The editors prefer to select and purchase whatever is to be reviewed in these pages.—EDITORS.]

EVOLUTION AND MAN¹

THE following interesting and illuminating books, published within a few months of each other, though quite diverse, have a certain underlying and mutual relationship in that they all deal, in one way or another, with the subject of organic development. The first volume on the list is a life of Herbert Spencer, which necessarily involves a historical and critical estimate of his opinions, his place in the history of philosophy, his personality, and his influence. The second volume is, as its title suggests, a critical estimate of the evolutionary hypothesis in the light of recent experiments and speculations. The third volume is a popular presentation of the same hypothesis in outline—essentially a constructive presentation of the evidence for evolution in its broader aspects. The fourth volume deals with those themes of perennial interest and value which lie along the frontiers of psychology, philosophy, science, and theology. The emphasis in this discussion is upon the place of man in the cosmic scheme—his spiritual constitution,

¹The Life of Herbert Spencer, by Hugh Elliott. New York, 1917. Pp. 330. A Critique of the Theory of Evolution, by Professor T. H. Morgan. Princeton, 1916. Pp. 197. The Theory of Evolution, by Professor W. B. Scott. New York, 1917. Pp. 183. The Spiritual Ascent of Man, by Dr. W. Tudor Jones. New York and London, 1916. Pp. 247.

the validity of his higher aspirations, and the relation between himself and the universe in which he lives.

There is evidently a special art of biography, relatively independent of the subject of it. An interesting character may be made the subject of a dull biography and vice versa. Herbert Spencer in himself is a forbidding subject for biography in the ordinary sense, partly, as has been said, because a scholar has no biography, and partly, as the author of this book admits, because Spencer's life, apart from his intellectual work, his thought, and writing, was so meager. In spite of this preliminary handicap, the biography, altogether apart from the history of Spencer's thought and opinions, is a fascinating study. The author deals with his subject's rather unattractive personality in a particularly attractive way. It is a striking example of clear-cut and vivid portraiture. The personality stands out in living lines, etched with masterly hand. No better example of making every sentence count—in telling just enough to reveal the truth—in short, of psychological focussing, has come our way for a long time. Equally satisfactory is the analysis, critique, and evaluation of the life work of Spencer as a leader of thought.

The book could not have been written except by a devoted admirer of Spencer, who was able to read, *con amore*, that formidable array of heavy volumes. The book could not have been written except by an emancipated admirer, set free from a too great docility of admiration. Mr. Elliott has been fortunately able to combine appreciation with criticism in such a way as to make us at once see the greatness and limitation of this truly wonderful and yet pitiful and pathetic figure of the nineteenth century. It is probably true, as the writer indicates, that his contemporaries overestimated, and that we underestimate Spencer's philosophical significance. It may be true, as John Fiske always maintained, that the logic of Spencer's teachings, especially with reference to God and the world, were hidden from himself and that he had more to do with the renascence of faith at the opening of the twentieth century than he or we who study him have realized. None the less, it remains true that his system of thought, as a whole, is too heavy, inconsistent, and fundamentally unsound. It cannot be denied, from any point of view, that

Spencer spent much of his life "vainly beating the air." Frederick Harrison really made a vital thrust at the whole elaborate system when he said: "You know too much about the unknowable."

What were the most marked characteristics of Herbert Spencer as a man and as a thinker? Mr. Elliott answers the question thus: "Mentally, Spencer's most obvious characteristic was his extreme originality and dislike of authority or convention. He was by nature a rebel; in early manhood he was well described by one of his friends as 'radical all over'" (p. 53).

This intellectual characteristic is the counterpart of the broader trait which is so evident throughout his whole life, namely, that he was by nature solitary. He was cold, self-contained, self-centered. He was an intense and exaggerated individualist. He was apparently incapable of love or even of what we term friendship. He had many intellectual or literary friendships, but he seems capable of violating or surrendering any or all of these on controversial grounds, as witness his long estrangement from Professor Huxley.

It is another strange fact that, radical as he was, Spencer was, or at least became, an extreme dogmatist. His youthful radicalism flowed hot like lava from an active volcano, but later, like the lava, it cooled and hardened into dogmatism. Elliott says: "As he got older this trait [radicalism] lost its fluidity: on the one hand it hardened into dogma, while on the other hand he respected the conventions in reality far more than he cared to admit" (p. 53). We shall not attempt in this review to give any estimate of Spencer's philosophical system—that may be done at a later time. It is enough to point out the value of this remarkable biography as a guide to Spencer's personality and thought. One or two general remarks on the significance of Spencer's life and character may be pertinent and suggestive.

The biographer points out the evidence "in his later writings of marked deterioration both in his powers of thought and in his literary style. As regards the former, he did little more than follow up mechanically the conceptions which he had entertained in youth. As regards the latter, he became pompous, and, if he had been a lesser man, it might even have been added priggish." In other words, he never really grew. The possibility of mental

growth did not lie within the compass of the system which he adopted. A man may fill his belly with the husks of spiritual nihilism, but he cannot feed his soul on them. Another fact. Back of the narrowing and impoverishing system which he adopted was the auto-starvation of the life which he lived. Had Spencer lived more normally he never could have accepted the system to which he gave his allegiance. As Elliott says in this immediate connection: "A clue to the deterioration [mentioned above] may perhaps be found in a sentence in his preface to the Autobiography: 'in the genesis of a system of thought the emotional nature is a large factor.' But Spencer became emotionally barren; the Synthetic Philosophy alone was too abstract and unsubstantial to provide adequate outlet for the deep feelings of a vigorous constitution. His emotions withered from lack of sustenance; and his powerful mind became concentrated on the minute trivialities of a commonplace life" (p. 46).

One other fact we wish to point out—that Spencer's system of thought did not make him a hopeful, cheerful or contented man. It is not with irony but with pity that we say: Spencer wrote eighteen great volumes on how to be miserable! To be sure, he was in ill health, much alone, and suffered the usual ills incident to hard work, a delicate constitution, and advancing years—but others have endured the same not only with fortitude but with cheerfulness. What is philosophy for but to enable one to interpret the world and to beautify life? Spencer's philosophy failed to do either the one or the other in such a way as to produce a great, an attractive or a victorious personality. He was beaten in the battle of life. "What was then [in earlier life] a mere absence of happiness became later a complete domination of wretchedness" (p. 47).

It would not be fair to close without suggesting to the reader the greatness of Spencer's intellectual achievement. In this we can do no better than to quote the biographer in his final summary:

"We shall find that, without money, without special education, without health, he produced eighteen large volumes of philosophy and science of many diverse kinds; that he invented an entire new system of philosophy which for half a century filled the attention of all thinking people; that he led the chief controversies on Evolution and Biology without ever having received any

tion in those subjects; that he wrote perhaps the most important text book of Psychology of his century, without any acquaintance with the works of his predecessors, and scarcely any with those of his contemporaries; that he established the science of Sociology in England; that in all branches of so-called Moral Science he was recognized as a leader; that he became the philosophic exponent of nineteenth century Liberalism; that he published a variety of mechanical inventions; and that on endless other subjects, great and small, he set forth a profusion of new and original ideas. A stable judgment will recognize in these achievements a true greatness, that may withstand all passing gusts of popular opinion" (p. 313).

Professor Morgan's book consists of four chapters (representing four lectures as originally delivered) in which the distinguished author attempts to strike a balance between the opinion "that we know nothing about evolution"—which is "a healthy reaction to the over-confident belief that we know everything about evolution"—and the fact that in the last few years "we have learned more about evolution than we might have hoped a few years ago." The book, therefore, is "a criticism of the older evidence" and "an appreciation of the new evidence." The discussion is brief—the whole book including the index has only 197 pages—but the depth of it cannot be measured in the same way. There are parts of the discussion which make difficult reading because the subject matter is delicate and intricate and the method is highly technical, but the result is well worth while.

In the first place, we have a very clear review (ch. 1) of the theory of evolution and the evidence for it. A new valuation of this evidence is imperatively needed for more reasons than one. Professor Morgan's review is particularly satisfactory because he sets forth unmistakably the limits of evolutionary theory which is all that is needed to make clear that it is an entirely innocuous scientific hypothesis, like the Copernican system of astronomy or the hypothesis of ether or gravitation or the kinetic theory of matter, no one of which demands any radical reconstruction of religious thought. To show how completely the anti-theistic thrust of evolution has broken down let me specify a few statements and principles of this discussion.

The first one quoted bears upon the relationship of evolution and creation. "To-day the belief that evolution takes place by means of natural processes is generally accepted. It does not seem probable that we shall ever again have to renew the old contest between evolution and special creation" (p. 38). The gist of this expression lies in the word *special*. The theory of special creation is that the Creator, at the beginning, brought into being all the various species of plants and animals as they now exist. This supposition we now indubitably know to be untrue, and if it were true it would be of no value whatever to theology. We have a right to believe that God created organisms which were capable of being, through heredity and variation, the ancestors of those organic forms now existing—which is all that we have the slightest interest in claiming.

In another place he says that "the man of science believes that the organism responds to-day as it does, because at present it has a chemical and physical constitution that gives this response" (p. 31). Again he says: "Evolution of wild species appears to have taken place by modifying bit by bit the structures and habits that the animal or plant already possessed. We have seen that there are thirty mutant factors at least that have an influence on eye color, and it is probable that there are at least as many normal factors that are involved in the production of the red eye of the wild fly" (p. 87). Evolution instead of being "red in tooth and claw," "assumes a more peaceful aspect." "New and advantageous characters survive by incorporating themselves into the race, improving it and opening to it new opportunities" (p. 87). The whole course of the discussion serves to bring out the fact that the mutations upon which progress depends are accidental in the scientific sense (quite different from the popular usage) that is, due to unknown causes, yet they are under law and form an essential part of the system as a whole. As Professor Morgan says: "The causes of the mutations that give rise to new characters we do not know, although we have no reason for supposing that they are due to other than natural processes"—all of which is entirely satisfactory to the Christian theist.

Another statement will also help to illuminate the rather dimly lighted border land of fact and theory. In answering the question whether evolution is a creative process or not, Profes-

Professor Morgan points out that science has no bearing upon the transcendental question involved. In other words, when science tending strictly to her own business she is positivistic—an observer of phenomena, a student of processes and secondary causation, and nothing more. “If by creative is meant that something is made out of nothing, then of course there is no need for the scientist to try to answer such a question. But if by a creative process is meant that something is made out of something else, then there are two alternatives to be reckoned with”—followed by a discussion of two possible results of the selective process (see p. 192f.).

Two points ought to be noted in closing this notice. First, Professor Morgan’s clear and condensed review of various evolutionary theories and partial theories (ch. 1); second, his most interesting and instructive discussion of the mechanism of heredity based upon a review of the work of Mendel and others together with the results of original investigations in which Professor Morgan himself was a participant.

Professor Scott’s work, *The Theory of Evolution*, can be dismissed more summarily, although to the average reader it would undoubtedly prove the more interesting book. It is a straightforward, candid, popular discussion of the theory of evolution based upon the consensus among scientists as to the fact of evolution, while admitting the almost total lack of agreement as to the details of the process or the factors which have entered into it. We shall dwell upon this fact somewhat at length because of its manifest relationship to the deeper implications of the whole subject. Professor Scott chose his subject and added another to the already numerous books on evolution in order to dissipate “the very general misapprehension in the public mind concerning the present status of the evolutionary theory among men of science.” This misunderstanding, according to Professor Scott, is twofold, a fallacious idea that the theory of evolution is outworn and generally abandoned by scientists, and a confusion of thought between evolution and Darwinism. Both of these misunderstandings our author endeavors to clear up.

In regard to the first of these misapprehensions the author has this to say: “This belief is principally due to the fact that there is no agreement among men of science as to the manner in

which evolution operates (modes) or as to its efficient causes (factors) and further, to the often fierce controversies which long have been and still are held concerning these problems of modes and factors" (p. 2). Again he says: "It is one thing to accept a fact as substantially proved and quite another thing to devise a satisfactory explanation of that fact."

Professor Scott calls attention to the fact that many evolutionists (among them Professor Bateson) are opponents of Darwinism and yet at the same time adherents of evolutionism (see p. 5). Even more explicitly than Professor Morgan, Professor Scott delimits the application of his theory and purges his discussion of any slightest implication of an anti-theistic trend. He says: "In order to hold the evolutionary hypothesis, it is not necessary to deny the ideal relationships between the successive gradations of living beings, or to exclude belief in a creative plan, which has been worked out by the method of evolution." He very clearly and wisely says: "This, however, is a metaphysical, rather than a scientific question, and has no bearing upon the evidences for the theory of evolution" (p. 30f.).

The reviewer would like to emphasize the fact that both these constructive scientific discussions, which are addresses to audiences of people not in the professional sense scientists, belong to the era of reconciliation as regards science and religion—or better still, the era of mutual toleration in which the boundary rights of each field are respected by those who are living and working in the other. For a clear, understandable presentation of the present status of scientific opinion one could hardly do better than make use of this book.

Another fine and heartening example of discussions on the borderland of science, philosophy, and theology by one who is at home on all sides, not as a marauding outlaw but as a naturalized citizen, is the book now under consideration—the last of our group, *The Spiritual Ascent of Man*. Happy is the man who believes in science and can follow its investigations with interest unclouded by doubt or fear, and rejoice in its assured discoveries, unvexed by antagonism, and, at the same time, hold fast to spiritual realities with assured conviction. The author of this volume is to be felicitated upon being among those who love both science and religion and have arrived at conclusions which are not at variance.

shall not attempt an outline of this book or its argument, but try to point out one or two features.

The first observation is that every intelligent discussion of problems of life and the world must begin, as this one does, with a well-defined limitation of the fields, adjacent and yet separate and mutually self-contained, of science, philosophy, and theology. The philosophic implication upon which theology rests is *personalism*—namely, the theory that the cosmic process is rooted in personality, the outcome of a living intelligence and will. Theology in itself is the orderly statement of what we know about the living Intelligence and Will from whom all things proceed. Empirical science, as such, is purely negative on matters of ultimate causation. It demands, for experimental purposes, a universe which is mechanically exact, law abiding, dependable, predictable on the basis of the past. Theology has absolutely no objection to granting this demand for a workable mechanism, provided only that empirical science does not demand also the last word, and reduce everything, including human intelligence, to its hypothetical mechanism. It is increasingly clear, on the one hand, that science is incapable, by its very nature, of establishing or even reaching such a conclusion, and, on the other, that the theological hypothesis does not involve or even imply an element of arbitrariness which forbids scientific and exact processes of investigation. Our author is clear and satisfactory in his discussion of the scope and limits of science.

The best work of recent years has been done here, preparing the way for a better mutual understanding on the part of scientists and theologians.

In the second place, this book is particularly valuable as a study of recent and contemporary thought. The author is a master of the difficult art of quotation which means that he does not to supplement poverty of his own thought, but in a creative way as the fulfilment and expression of his own mind. Reading this book opens a window into the best scientific and speculative thought of our day. The result is that we have an original discussion of the leading questions in science and philosophy as contemporary thought is facing and dealing with them, and a most carefully and intelligently selected bibliography on these subjects.

In the third place, this book is peculiarly significant because it begins the battle for personality, freedom, and spiritual things at the right place. He begins, not with man, but with *matter*—pointing out that through the whole sweep of the cosmic process spiritual realities are implied and disclosed. Evolution becomes the self-revelation of God, and the ascent of man, otherwise inexplicable, becomes the return of man to his source and origin in God. The discussion moves from the nature and relationship of matter and life to body and mind, then to the *is* and *ought*, from fact to obligation, then to the world of *values*, thence to the crowning thoughts, the nature of spirit, the conception of God and religion and Christianity. "The culmination of personality is found in our unison with the over-individual ideal of life and with God" (p. 242).

LOUIS MATTHEWS SWEET.

THE BELIEF IN GOD AND IMMORTALITY¹

DR. LEUBA in defining the scope of this study says: "My investigation of immortality bears upon 'personal immortality' only. I take this term in its ordinary acceptance, i. e., as meaning continuation after death (with or without body) of the consciousness of personal identity. Similarly, I am concerned, as in my earlier book, only with that conception of the divine which I have qualified by the term 'personal.' * * * A personal God as here understood is therefore not necessarily an anthropomorphic, but certainly an *anthropopathic* being" (p. VIII f.). "I have called those beings who hold the direct personal relations with man characteristic of the worship of the historical religions 'personal gods.' It is with gods of that description only that we are concerned in this volume" (p. 174).

The book is in three parts, the first discussing the belief in the doctrines of the title, the second presenting statistical data as to

¹The Belief in God and Immortality, by James H. Leuba. Boston 1916. Pp. 340.

current status of these beliefs, and the third discussing the history of these beliefs. Part I, covering 169 pages, is a psychological and anthropological discussion of the ancient and modern conceptions of immortality, and sets forth the origin and characteristics of the early and modern beliefs in the continuation of personal consciousness as ghost or soul. In this part are presented the primitive and superstitious beliefs in the existence of ghosts and their diminishing continuation, with the idea of immortality as a term of widely variant significance, but our author asserts that "survival after death is not equivalent with immortality" (p. 10). "There is no evidence that the savage ever concerns himself with his own fate after death" (p. 42). His chief concern was the effect of the ghosts upon his present life, and with semi-civilized peoples this belief led to rites, not only averting the hostile action of ghosts during life, but also related to a real concern for one's own future. Greeks, Hebrews, and Romans followed this semi-civilized belief in ghosts with personal powers. The transfer from belief in immortality to the modern belief came only when the great imperial power and pride of Rome was breaking down, when the individualistic element was being enlarged, and when fulfilment of man's ideals could be summarized only in a future and immortal life.

"The primary and modern beliefs were both at first naïve beliefs, uncritically accepted" (p. 127), according to individual desire, but later the desired belief in immortality demanded valid metaphysical proof of its legitimacy. Chapter V is given to a discussion of the deductive demonstration of modern immortality. Here, after reviewing the various historic and scientific arguments, the author says: "Only the ethical argument and those drawn from evolution and from the conservation of values enjoy some degree of influence to-day, but not one of them, nor all together, are generally admitted among educated believers in immortality as adequate proof. The contemporary world has grown suspicious of these arguments, and all that even the believer will claim is that at most they create a *presumption* in favor of immortality" (p. 146).

"The hope of immortality' is a favorite expression with theologians who are themselves believers. * * * An interesting double outcome of the new attitude toward deductive argu-

ments is that, on the one hand, men have sought with renewed energy a scientific demonstration of immortality; and, on the other hand, have felt compelled to rely more and more for an assurance of it upon what they call 'inner experience,' i. e., an experience they think outside the pale of science" (p. 146f.). "The 'inner experience' which, these theologians say, should and does convince of immortality is no other than a sense of the worth of human life and the realization that this life can be rationally and morally satisfactory only if the good, or the supremely good endures" (p. 153). Thus the "inner experience" is dismissed as a "disguised statement of the moral argument," and our author turns in his next chapter to the demonstration of modern immortality by direct sensory evidence and scientific induction, discussing spirit manifestations as physical and as psychical. This chapter ends Part I with a brief discussion of the resurrection of Christ and the following iconoclastic summary: "The outcome of the last two chapters is that the metaphysical proofs of immortality are admittedly inadequate; that the ground of that belief when it is based on 'inner experience' is really the naïve conviction that human life at its best is too precious to end with death, and that survival is demanded for the gratification of ideal desires; and finally that the effort to prove modern immortality by the methods of science has so far remained inconclusive" (p. 168).

In Part II Dr. Leuba has given a valuable, original, suggestive, and scholarly contribution in his statistical studies of the belief in a personal God and in personal immortality, as based on data gathered in the United States. Two of these investigations are with college students, the first group represented by 927 replies from 289 men and 638 women located in nine representative colleges and one normal school. These people were from eighteen to twenty years of age. The questions put to them were:

- "1. Do you think of God as a personal or impersonal being?
- "2. What difference do you make between a personal and an impersonal being?
- "3. Describe as fully as you can how, under what image, or images, you think of God. Distinguish here between what

in your description is for you merely an image, a form of speech, and what is the reality.

What difference would the non-existence of God make in your daily life?" (p. 187).

The answers were returned signed or unsigned at the pleasure of the writers. Most interesting individual variations in the replies are given in excerpts in the chapter, but tabulation of the conclusions showed that 31 per cent. of the men and 11 per cent. of the women conceive God as impersonal; if doubtful replies be added to these figures the percentages will be 40.5 for the men and 15.7 for the women. "This greater variation from tradition on the part of the men is one of the striking features of these results. It must be referred on the whole, I think, to a stronger impulse to self affirmation and freedom, and to a correlated lesser need of affection and of moral support felt by the men" (p. 203).

The second investigation is a study exclusively of belief in immortality in one representative American college of high grade, whose students represent "affiliation among all the important Protestant denominations" and a few Roman Catholics. Here the most striking result is the high percentage of believers in immortality in the lower classes and the relatively high percentage of disbelievers in the higher classes. Only 15 per cent. of Freshmen believe in immortality, while nearly 32 per cent. of the Juniors have given it up. "The increase in unbelief observed as one passes from the younger to the older classes, indicates rather the growing recognition of the insufficiency of the foundation upon which belief stands. * * * These figures would refute the suggestion that some might be inclined to direct against colleges the charge of indoctrinating their students. They indicate rather how impressively uninterested and ignorant these 'cultivated' young people are regarding what is commonly considered a great religious issue" (p. 218).

The third, and most elaborate, investigation is a statistical study of the belief in a personal God and in personal immortality, based on replies from questionnaires addressed to representative American scholars, including historians, physical scientists, biological scientists, sociologists, and psychologists. The persons addressed in each of these great lines were selected from the

latest available American year books. Selection was made automatically so as to secure large and truly representative groups of those greater, and of those lesser, in fame or success, in each line so that comparative studies might be made both within the groups and between the groups. The summaries of this extensive study show the following astounding comparative percentages, worked out from the text and graphs:

		BELIEF IN GOD	BELIEF IN IMMORTALITY
Historians	Greater	32.9	35.3
	Lesser	63.	67.6
	Combined	48.3	51.5
Scientists (Physical)	Greater	34.8	40.
	Lesser	49.7	57.1
	Combined	43.9	50.7
Scientists (Biological)	Greater	16.9	25.4
	Lesser	39.1	45.1
	Combined	30.5	37.7
Sociologists (Professors) (Non-professors)	Greater	19.4	27.1
	Lesser	29.2	52.2
	Combined	54.6	61.2
Psychologists	Greater	46.3	55.3
	Lesser	13.2	8.8
	Combined	32.1	26.9
	Combined	24.2	19.8

The partial summary of results "shows that in every class of persons investigated, the number of believers in God is less, and in most classes very much less than the number of non-believers, and that the number of believers in immortality is somewhat larger than in a personal God; that among the more distinguished, unbelief is very much more frequent than among the less distinguished; and finally that not only the degree of ability, but also the kind of knowledge possessed, is significantly related to the rejection of these beliefs" (p. 277). "I do not see any way to avoid the conclusion that disbelief in a personal

and in personal immortality is directly proportional to the facilities making for success in the sciences in question" (p. 279). The situation revealed * * * demands a revision of public opinion regarding the prevalence and the future of the two cardinal beliefs of official Christianity" (p. 281).

Leuba discusses individualism as the cause of the rejection of traditional beliefs. Greater impulse to self-affirmation and independence as found in men more than in women, and greater eminence, by its freedom, so influences one that "when the professed grounds of belief are insufficient to meet the requirement of an independent mind, then independence will lead either to the rejection of the belief or to agnosticism" (p. 288).

Part III of this challenging book discusses the present utility of the beliefs in personal immortality and in a personal God. It assumes the findings of the foregoing parts as justified and expresses Leuba's opinion that "the modern belief in immortality costs more than it is worth. * * * Its disappearance from among the most civilized nations would be, on the whole, a gain" (p. 291f.), and in a footnote (p. 292) he continues this thought: "Inasmuch as a similar problem exists with regard to the belief in a personal God, and as these beliefs usually disappear together, I shall refer to both of them when the argument applies to both."

"It would be difficult to evaluate the harm done to humanity in the past by the conviction that the real destination of man is in the world to come. * * * I may add that the atmosphere of doubt surrounding the Christian beliefs with which we are concerned, co-existing as it does with creeds that affirm their truth and with a worship that implies it, creates in the upper intellectual circles of the Churches and more particularly among professors and students of theology a situation threatening the most precious possession of teachers and students: their intellectual integrity" (p. 328f.).

In his introduction Leuba cautions us against regarding this book as merely destructive in its results. * * * Rather should it be regarded from a practical point of view, as tending to accomplish a threefold good: the deliverance of man from a vitalizing fear of imaginary disastrous consequences that are attendant the loss of these beliefs; his inspiration with renewed

confidence in the reliability of the forces by which he feels himself urged onward, however ignorant of their nature he may otherwise be; and his enrichment with information useful for the wise guidance of his efforts at reconstruction when reconstruction shall have appeared imperative" (p. XI^f.).

A careful review of the quotations made shows unmistakably the opposition of this book to the orthodox beliefs in God and immortality. Nor can anyone reading the book be unaware of the tendencies of the author in his teachings on religion. Even though we do not agree with the author in his conclusions, we gratefully acknowledge his service in presenting much data that challenges us to a re-examination of his findings and to the collection of additional data that may more fully reveal the truth.

JOHN ANDERSON WOOD.

MISCELLANEOUS INSCRIPTIONS IN THE YALE BABYLONIAN COLLECTION*

A NEW world has been opened to the student of the past, during the last one hundred years, by the progress of archæology. From the numerous mounds in the lands of the Orient innumerable inscriptions have come to us, written on marble slabs, palace walls, and seemingly insignificant clay tablets, and to-day the past stands out in new relief because of the work done on these remains by a body of devoted scholars in all parts of the world. The historian has found many gaps filled up so that to-day he can trace dynasty after dynasty, and movement after movement, being assured that he is on solid ground as he journeys back into the past.

Particularly has the student of the Bible cause for thankfulness when he learns of the new discoveries. The Bible now shines in a new light, and many of its so-called dark places are

*Yale Oriental Series. Babylonian Texts. Vol. I. By A. T. Clay, Ph. D. New Haven, Connecticut. Pp. X+108. Plates, 55.

was illuminated. Men whose very existence has been denied have been revealed as men of real flesh and blood, and events which were apparently insignificant have been shown in true perspective, the result being that it can be truly said the Bible is never been so understandable.

It is gratifying to American scholarship to know that America is playing a great part in this new field of research, as many valuable volumes testify, and all students must feel it a cause for national pride that American universities are not behind in actual field work in the Orient. During the past few years there has been assembled at Yale University a Babylonian collection, numbering at the present time about eight thousand Sumerian and Akkadian inscriptions and other antiquities, belonging to all periods of Babylonian history. It includes hymns, epics, liturgies, historical, mathematical, and divination texts, exercises from temple schools, legal and business transactions, official and personal letters, administrative documents from the archives of temples, etc.

Through the generosity of Mr. Ogden H. Hammond a fund has been created for the purpose of publishing a series of volumes in which shall be recorded the researches among this collection, and the magnificent volume before us is the first of the series, containing some texts of a miscellaneous character covering a period of between four and five thousand years.

The student of Babylonian history will find a number of interesting and valuable inscriptions in this volume, one of the most valuable being the Larsa Dynastic List (pp. 30-44), the discovery of which makes it possible to determine a number of very important historical and chronological questions in Babylonian history.

To show the remarkable change involved, it is well to note that Winckler (*History of Babylonia and Assyria*) tells us that "three of its kings (Larsa) are known to us, viz., Nur-Ramman, Sin-Iddin and Rim-Sin who succeeded in turn to the throne." The new list gives the names of fourteen rulers, followed by Hammurabi and Sin-Muballit, and instead of the kings succeeding in turn we now find four kings between Sin-Iddin and Rim-Sin covering twenty-one years. Lack of space forbids a detailed account of this valuable list with its many new problems, and also of the Date List of Babylonian Rule over Larsa.

A number of inscriptions of rulers already known are given in the volume, but more valuable for the student are the names of kings hitherto unknown or only partially known. A new king of Guti (Shamash-bani) records in Sumerian that he rebuilt the old temple to "Ningurra the mother of Umma," while from a diorite object we learn the name and dynasty of one called Sin-iribam, the tenth ruler of Larsa. This latter king was already known by name, but now we can rightly place him, not only from this object but also from the Larsa List already mentioned, where he appears with Naplanum, Emisu, Samum, Zabaia (Sin-iribam), and Sin-iqisham.

From these few notes it will be evident what a treasure-house the historical student will enter when he takes up the volume for study.

Of great value for the students of the language is the Yale Syllabary (pp. 84-97). This has four columns, the first giving the Sumerian values; the second, the signs to be explained; the third, the name of the sign; and the fourth, the Semitic value corresponding to the Sumerian value in the first column. Of special importance are the several hundred new values in Sumerian and Babylonian, not to mention the names of the signs, about sixty of which appear for the first time.

Turning to the new light on the Bible, the same wealth of material is to be claimed, for one has not read far when he discovers a legal basis for the teaching of the parable of the Prodigal Son. Remembering the tenacity of custom in the Orient, it is interesting to find that when a son had asked for his "portion," and, having received it, had left home, he had by that act severed all legal relations with the family. When the prodigal came to himself he cried: "I will arise and go to my father and will say unto him. * * * Make me as one of thy hired servants," knowing that this was the only position he could occupy from a legal standpoint. The elder brother, as the sole beneficiary of the estate, was legally within his rights when he objected to the prodigal being reinstated, seeing that he had stayed at home and had sought to improve the estate. That he was within his rights we know from the reply of the father. But, legally right or wrong, a father's heart is a father's heart, and it was meet that they should rejoice and be glad, "for this my son was

legally] dead [as a son] and is [by favor of the father, legally] live again [as a son], was [legally] lost and is [by favor] found."

The tablet on which this legal basis is found is a Sumerian prototype of the Code of Hammurabi, and was written a little prior to 2,000 B.C. In the words of the author: "The legal aspect of the parable does not seem to have been surmised by the commentators. It heightens the contrast between the father, who, on the one hand, complied with what the law permitted the son to demand; and, on the other, the forgiving father, who rejoiced over his return, not as a legal heir but as a real son."

Much discussion has been carried on in the past regarding Belshazzar. That he was not "king" of Babylon we now know, but that he was closely associated with his father, Nabonidus (the last native king of Babylon), this volume furnishes further evidence where we read a dream portending favors for Nabonidus and Belshazzar. Twice we read the words: "For favor of Nabonidus, king of Babylon my lord, and for favor of Belshazzar, the son of the king."

Still further is the interest raised when we read, not only of Belshazzar, but also of his sister who, according to the text of a cylinder written by their father, was dedicated by her father as a votary, her name being Bel-shalti-Nannar.

New light is thrown on the question of the origin and nature of the Sabbath from twenty-three tablets discovered at Warka, and dating B.C. 534-523. Here is "found the first actual observance of anything that suggests the existence of a parallel to the Sabbath in Babylonia." We can but state the fact and leave the student to study the volume.

The author states fresh evidence for his views on Amurru, which must be given attention by all who are seeking further light on the relationship of Israel and the surrounding nations, especially where one is concerned about the question of the borrowings of nations.

Interesting light is thrown on the last verses of the book of Revelation on pages 11, 47, 58, 60, where the curse is pronounced on any who shall attempt to alter the text of the inscriptions.

We should have been made happier to learn what discoveries so far made verify the details set forth in Genesis 14 (p. 44).

Has any discovery been made bearing on the data set forth there? If not (and we do not know of any) why say that "not a single discovery in any way has impaired its accuracy"? While it is quite outside of any present archæological proof, is it wise to utilize it "in the reconstruction of the history of the period"?

Would it not be well to keep to the spelling Nebuchadrezzar instead of the older spelling in view of the texts, Na-bi-um-kudur-ri-sur?

On many pages there are evidences of the tragedy of illicit excavations. (Pp. I, 8, 11, 13, 14, 16, 18, 27, 28, 46, 50, 60, 62, 66). Granted that some of these illicit "finds" are bought by competent authorities, it does not alter the fact that a great responsibility rests on every lover of ancient history and the Bible to raise sufficient funds in order that excavations can be carried on under scientific management and method.

Lack of space forbids an extended review of a volume every page of which is of greatest interest and value; enough to state that the world of scholarship has been enriched by these researches, and author and publishers are to be congratulated on the valuable and handsomely bound volume. Type, plates, and binding are all that can be desired, the plates being excellently prepared.

G. H. RICHARDSON.

RATIONAL ORTHODOXY*

THE author of this book undertakes to cover a wide field of doctrinal discussion. The space at our command does not permit a mere list of the "mooted questions" which he seeks to answer. The Trinity and the Atonement, The Person of Christ, and The Personality of Satan, The Mosaic Cosmogony and the Authority of the Scriptures, The Virgin Birth, and The Resurrection are among the subjects treated.

The position of the author on most of these matters—many would say, on all of the issues raised—is such as to justify his

*Rational Orthodoxy, by a member of the New York Presbytery. New York, 1917. Pp. 565.

aim to be counted among the upholders of "orthodoxy." He believes in the Deity of Christ and of the Holy Spirit; he accepts cordially the fact of the virgin birth and the physical resurrection of Jesus; he believes in the saving power of the cross; his doctrine of the atonement is not altogether clear, as he seems to attempt a combination of the governmental and substitutionary theories, rather stressing the former; he undertakes to show that saving faith is "a simpler acceptance of truth than that for which Christianity calls" (p. 11); he accepts the Holy Scriptures as the only infallible rule of faith and practice in the sense that they are the only divinely authorized guide to saving truth" (p. 9), but he repudiates the doctrine of the inerrancy of the Bible; he argues at some length against the Darwinian hypothesis of evolution and accepts the Mosaic record of creation as "agreeing with ascertained facts and really probable theories" (p. 456).

The book is really a collection of essays on various topics, lacking co-ordination and apparently without any organizing theological principle. The author declares his personal views on various subjects and gives his reasons for regarding them as reasonable and orthodox, but we look in vain for any exposition of "Rational Orthodoxy" as a coherent system. The title of the volume may raise in some minds the hope of finding a reasonable and judicial treatment of mooted questions. Any such hope is dispelled by the opening sentence of the Preface, where the author declares that the "questions are considered from a rational point of view and without any appeal either to human or divine authority." It is a bold spirit that undertakes to determine such matters as the fact of the virgin birth, or the reality of the resurrection of Jesus in "the same body that was laid in the tomb" (p. VII), or His pre-existence and Deity, while making no appeal to any authority either human or divine. The courage of such a venture certainly has no "rational point of view." The writer has not appreciated the meaning of the term "authority" or grasped in any definite way the steps of a rational investigation. It is difficult to analyze the processes of thought that start in such a fog.

It is perhaps needless to say that the author does not adhere to his announced principle and method. He constantly appeals to the authority of the Scriptures, and says (p. 11): "The Bible

contains grounds for absolute convictions regarding the fundamentals of Christianity." "One may gather from them [the Scriptures] a perfect code of morality." "They also tell us the truth regarding the spiritual condition and prospects of mankind." "Especially they inform us of the way of salvation through God's Son, our crucified Redeemer; accepting their teachings the believer can say: *I know whom I have believed.*" In discussing the doctrine of the Trinity, constant appeal is made to statements found in the Scriptures. The baptismal formula as given in Matthew is cited, with the remark: "In prescribing this formula, the Lord Jesus set forth Himself and the Holy Spirit as equally the objects of our faith and worship with the Father" (p. 259). Paul's statements are cited in proof of the omniscience, the volitional power, and the emotional sensibility of the Holy Spirit (pp. 263-266). And—most astounding fact of all in a work on "Rational Orthodoxy," that is to make no appeal to authority—the author actually supports his doctrine of the Trinity by an appeal to 1 John 5:7 A. V., a passage long ago exposed as spurious, omitted from the Revised Version, and rejected both by rationalists and believers in inerrancy.

It is true that the author disclaims doing what he actually does. He "recognizes the Scriptures as a reliable source of knowledge," but "ascribes the knowledge and his certainty of it to a right exercise of reason in considering the teachings of the Bible" (p. 12). He is utterly unconscious of the confusion of thought which is here revealed. And this leads us to say that one of the logical weaknesses of the book is its failure to grasp clearly and hold firmly a true conception of the thing which a believer really does in the exercise of his reason, when reading the Bible (p. 12). The office of reason in testing the proofs of the claims which the Bible makes is nowhere distinguished in any intelligent way from its office in interpreting and using the truth after its divine origin and authority have been established. The men who heard our Lord speak were bound to examine in a rational way His claims to be the Prophet of God. After those claims were proved by proper credentials, they had no right to appeal to their reason as against His sayings and to set His word aside.

Reason may ask: Is this message a revelation from God? But when adequate proof establishes the fact that it is the Word

God, then Reason must bow before a higher authority. One cannot accept the Bible as divine and claim the right to repudiate declarations as to matters of fact, such as the miracles of Jesus, or on matters of doctrine, such as the purpose and meaning of His death.

We give all honor to the evident genuineness and fervor of the faith of the unknown writer of this volume. But we feel that those who accept his premises will finally repudiate his conclusions. For an orthodoxy based on such precarious supports ventures to stand in the wisdom of men and not in the power of God.

WILLIAM H. MARQUESS.

LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF MISS.

LIBRARY
UNIVERSITY OF MISS.